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Desde a entrada em vigor, em 1994, da Convenção Quadro das Nações Unidas para as 
Alterações Climáticas (CQNUAC), proposta inicialmente na Conferência das Nações 
Unidas sobre Ambiente e Desenvolvimento (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), as respostas ao 
problema das alterações climáticas surgem associadas a dois grandes grupos de 
estratégias:   
• políticas e medidas de mitigação, que visam eliminar as causas antropogénicas 
das alterações climáticas através da redução da emissão de gases com efeito de 
estufa para a atmosfera, e 
• políticas e medidas de adaptação, que englobam quaisquer ajustamentos nos 
sistemas humanos e/ou naturais, em resposta a estímulos climáticos observados 
ou expectáveis, com o objectivo de minimizar os efeitos negativos ou explorar 
oportunidades benéficas.  
Contudo, uma estratégia alternativa para fazer face ao problema das alterações 
climáticas  tem vindo a ganhar terreno ao longo da última década: a Geoengenharia (ou 
Engenharia Climática), comummente definida como a “manipulação deliberada e em 
larga escala do ambiente planetário para combater as alterações climáticas 
antropogénicas” (The Royal Society 2009: 1). Embora o termo geoengenharia surja 
associado a um conjunto vasto de tecnologias - que comportam modos de actuação 
distintos e riscos e efeitos secundários diversos - duas grandes categorias de métodos 
procuram abarcar o conjunto de tecnologias até à data propostos: Remoção do Dióxido 
de Carbono e Gestão da Radiação Solar (CDR e SRM, respectivamente, nas siglas em 
inglês). Como o nome indica, os métodos de remoção do dióxido de carbono visam 
reduzir as concentrações de dióxido carbono na atmosfera e, deste modo, contribuir 
para o arrefecimento do sistema Terra-atmosfera através da redução da quantidade de 
radiação de longo comprimento de onda emitida pela superfície terrestre (radiação 
RESUMO 
i 
 
 térmica infravermelha) que é absorvida pela atmosfera. O segundo conjunto de 
métodos, gestão da radiação solar, visa igualmente alterar o balanço radiativo da Terra, 
mas através do aumento da quantidade de radiação solar incidente que é reflectida para 
o espaço - gerando assim um aumento do albedo planetário que concorre para uma 
diminuição da temperatura.  
Até recentemente, a comunidade científica olhava para estas propostas com cepticismo, 
se não mesmo com incredulidade. De facto, em 2007, o Painel Intergovernamental para 
as Alterações Climáticas (IPCC) ainda considerava que as soluções de geoengenharia - 
tais com a fertilização dos oceanos para promover a remoção de CO2 da atmosfera, ou a 
colocação de materiais na alta atmosfera de modo a reduzir a quantidade de radiação 
solar recebida pela superfície terrestre - eram em larga medida especulativas, 
comportando riscos e efeitos secundários desconhecidos. 
Porém, desde a publicação do Quarto Relatório de Avaliação do IPCC, a geoengenharia 
tem atraído uma atenção crescente no contexto das alterações climáticas, passando de 
um tópico discutido maioritariamente em ficção científica e artigos científicos esotéricos 
para o centro dos debates científico e político (Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013: 465). 
As tentativas fracassadas de redução das emissões globais de gases com efeito de estufa 
(Crutzen 2006) — um sintoma do que tem sido descrito como um “problema de inércia 
política” (Gardiner 2010: 286-287) — o apelo cada vez mais intenso para uma maior 
gestão planetária (Global Environmental Change Programmes 2001) e a tendência para 
valorizar as respostas às alterações climáticas de natureza transformacional em 
detrimento das de natureza incremental (New et al. 2010) são alguns dos factores que 
ajudam a explicar a razão pela qual o cepticismo e a desconfiança com que a 
geoengenharia foi inicialmente acolhida deram lugar a uma ponderação mais 
pragmática e séria dos seus recentes avanços científicos e tecnológicos.  
No entanto, o conhecimento científico associado aos processos de geoengenharia 
climática é bastante limitado, existindo inúmeras incertezas acerca dos impactos 
potenciais destas tecnologias nos sistemas humanos e naturais. O modo como os 
métodos de geoengenharia visam alterar forçamentos à escala planetária, a 
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 imprevisibilidade dos impactos das acções de geoengenharia nos diferentes subsistemas 
climáticos e as enormes incertezas associadas a estes métodos revelam uma mudança 
na natureza da acção humana que pressupõe uma ética, assente na responsabilidade e 
antecipação, capaz de fazer face à escala e complexidade das enormes tarefas 
tecnocientíficas envolvidas. De facto, antes de se considerar a possibilidade de embarcar 
em tão ambicioso projecto, um esforço considerável deverá ser realizado no sentido de 
escrutinar e aprofundar as implicações éticas e sociais da geoengenharia. 
Deste modo, o principal objectivo desta dissertação é o de contribuir para uma melhor 
compreensão das implicações éticas e sociais associadas às recentes propostas de 
geoengenharia e, com esse propósito, encontrar um ponto de vista adequado para 
responder às seguintes questões:  
• Porque razão é hoje a geoengenharia considerada uma resposta possível às 
alterações climáticas antropogénicas? 
• Que “imaginários” de ciência e tecnologia subjazem aos debates em torno da 
geoengenharia?  
• Quão plausíveis são as actuais propostas de geoengenharia climática?  
• Quais são as expectativas, os valores e os modos de construção de sentido 
contidos nas propostas de geoengenharia? 
• Que tipo de enquadramento ético poderá servir de base à análise das propostas 
de geoengenharia e apoiar os processos de tomada de decisão política?   
A dissertação está organizada em duas partes. A primeira parte inclui os capítulos de 1 a 
5. No primeiro capítulo são apresentados os objectivos e as questões que guiaram esta 
investigação, bem como alguns dos pressupostos e premissas iniciais. No segundo 
capítulo é descrita a abordagem metodológica e discutidas as opções que determinaram 
o conjunto de métodos de análise adoptados. O capítulo 3 inclui a descrição do 
problema em análise, uma breve apresentação dos principais métodos de 
geoengenharia propostos e a discussão acerca da relevância do estudo dos aspectos 
éticos e sociais associados a estas propostas. Os principais resultados desta investigação 
surgem sumariados no capítulo 4, organizado em torno das cinco questões que guiaram 
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 esta dissertação. Finalmente, no capítulo 5 são apresentadas as principais conclusões e 
linhas de investigação a explorar no futuro. 
A parte II da dissertação reúne o conjunto de artigos escritos no decorrer desta 
investigação. 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
  
Since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), responses to address climate change have fallen within two major groups of 
strategies, namely:  
• mitigation measures, which comprise all human interventions to reduce the 
anthropogenic forcing of the climate system, such as reducing greenhouse gas 
sources and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks, and  
• adaptation measures, which include any adjustments made to natural or human 
systems in response to actual or expected impacts of climate change, with the 
aim of moderating harm or exploiting beneficial opportunities. 
However, another strategy to limit the impacts and consequences of climate change has 
been gaining ground over the past decade: the idea of geoengineering, commonly 
defined as the “deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment to 
counteract anthropogenic climate change” (The Royal Society, 2009: 1). 
The self-assertive invasion of nature’s various domains, the scale and complexity of the 
technoscientific tasks involved, the unpredictable long-term impacts of geoengineering 
actions, and the huge uncertainties that these proposals raise point to a shift in the 
nature of human action that requires a commensurate ethics of foresight and 
responsibility.  
Through this dissertation I hope to offer a perspective from which the very nature of 
geoengineering proposals can be brought into question, so as to better focus on and 
deal with the fundamental issues that geoengineering proposals entail. Accordingly, the 
aim of this dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of the far-reaching 
ethical and social implications of these proposals and, to that end, find an adequate 
vantage point from which to address the following research questions:  
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 • Why is geoengineering becoming a part of the portfolio of response options to 
anthropogenic climate change? 
• What ‘imaginaries’ of science and technology underlie geoengineering debates? 
• How plausible are current geoengineering proposals? 
• What are the expectations, the embedded values, and the ways of making sense 
of a geoengineered world? 
• What kind of ethical framework can serve as a basis for assessing geoengineering 
proposals and inform policy responses to geoengineering governance? 
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"A risk management strategy for climate change will 
require integrating responses in mitigation with different 
time horizons, adaptation to an array of climate impacts, 
and even possible emergency responses such as 
‘geoengineering’ in the face of extreme climate impacts. In 
the face of potential extreme impacts, the ability to quickly 
offset warming could help limit some of the most extreme 
climate impacts although deploying these geoengineering 
systems could create many other risks" (IPCC, 2014b: 9). 
 
Since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), responses to address climate change have fallen within two major groups of 
strategies, namely:  
• mitigation measures, which comprise all human interventions to reduce the 
anthropogenic forcing of the climate system, such as reducing greenhouse gas 
sources and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks, and  
• adaptation measures, which include any adjustments made to natural or human 
systems in response to actual or expected impacts of climate change, with the 
aim of moderating harm or exploiting beneficial opportunities. 
However, another strategy to limit the impacts and consequences of climate change has 
been gaining ground over the past decade: the idea of geoengineering, commonly 
defined as the “deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment to 
counteract anthropogenic climate change” (The Royal Society, 2009: 1). 
Hitherto, the scientific community has regarded these proposals with scepticism, if not 
outright disbelief (Cicerone, 2006; Wolpert, 2008; Fleming, 2010). Indeed, in 2007 the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) still considered that 
“geo-engineering options, such as ocean fertilisation to remove CO2 directly from the 
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 atmosphere, or blocking sunlight by bringing material into the upper atmosphere, 
remain largely speculative and unproven, and with the risk of unknown side-effects” 
(IPCC, 2007: 15, emphasis added).  
Since the publication of the AR4, geoengineering has attracted increasing attention as a 
means to address climate change, having been "transformed from a topic discussed 
largely in science fiction and esoteric scientific papers into mainstream scientific and 
policy debate" (Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013: 465). The “grossly unsuccessful” 
efforts to lower carbon dioxide emissions (Crutzen, 2006) — a symptom of what has 
been described as a “problem of political inertia” (Gardiner, 2010: 286-287) — the 
resonant call for greater planetary management and Earth-system control (Global 
Environmental Change Programmes, 2001), and the tendency to favour transformational 
rather than incremental responses to climate change (New et al., 2010) are all factors 
that may help explain why the scepticism and suspicion with which geoengineering was 
initially greeted is now giving way to a more pragmatic and serious consideration of its 
latest scientific and technological breakthroughs and the challenges ahead.  
However, the understanding of the physical science basis of geoengineering is still 
limited, and there are still major uncertainties concerning the impacts these 
technologies might have on human and natural systems. The self-assertive invasion of 
nature’s various domains, the scale and complexity of the technoscientific tasks 
involved, the unpredictable long-term impacts of geoengineering actions, and the huge 
uncertainties that these proposals raise point to a shift in the nature of human action 
that requires a commensurate ethics of foresight and responsibility. If there is a decision 
to embark on such an ambitious project, a major effort should be made to scrutinise and 
gain a deeper understanding of the social and ethical implications of geoengineering. 
1.1 Aim and research questions 
In the prologue to her book The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt (1958) refers to the 
launch of the first artificial satellite in 1957 and recalls the line carved on the funeral 
obelisk of the Russian scientist Konstantin E. Tsiolkovsky  ̶ “Mankind will not remain 
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 bound to the earth forever”  ̶  to illustrate the human capacity for making new 
beginnings and to reflect about the meaning of this first "step toward escape from men's 
imprisonment to the earth" (Idem: 1). For Arendt, the launch of Sputnik 1 is fraught with 
both historical and symbolic significance. It represents the first step towards realising 
the hubristic desire of "liberating" us from Earth - the very quintessence of the human 
condition. The same desire, Arendt believes, manifested in the attempt to create life in 
the test tube, and thus "cutting the last tie through which even man belongs among the 
children of nature" (Idem: 2). 
This desire long precedes our knowledge, showing “that men everywhere are by no 
means slow to catch up and adjust to scientific discoveries and technical developments 
(...) Here, as in other respects, science has realized and affirmed what men anticipated in 
dreams that were neither wild nor idle” (Idem Ibidem). With this passage Arendt not 
only makes the case for the need to resist a deterministic view of the autonomy of 
science and technology, but also paves the way to a central discussion in (of) The Human 
Condition: the Earth alienation underlying the whole development of natural science in 
the modern age. 
"This future man, whom the scientists tell us they will produce in no more 
than a hundred years, seems to be possessed by a rebellion against human 
existence as it has been given, a free gift from nowhere (secularly 
speaking), which he wishes to exchange, as it were, for something he has 
made himself. There is no reason to doubt our abilities to accomplish such 
an exchange, just as there is no reason to doubt our present ability to 
destroy all organic life on earth. The question is only whether we wish to 
use our new scientific and technical knowledge in this direction, and this 
question cannot be decided by scientific means; it is a political question of 
the first order and therefore can hardly be left to the decision of 
professional scientists or professional politicians" (Idem: 2-3). 
It is with this question in mind - whether we wish to use our new scientific and technical 
knowledge in this direction - that I propose to examine current proposals to intentionally 
engineer the Earth’s climate. Motivated by a conviction that we need to move beyond 
the rhetoric of risk, fear, and control, which provides justification to geoengineering 
proposals within a "risk management strategy for climate change" (IPCC, op. cit), I take 
this question as the fundamental question that needs to be answered before we decide 
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 whether geoengineering should indeed be considered as a possible emergency response 
to climate change. Moreover, by recognising that this fundamental question (and 
concomitant ones concerning geoengineering research, governance and deployment)  is 
a political question of the first order, that cannot be decided by scientific means or left 
to the decision of professional scientists or professional politicians, I take as the point of 
departure for the present research the need to open up the discussion around 
geoengineering and to subject it to greater critical scrutiny. Thus, through this 
dissertation I hope to offer a perspective from which the very nature of geoengineering 
proposals can be brought into question, so as to better focus on and deal with the 
fundamental issues that geoengineering proposals entail. Accordingly, the aim of this 
dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of the far-reaching ethical and 
social implications of these proposals and, to that end, find an adequate vantage point 
from which to address the following research questions:  
• Why is geoengineering becoming a part of the portfolio of response options to 
anthropogenic climate change? 
• What ‘imaginaries’ of science and technology underlie geoengineering debates? 
• How plausible are current geoengineering proposals? 
• What are the expectations, the embedded values, and the ways of making sense 
of a geoengineered world? 
• What kind of ethical framework can serve as a basis for assessing geoengineering 
proposals and inform policy responses to geoengineering governance? 
The formulation of these questions is intended to highlight the need to unlock the 
geoengineering debate from the path-dependent questions that, almost invariably, 
provide justification for more and more research. Thus, it takes the standpoint that 
scientific enterprise is not merely a matter of epistemic permissibility, but also of moral 
permissibility. An enterprise that entails methodological choices of perspective − "What 
is to be studied, by what means, for what purpose?" (Strand, 2002: 172) −, which cannot 
be excused from moral considerations and cannot be thought of as something entirely 
outside the realm of action. 
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 "We have to choose what we want to know, imposing a context; research 
per se often irreversibly changes the world through its invention of 
technology; and the course of this development is not inevitable, but has a 
historical character" (Idem Ibidem). 
Therefore, these research questions demarcate themselves from the technically feasible 
and cost-effective responses that, within a utilitarian framework, have been advanced in 
the geoengineering debate, suggesting that only within the development of a systematic 
discourse, involving ethics − as accompanying research (‘Begleitforschung’)  (Hronszky, 
2005) − can a better understanding of the ethical and social implications of 
geoengineering be achieved. 
 
1.2 Dissertation outline and content 
This dissertation is organised in two parts. Part I comprises this introductory chapter and 
chapters 2 to 5. Chapter 2 briefly describes how the literature survey was carried out 
and the methodological approach taken. It introduces the main features and 
assumptions of discourse analysis within the general field of social constructivism and 
presents the relevance of discourse analysis to address the research questions identified 
in Chapter 1.  Chapter 3 outlines the background of this research and defines the 
problem under analysis. In doing so, it highlights the uncertainties and controversies 
surrounding geoengineering and the significance of this research. Chapter 4 presents a 
brief summary of each paper and discusses the main findings of this dissertation. Finally, 
chapter 5 concludes with a summary of open questions and areas for further research. 
Part II of the dissertation includes all the articles published in peer-reviewed journals, as 
well as a chapter for publication in the book "Science, Philosophy and Sustainability: The 
End of the Cartesian Dream". 
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"Although discourse analysis can be applied to all areas 
of research, it cannot be used with all kinds of 
theoretical framework. Crucially, it is not to be used as 
a method of analysis detached from its theoretical and 
methodological foundations. (...)  In discourse analysis, 
theory and method are intertwined and researchers 
must accept the basic philosophical premises in order 
to use discourse analysis as their method of empirical 
study" (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 3-4). 
In this chapter I present the methods used to conduct this dissertation. I begin with a 
brief description of the primary sources of information and the literature survey 
conducted in the initial stages of the project. This section is followed by a description 
and justification of the methods of discourse analysis used to address the research 
questions identified in the previous chapter. 
2.1 Literature survey and sources of information 
Given the exploratory nature of my research questions, I began this research by carrying 
out an extensive literature survey in order to gain a better understanding of the current 
debates on geoengineering (PAPER I). The initial literature survey was carried out from 
September 2010 to January 2011 using multiple databases: Thomson's Web of Science, 
Scopus (Elsevier), JSToR, Academic Search (Ebsco), and Ingentaconnect. The search was 
performed using the following combination of terms "geoengineering" OR "climate 
engineering" OR "solar radiation management" OR "carbon dioxide removal" in the title, 
abstract or keywords of the article. Articles published in all years were considered. 
References cited in the retrieved publications were also reviewed. Using Google Scholar 
and further web engines the literature survey was finally extended to include grey 
literature, media news, films, blog comments, and all kinds of visual representations of 
geoengineering.  
2. METHODOLOGY 
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 Over the past three years the field of geoengineering has grown dramatically, and there 
is an accelerating trend in the number of media and scientific publications on this topic 
(Belter and Seidel, 2013), therefore the collection and review of relevant 
documentation was an on-going process and continued throughout the later stages of 
the project. Accordingly, and as illustrated by the attempt to take into consideration the 
recent assessment of geoengineering solutions conducted by the IPCC (cf. Chapter 3 and 
Paper VI), the literature review was revisited at several points of this research  in order 
to keep the dissertation continuously updated and supplemented with the latest 
research findings in the field of geoengineering. 
At the same time as this information was being gathered and analysed, I developed a 
website on geoengineering aimed to facilitate further research on this topic, as well as 
to provide a space for reflection and debate on the social and ethical implications of 
geoengineering1. A short movie produced in the context of the project Technolife2 was 
included in the website in order to engage the public at large in the online debate on 
geoengineering. Through three fictional situations, the movie presents the main aspects 
of geoengineering technologies and raises important questions concerning: 
• the uncertainties and experimental nature of geoengineering proposals; 
• the conditions under which geoengineering might be deployed; 
• the policy issues and governance of geoengineering technologies. 
The website went online in December 2012 and has since been updated periodically 
with relevant information on this topic. The questionnaire and online debate provided 
empirical material for this research and will constitute the basis of further analysis 
(Chapter 5). 
1 https://sites.google.com/site/geoengineeringdebate/. 
2 The TECHNOLIFE project sought to develop new frameworks for the early identification,  
characterization, and deliberation upon ethical issues arising from a broad range of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), including their convergence with other  scientific and technological 
fields (such as bio-nano). Providing multi-layered descriptions  and normative analyses through inter-and 
trans-disciplinary research, the project worked to  improve existing conceptual frameworks and 
procedures for implementing and representing  the social needs and interests of citizens at early stages of 
policy-making and research. For more information on the Technolife Projects see: http://technolife.no/.  
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 This study applies discourse analysis methods (narrative analysis and visual narrative 
analysis) to address the complexity of the broader scientific, political, and social context 
in which the geoengineering debate is taking place. In what follows, I briefly introduce 
the main theoretical assumptions of discourse analysis, thus providing the analytical 
framework which informed the methodological approach used to address the research 
questions presented in Chapter 1. Finally, I describe the two approaches to discourse 
analysis used in this dissertation and discuss their relevance to examine the plausibility 
of geoengineering, its objects of research, and the sociotechnical imaginaries that 
underpin current visions of a geoengineered world. 
2.2 Science is discourse and fiction 
In Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts,  Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar (1986) traced the construction of scientific facts by examining the daily 
activities carried out in one particular neuroendocrinology laboratory3.  The focus of 
their analysis was the social processes involved in the establishment of thyrotropin 
releasing factor (Hormone) as a "scientific fact"; an analysis motivated by their concern 
"with the social construction of scientific knowledge in so far as this draws attention to 
the process by which scientists make sense of their observations"4. 
Through the use of ethnographic-based discourse analysis Latour and Woolgar examined 
the "literary inscriptions"5 used and produced by the scientists and technicians of the 
laboratory - "a strange tribe who spend the greatest part of their day coding, marking, 
altering, correcting, reading, and writing"6 - to illuminate the roles of inscription 
3 Laboratory Life is the product of the fieldwork conducted between October 1975 and August 1977 by 
Bruno Latour in the neuroendocrinology research laboratory of Roger Guillemin (who was later awarded 
the Nobel Prize) at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in San Diego, California. The book was published 
in 1979 in co-authorship with the British sociologist Steve Woolgar. 
4 Idem: 32. 
5 Idem: 45. 
6 Idem: 49. 
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 devices7, discipline-scientific research procedures, and rhetorical strategies in the 
construction of "scientific facts". 
By emphasising the processes whereby scientific facts are constructed as "literary 
inscriptions" and "statements" with no referent to an "independent existence out there" 
Latour and Woolgar argued that scientific work is largely a rhetorical and linguistic 
activity that involves both persuasion and making of meaning; a form of "literary 
production" conducted by "writers and readers in the business of being convinced and 
convincing others"8 and which "comprises the construction and sustenance of fictional 
accounts9 which are sometimes transformed into stabilised objects".  
In making this case, Latour and Woolgar stressed the importance of refusing important 
distinctions commonly adopted both by historians and analysts of science: "the 
distinction between social and technical issues"; "the distinction of nature between facts 
and artefacts"; "the a priori distinction between commonsense and scientific reasoning"; 
"and even the distinction between 'thought' and craftwork needed to be avoided as an 
explanatory resource because it appeared to be the consequence of scientific work in 
the laboratory"10.  
By translating scientists' practice and experiments into discursive techniques Latour and 
Woolgar not only contributed to contemporary efforts in the humanities and social 
sciences to broaden the application of discourse analysis approaches to the study of 
scientific knowledge, but also brought to light the intricate and frequently ambiguous 
relation between discourse and praxis. 
7 According to the authors "an inscription device is any item of apparatus or particular configuration of 
such items which can transform a material substance into a figure or diagram which is directly usable by 
one of the members of the office space" (Idem: 51). 
8 Idem: 88. 
9 In their attempt "towards making clear the link between science and literature" Latour and Woolgar 
incorporate a degree of reflexivity into their own analysis, reminding  the reader that all texts are stories, 
and "that observers of scientific activity are engaged in methods which are essentially similar to those of 
the practioners which they study" (Idem: 30). 
10 Idem: 253. 
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 It is in line with this notion of science, as discourse and fiction, that I suggest the 
relevance of adopting a "discursive framework" to critically analyse the documents and 
materials collected during the first stage of my research. All these documents and 
materials, despite their varied nature, are here considered as "literary inscriptions" of 
geoengineering, inasmuch as they seem to inform the diversity of framings of 
geoengineering and the way the field of geoengineering science is being defined and 
redefined.   
As discussed in the following sections, the approaches to discourse analysis applied in 
this research were selected for their close attention to rhetorical forms of scientific 
argumentation. These approaches form the basis of my attempt to critically examine the 
"literary inscriptions" of geoengineering, i.e. the persuasive tools of a science-in-the-
making that seems to have replaced the "laboratory ideal" by the "field ideal of 
experimentation" (Schwarz and Krohn, 2011), with all the consequences that this 
implies. 
2.3 Discourse analysis 
"Discourse has a quite specific meaning. It refers to 
groups of statements which structure the way a 
thing is thought, and the way we act on the basis of 
that thinking. In other words, discourse is a 
particular knowledge about the world which shapes 
how the world  is understood and how things are 
done in it" (Rose, 2001: 142). 
Discourse analysis "focuses on talk and texts as social practices and on the resources 
that are drawn on to enable those practices" (Potter, 1996: 129). It encompasses a wide 
range of theoretical orientations and methodological approaches (Stubbs, 1983). As 
pointed out by Wood and Kroger, discourse analysis "is not only about method; it is also 
a perspective on the nature of language and its relationship to the central issues of the 
social science" (Wood and Kroger, 2000: x). Accordingly, discourse analysis can be seen 
as a set of collection of approaches to discourse that entail not only practices of data 
collection and analysis, but also a set of theoretical assumptions and key premises about 
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 how entities such as ‘language’ and ‘the subject’ are to be understood (Jorgensen and 
Phillips, 2002; Potter, 1996). 
The general philosophical assumptions that underpin most discourse analytical 
approaches are found in social constructionism and were summarised by Gergen as 
follows: 
"The terms by which we account for the world and ourselves are 
not dictated by the stipulated objects of such accounts (...) The 
terms and forms by which we achieve understanding of the world 
and ourselves are social artifacts, products of historically and 
culturally situated interchanges among people (...) The degree to 
which a given account of world or self is sustained across time is not 
dependent on the objective validity of the account but on the 
vicissitudes of social process (...) Language derives its significance in 
human affairs from the way in which it functions within patterns of 
relationship (...) To appraise existing forms of discourse is to 
evaluate patterns of cultural life; such evaluations give voice to 
other cultural enclaves" (Gergen, 1994: 49-53). 
In addition to these general social constructionist assumptions, all discourse analytical 
approaches share the following key premises with respect to their views of language and 
the subject (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 12): 
• Language is not a reflection of a pre-existing reality. 
• Language is structured in patterns or discourses – there is not just one general 
system of meaning as in Saussurian structuralism but a series of systems or 
discourses, whereby meanings change from discourse to discourse. 
• These discursive patterns are maintained and transformed in discursive 
practices. 
• The maintenance and transformation of the patterns should therefore be 
explored through analysis of the specific contexts in which language is in action. 
One form of discourse analysis that assumes particular significance in the context of this 
research is narrative analysis. Narrative analysis has been approached from many 
different angles across the social sciences and, depending on disciplinary priorities and 
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 research foci, a variety of analytical perspectives and methodologies have been 
proposed (Thornborrow, 2012: 51).  
In this dissertation I draw upon the ideas of Rouse, who claimed that scientific research 
is intelligible only in the context of a narrative, and therefore narrative should occupy a 
fundamental place within our understanding of the sciences. Four crucial considerations 
inform Rouse's account of the narrative dimension of scientific practice:  
i) first, the epistemic importance of narrative should not be confined to a specific 
group of disciplines, domains of inquiry, or objects of knowledge. Narrative 
understanding is characteristic of any scientific practice;  
ii) second, more important than the form in which the results of investigation are 
written, is the ways in which the practices of scientific research and the resultant 
knowledge acquire their intelligibility and significance from being situated within 
narratives;  
iii) third, the intelligibility of action and of the things we encounter or use in acting 
depends on their already belonging to a field of possible narratives;  
iv) and lastly, the epistemic significance of narrative should not be seen in terms of 
completed narratives. In the narrative fields of scientific practice there is no 
unitary authorial point of view, but multiple authors that engage in an ongoing 
struggle to determine the configuration of the narrative within which they are all 
situated. Because current scientific research does not simply focus on what will 
happen next, but continually reconfigures its own past, scientific understanding 
must be situated within narratives in continual re-construction.  
According to Rouse these four considerations can be summarized in a single claim: "the 
intelligibility, significance, and justification of science knowledges stem from their 
already belonging to continually reconstructed narrative contexts supplied by the 
ongoing practices of scientific research" (Rouse, 1996: 161). 
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 2.3.1 Narrative analysis 
"If narratives are tools and if the crafting and 
sharing of stories involve morals, then a discussion 
of ethics is a necessary component of narrative 
inquiry" (Adams, 2008: 177). 
Rouse's account of the narrative dimension of scientific practice offers a privileged 
perspective from which to address my research questions. Indeed, one possible way of 
looking at the geoengineering issue and the scalar dislocations it introduces into modern 
systems of experience and understanding is to explore the social and ethical implications 
of geoengineering by adopting expanded notions of narrative, which account for 
particular ways of rendering the world in both visual and verbal forms.   
By contending that reasoning can be discovered in all sorts of symbolic actions 
(non-discursive as well as discursive) Walter Fisher introduced the concept of narrative 
rationality, suggesting that its application to specific stories11 may further clarify its 
nature and value (Fisher, 1987; Fisher, 1985). 
"The perspective of narrative rationality does not exclude the long tradition 
of rhetorical logic; it is a rhetorical logic itself. Other rhetorical logics, 
however, have dwelt on argument, argumentative genres, and specific 
standards of argumentative assessment. The perspective of narrative 
rationality focuses on all forms of human communication as carriers of good 
reasons and on a system of evaluation that incorporates the available 
standards of argumentative assessment but offers additional considerations 
(...) the concept of narrative rationality offers systematic principles, 
procedures, and criteria for assessing elements of discourse that provide 
warrants for believing or acting in particular ways" (Fisher, 1987: 49). 
It is in line with these ideas that I propose to analyse the narratives of geoengineering. 
Within the framework of Fisher’s “narrative paradigm”, I argue that both the descriptive 
and explanatory elements of geoengineering narratives need to be examined in order to 
better understand the role specific structures play in satisfying the demands of 
11 Although recognizing that technical communities have their own conceptions and criteria for judging 
the rationality of communication, Fisher considered that ‘the work even of scientists is inspired by stories, 
hence their discourse can be interpreted usefully from the narrative perspective’ Fisher WR. (1984) 
Narration as human communication paradigm: The case of public moral argument. Communication 
Monographs 51: 1-22. 
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 probability and fidelity of geoengineering proposals. The descriptive and explanatory 
elements of a narrative point toward the two different kinds of narrative research 
described by Polkinghorne: the descriptive narrative research aims “to render the 
narrative accounts already in place which are used by individuals or groups as their 
means for ordering and making temporal events meaningful"; the explanatory narrative 
research seeks "to construct a narrative account explaining 'why' a situation or event 
involving human actions has happened” (Polkinghorne, 1988: 161). I expect that the first 
kind of narrative research may help to disentangle the various (conflicting?) narrative 
schemes that lie underneath the representations of geoengineering – narrative schemes 
that operate not only in the realm of rationality, knowledge, and facts, but also in the 
realm of subjectivity, values, imagination, and fiction. However, it is only within an 
explanatory narrative approach that I will be able to address the fundamental question 
of why geoengineering is gaining more serious consideration and becoming an 
increasingly plausible solution to tackle climate change. Because explanatory narrative 
research is retrospective and retrodictive, adopting this kind of approach does not seem 
an easy task when considering the ongoing debates on geoengineering. Nonetheless, 
because an analogy can be made with prior, already-told stories – of which "the 
pathological history of weather and climate modification" is just one example (Fleming, 
2010) –, I believe this task is not only possible, but also an imperative: 
"I can only answer the question “What am I to do?” if I can answer the prior 
question “Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?” We enter human 
society, that is, with one or more imputed characters — roles into which we 
have been drafted — and we have to learn what they are in order to be able 
to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are 
apt to be construed" (MacIntyre, 1984: 216). 
It is important, however, to recognise the resistance put up by science to this kind of 
investigation. In fact, explanatory narrative research is not typically used in the sciences, 
partly because “narrative truth is distinguished from other kinds of formal science truths 
by its emphasis on the life-like, intelligible and plausible story. Stories typically reflect a 
coherence (as opposed to correspondence) theory of truth in that the narrator strives 
for narrative probability — a story that makes sense; narrative fidelity — a story 
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 consistent with past experiences or other stories; and aesthetic finality — a story with 
satisfactory closure and representation appeal” (Sandelowski, 1991: 164-165). 
In the context of this discussion, which points to some of the presuppositions that 
underpin Fisher’s narrative paradigm (Fisher, 1987: 64-65; Fisher, 1984), it is important 
to emphasise the difference between the elements of narrative theory, a theoretical 
distinction stressed by structuralists who considered that each narrative has two parts: a 
story (what is depicted in a narrative - the content) and the discourse (how it is depicted 
- the expression). According to Chatman (1978: 19-22), the story consists of the content 
or chain of events (actions and happenings) and the existents (characters and items of 
setting), while the discourse refers to the means by which the content is communicated, 
thus comprising two subcomponents: the narrative form itself (the structure of narrative 
transmission) and its manifestation (its appearance in a specific materializing medium). 
In order to capture all elements of the communicative situation, Chatman reminds us 
that narrative is a semiotic structure, which presupposes a form and a substance of 
expression and a form and a substance of content (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 - Elements of narrative theory (Adapted from Chatman, 1978, p. 29). 
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 2.3.2 Visual Narrative Analysis 
"(...) if images, as we claim, do not merely illustrate 
theoretical views, but are means of arriving at and 
embodying such views, then a history of science 
limited to theoretical and textual pronouncements 
misses part of the action" (Cambrosio et al., 2005: 
190). 
The universe of geoengineering is filled with all sorts of imageries. These imageries seem 
to fill the "visual science continuum" that has at one extreme the set of figures that 
convey data and, at the other, scientific illustrations, i.e. “representations of how 
something might or could be” (Ottino, 2003: 474). They are all part of the 
geoengineering story, revealing facts, knowledge, values, fears, desires, promises, 
anxieties, incredulity, about not only the idea of deliberately manipulating Earth’s 
climate to offset anthropogenic climate change, but also, and above all, what we know 
about the world and how we make sense of our place in it.  
Against this background, I suggest the relevance of examining the visual representations 
of geoengineering in order to understand how they use a narrative way of structuring 
thought to make sense of a geoengineered world. Therefore, I also adopt a visual 
narrative approach to interpret and assess the sense-making structures of a set of 
pictorial narratives of geoengineering, as well as to identify the particular instance of 
these narratives that provide (or not) a reliable, trustworthy, and desirable guide to 
thought and action. 
The rationale behind this approach is twofold. First, by acknowledging that the visual 
modes of representation (that are integral to many kinds of thinking) function as a 
powerful method of meaning making, and that pictorial expressions are not qualitatively 
different from verbal expressions (Barbatsis, 2005), it seems opportune to draw 
attention to the concepts of “narrative rationality” (Fisher, 1987; Fisher, 1985) and 
“imag[in]ing” (Ruivenkamp and Rip, 2011) in order to explore the way geoengineering 
images convey plausible, or implausible, arguments about current proposals to 
intentionally modify the global climate and how a geoengineered world could be. The 
second assumption underlying this approach is that the pictorial representations of 
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 geoengineering can also provide valuable insights into its objects of research, an issue 
that has not received a great deal of attention but seems particularly relevant when 
considering the social and ethical implications of geoengineering proposals. 
Accordingly, and based on the conceptual framework proposed by Pauwels for the 
analysis of visual representations in science (Pauwels, 2006), I will attempt to 
understand how particular images of geoengineering work to persuade, and how they 
produce their effects of "truth".  By taking into consideration the “diversity that exists 
with regard to types of translation processes and actors in the production cycle, as well 
as the different purposes and intents of representations and specific contexts of use” 
(Idem: 4), Pauwels' framework provides a rationale to address the complex process of 
meaning-making that has an “impact on what can be known and how, on what is 
revealed or obscured, and on what is included or excluded” (Idem: 5). In order to 
highlight processes of persuasion that may otherwise be difficult to detect I will focus 
my analysis on the broad amplitude of intended or unintended choices that may 
influence visual representation. This broad amplitude of the representational space, in 
what Pauwels refers to as the “visual representational latitude”, is determined by the 
nature of the problem being depicted (type of referent), by the intentional and 
unintentional choices of the author (the context of production), and also by the 
characteristics of the audience in relation to a particular visual representation (the 
context of use).  
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What is climate geoengineering? Why has it recently emerged as a topic of interest and 
discussion within the climate science community? Why is there a need to consider the 
social and ethical implications of geoengineering proposals? In this section I will address 
these three questions in order to present the background and relevance of this research.  
3.1. Why Geoengineering? 
The carbon dioxide theory of climate change and the global warming forecast are not 
new issues. This is aptly captured in the book Historical Perspectives on Climate Change, 
in which James Fleming examines the historical roots of global climate change as a field 
of inquiry, from the Enlightenment to the late twentieth century, to provide an 
insightful, reflexive account of the paths through which we have arrived at our current 
state of knowledge and "apprehension"12 of climate change (1998). By looking back to 
the work of scientists such as Joseph Fourier, John Tyndall, Svante Arrhenius, T. C. 
Chamberlin, Ellsworth Huntington, G. S. Callendar, Gilbert Plass, Hans Suess, and Roger 
Revelle he explores the historical relationships among the numerous and quite varied 
theories about climatic change and concludes that "the modern, scientific description of 
weather and climate has been gradually established since about the mid-nineteenth 
century" (Idem: 136).  
Although our understanding of the complex processes that affect both the Earth's 
energy balance and the energy flows within the global climate system has increased 
progressively and significantly over the past two centuries, and we know a good deal 
more than ever before about the anthropogenic greenhouse effect and its influence on 
12 Fleming uses the term "apprehension" in its threefold sense: (1) awareness or understanding, (2) 
anticipation or dread, and (3) intervention (Idem: 5). 
3.  BACKGROUND 
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 global climate change, the very latest scientific evidence on climate change provides 
little cause for optimism. 
According to the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC, 2013b) the concentrations of the atmospheric greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) have increased by 
about 40%, 150%, and 20%, 
respectively, since the beginning of 
the Industrial Era13 as a result of 
anthropogenic emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion, agriculture, and 
land-use changes (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Atmospheric CO2, CH4, and N2O concentrations history over the industrial era determined from 
air enclosed in ice cores and firn air (colour symbols) and from direct atmospheric measurements (blue 
lines, measurements from the Cape Grim observatory) (MacFarling Meure et al., 2006) (Source: Ciais et al., 
2013). 
 
13 The tropospheric mixing ratio of CO2 has increased globally from 278 ppm in 1750 to 390.5 ppm in 2011. 
During the same time interval, CH4 increased  from 722 ppb to 1803 ppb, and N2O from 271 ppb to 324.2 
ppb. 
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 The current atmospheric concentration of these GHG substantially exceed the highest 
concentrations recorded in ice cores during the past 800,000 years and their mean rates 
of increase over the past century are unprecedented with respect to the ‘highest 
resolution’ ice core records of the last 22,000 years (IPCC, 2013c).  
This increase is the main driving cause of climate change. By reducing the flux of 
outgoing long-wave radiation from the Earth to space (trapping of long-wave radiation),  
the increasing atmospheric concentration of these (CO2, CH4, and N2O) and other GHGs 
(e.g. halocarbons, O3) has been changing the balance between the incoming solar 
radiation and the outgoing infrared radiation emitted by the Earth. As recently observed 
changes in the climate system indicate, these perturbations in the radiative energy 
budget of the Earth's climate system - often described in terms of Radiative Forcing 
(RF)14 -  can have a profound influence on the Earth's climate and, consequently, on the 
Earth system as a whole.  
As seen in Figure 3, the total anthropogenic RF for 2011 (3.33 W m–2) relative to 1750 
(1.13 W m–2) is 2.29 W m–2.15 Altogether the above-mentioned three GHGs (CO2, CH4, 
and N2O) amount to 80% of the total radiative forcing (RF) from well-mixed greenhouse 
gases (WMGHGs)16. Emissions of CO2 have made the largest contribution to the 
14 The concept of radiative forcing provides a way to quantify the net change in the energy balance of the 
Earth system at the top of the atmosphere as a result of an externally imposed change. It is usually 
expressed in watts per square meter (W m–2) averaged over a particular period of time. For a wide range of 
forcings there is a nearly linear relationship between the RF and the resulting equilibrium response of 
global mean surface temperatures (GMST) as simulated in general circulation models (National Research 
Council 2005), making it valuable for comparing the influence on GMST of most individual agents affecting 
the Earth’s radiation balance. 
15 This estimate is 43% higher than that reported in AR4 for the year 2005. This difference is primarily due 
to the continued growth in most GHGs concentrations (positive RF), but also to improved estimates of RF 
by aerosols, which indicate a weaker net cooling effect (negative RF) Myhre G, D. Shindell, F.-M. Bréon, W. 
Collins, J. Fuglestvedt, J. Huang, D. Koch, J.-F. Lamarque, D. Lee, B. Mendoza, T. Nakajima, A. Robock, G. 
Stephens, T. Takemura and H. Zhang. (2013) Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forcing. In: Stocker TF, 
D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (ed) 
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, 
USA: Cambridge University Press, 659-740. 
16 Well-mixed greenhouse gases (WMGHGs) are those GHGs "that are sufficiently mixed throughout the 
troposphere that concentration measurements from a few remote surface sites can characterize the 
climate-relevant atmospheric burden; although these gases may still have local variation near sources and 
sinks and even small hemispheric gradients. Global forcing per unit emission and emission metrics for 
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 increased anthropogenic RF, accounting for about 56% (1.68 W m–2) of the total RF of 
WMGHGs from 1750 to present time. 
 
Figure 3 - Radiative forcing estimates in 2011 relative to 1750 and aggregated uncertainties for the main 
drivers of climate change. Values are global average radiative forcing (RF), partitioned according to the 
emitted compounds or processes that result in a combination of drivers. The best estimates of the net 
radiative forcing are shown as black diamonds with corresponding uncertainty intervals; the numerical 
values are provided on the right of the figure, together with the confidence level in the net forcing (VH – 
very high, H – high, M – medium, L – low, VL – very low). Albedo forcing due to black carbon on snow and 
ice is included in the black carbon aerosol bar. Small forcings due to contrails (0.05 W m–2, including 
contrail induced cirrus), and HFCs, PFCs and SF6 (total 0.03 W m–2) are not shown. Concentration-based 
RFs for gases can be obtained by summing the like-coloured bars. Volcanic forcing is not included as its 
episodic nature makes is difficult to compare to other forcing mechanisms. Total anthropogenic radiative 
forcing is provided for three different years relative to 1750 (IPCC, 2013c: 14). 
these gases thus do not depend on the geographic location of the emission, and forcing calculations can 
assume even horizontal distributions. These gases, or a subset of them, have sometimes been referred to 
as ‘long-lived greenhouse gases’ as they are well mixed because their atmospheric lifetimes are much 
greater than the time scale of a few years for atmospheric mixing, but the physical property that causes 
the aforementioned common characteristics is more directly associated with their mixing within the 
atmosphere. WMGHGs include CO2, N2O, CH4, SF6, and many halogenated species" Ibid. 
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 Recent observations have also strengthened the evidence that anthropogenic increases 
in the WMGHGs have substantially enhanced the greenhouse effect and the resulting 
forcing continues to increase. As seen in Figure 4(b) the forcing from CO2 and other 
WMGHGs has increased significantly faster since the 1960s and evidence has grown 
since the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the IPCC that the widespread changes 
observed in the climate system in the latter half of the last century (Figure 5) are 
primarily due to the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other 
anthropogenic forcings together. These results strengthen the conclusion that human 
activity is the dominant cause of observed warming since the mid-20th century. 
  
Figure 4 - (a) Radiative forcing (RF) from the major WMGHGs and groups of halocarbons from 1850 to 
2011. (b) Rate of change in forcing from the major WMGHGs and groups of halocarbons from 1850 to 
2011 (Source: Myhre, 2013: 677). 
During 2002–2011, atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased at a rate of 1.9 to 2.1 
ppm yr–1. This decadal rate of increase is higher than those observed during any 
previous decade since direct atmospheric concentration measurements began in 1958 
(Ciais et al., 2013: 467).  
Current concentration of GHGs have already contributed to an increase of the Global 
Mean Surface Temperature (GMST) of 0.85°C [0.65 to 1.06]°C over the period 1880-
2012. Despite the cooling effect of the  Mt. Pinatubo volcanic eruption in 1991, the past 
three decades have been among the warmest since 1860. The observed increase in 
GMST from 1951 to 2010 is approximately 0.6°C to 0.7°C and it is extremely  
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Figure 5- Overview of some of the main observed climate change indicators as listed in AR5 (cf. footnote 17 for a description of the terms in italic, as used in the IPCC's AR5 to indicate the 
assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result. See Chapter 10 and Table 10.1 for further details).  
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 likely17 that the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations has 
been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century18.  
Furthermore, it is now clear that some degree of climate change is already inevitable as 
the impacts over the next decades have been determined by past and present 
emissions. Indeed, even if we do not take into account the problem of political and 
socio-economic inertia that led us to the current situation, and consider the implausible 
"zero emissions" scenario where we were to halt all human-induced emissions today 
(also termed "geophysical warming commitment"), the warming commitment19 by the 
end of this century would still be an additional 0.7°C above pre-industrial levels (Hare 
and Meinshausen, 2006). This inevitable delay between cutting emission of GHGs and 
the point at which anthropogenic climate change will cease is mainly due to the large 
ocean inertia, slow processes in the cryosphere and land surfaces, and the long lifetime 
of many greenhouse gases (primarily CO2).  
17 All three IPCC Working Groups in the AR5 have agreed to use two metrics for communicating the degree 
of certainty in key findings: (i) Confidence in the validity of a finding based on the type, amount, quality, 
and consistency of evidence (e.g., data, mechanistic understanding, theory, models, expert judgment) and 
the degree of agreement. Confidence is expressed qualitatively (from very low to very high). (ii) Quantified 
measures of uncertainty in a finding expressed probabilistically (based on statistical analysis of 
observations or model results, or expert judgement): Virtually certain 99–100% probability, Very likely 90–
100%, Likely 66–100%, About as likely as not 33–66%, Unlikely 0–33%, Very unlikely 0–10%, Exceptionally 
unlikely 0–1%. The following additional terms were also used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an 
outcome or a result: Extremely likely: 95–100%, More likely than not >50–100%, and Extremely unlikely 0–
5%Mastrandrea MD, Mach KJ, Plattner G-K, et al. (2011) The IPCC AR5 guidance note on consistent 
treatment of uncertainties: a common approach across the working groups. Climatic Change 108: 675-
691, Mastrandrea MD, Field CB, Stocker TF, et al. (2010) Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report on  Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). 
18 GHGs contributed to a global mean surface warming likely to be in the range of 0.5°C to 1.3°C over the 
period 1951 to 2010 IPCC. (2013c) Summary for Policymakers. In: Stocker TF, D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. 
Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (ed) Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1-29. 
19 The concept of warming commitment has been used to convey the magnitude and time scales of inertia 
in the climate system with respect to human induced increases in greenhouse gas concentrations. The 
concept of ‘geophysical warming commitment’ defines the warming commitments from a purely 
geophysical perspective, as the warming that would result from a complete and abrupt cessation of all 
human-induced emissions Hare B and Meinshausen M. (2006) How Much Warming are We Committed to 
and How Much can be Avoided? Climatic Change 75: 111-149.The value of this concept relies on the fact 
that it shows the timescales of the climate system without implicit entanglements with socio-economic 
assumptions. 
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 Cumulative emissions of CO2 are therefore expected to be the dominant driver of future 
climate change. In fact, CO2 represents about 80 to 90% of the total anthropogenic 
forcing in all Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)20 scenarios over the 21st  
century (Collins, 2013: 1031). As can be seen in Figure 6, a consistent and robust feature 
across all RCP scenarios is the similar warming rate until the middle of this century ̶ 
clearly demonstrating the warming commitment from current atmospheric composition 
and from past emissions. At longer time scales, the warming rate begins to depend more 
on the specified GHG concentration pathway associated with each RCP scenario, being 
highest (>0.3°C per decade) in the RCP8.5 scenarios and significantly lower in the 
RCP2.6, which assumes strong mitigation actions, as well as the use of large-scale bio-
energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)21 to achieve globally negative emissions 
after around 2080. 
20 Four Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios produced from Integrated Assessment 
Models (IAMs) were used in the Fifth Assessment Report of IPCC as a basis for the climate predictions and 
projections presented by WGI (AR5 WGI report, chapters 11 to 14). These four RCPs are identified by their 
approximate total radiative forcing in year 2100 relative to 1750: 2.6 W m–2  for RCP2.6, 4.5 W m–2  for 
RCP4.5, 6.0 W m–2  for RCP6.0, and 8.5 W m–2  for RCP8.5.  
21 BECCS is a form of geoengineering, as described in the following section. 
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Figure 6 - Global mean surface temperature increase as a function of cumulative total global CO2 
emissions from various lines of evidence. Multimodel results from a hierarchy of climate-carbon cycle 
models for each RCP until 2100 are shown with coloured lines and decadal means (dots). Some decadal 
means are labeled for clarity (e.g., 2050 indicating the decade 2040−2049). Model results over the 
historical period (1860 to 2010) are indicated in black. The coloured plume illustrates the multi-model 
spread over the four RCP scenarios and fades with the decreasing number of available models in RCP8.5. 
The multi-model mean and range simulated by CMIP5 models, forced by a CO2 increase of 1% per year 
(1% yr–1 CO2 simulations), is given by the thin black line and grey area. For a specific amount of cumulative 
CO2 emissions, the 1% per year CO2 simulations exhibit lower warming than those driven by RCPs, which 
include additional non-CO2 forcings. Temperature values are given relative to the 1861−1880 base period, 
emissions relative to 1870. Decadal averages are connected by straight lines (Source: IPCC, 2013c: 28). 
 
With these latest findings of the IPCC's AR5 report in the foreground it seems clear that 
the advances in the scientific understanding of global climate change since the mid- 
nineteenth century was concomitant with an unprecedented change in our 
environment. Indeed, our scientific understanding of the complex processes that affect 
both the Earth's energy balance and the energy flows within the global climate system 
has been continuously challenged by the increasing human interference with Earth's 
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 climate 22. This is made clear by M. Jarraud and A. Steiner in the Foreword to the 
Working Group I contribution to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report: 
"The report confirms that warming in the climate system is unequivocal, with 
many of the observed changes unprecedented over decades to millennia: 
warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, diminishing snow and ice, rising 
sea levels and increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases. Each of the last 
three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any 
preceding decade since 1850. These and other findings confirm and enhance 
our scientific understanding of the climate system and the role of greenhouse 
gas emissions" (IPCC, 2013b: v). 
The recognition that key environmental parameters have moved well beyond the range 
of natural variability and the prospect that human influences on the climate system may 
trigger abrupt climate change have contributed to a growing sense of urgency and have 
given further impetus to the idea that transformational actions to address climate 
change need to be scaled up. As a result, attention is increasingly focused on what can 
be done to manipulate the climate with the primary intention of reducing undesired 
climate change caused by human influences. This idea lies at the core of what has been 
termed "geoengineering" (or "climate engineering"). 
3.2 What is  Geoengineering? 
Geoengineering is a term that refers to "a broad set of methods and technologies that 
aim to deliberately alter the climate system in order to alleviate the impacts of climate 
change" (IPCC, 2012: 2).  Although proposed geoengineering methods vary greatly in 
terms of their technological characteristics, modes of action, and potential side effects, 
they are usually subdivided into two broad categories: Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) 
and Solar Radiation Management (SRM) methods (The Royal Society, 2009; IPCC, 2012) .  
Figures 7 and 8 depict the most commonly discussed geoengineering methods in both 
these categories. 
22 For a detailed description of the observed impacts and indicators of a changing climate, see: Field CB, 
Barros VR, Dokken DJ, et al. (2014) Technical Summary. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, 
USA: Cambridge University Press. 
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 Carbon Dioxide Removal 
CDR covers a wide range of methods that seek to remove CO2 from the atmosphere, and 
which are intended to cool the planet by reducing the absorption of long-wave (thermal 
infrared) radiation in the atmosphere. As can be seen in Figure 7, many of these 
methods are designed to enhance natural physical, biological, or chemical processes that 
capture and store CO2 in the ocean and land. 
 
Figure 7 - Illustration of the most widely discussed Carbon Dioxide Removal methods (Source: GAO, 2010: 
11). 
Despite the major uncertainties surrounding the global potential of all CDR methods 
(Haszeldine and Scott, 2014; The Royal Society, 2009), a recent study estimates that 
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 the global physical potential23 of different CDR methods at present is 1.5-3 PgC yr–1, 
of which 0.55-0.76 PgC yr–1 has already been realised through afforestation and 
inadvertent ocean fertilisation (Lenton, 2014). According to this same study, the 
total CDR potential (without considering direct air capture) is estimated to reach 4-9 
PgC yr–1  by the middle of this century, and 9-26 PgC yr–1 by the end of the century.  
However, as we will see next, CDR methods raise complex issues related primarily to 
scale, cost, effectiveness and local environmental consequences (Caldeira et al., 
2013).  
What follows is a brief description of the most widely discussed CDR methods as 
they have been presented to date. 
• 1. Enhanced upwelling/downwelling - One of the ocean-based approaches to 
reduce the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere is based on the idea that the rate of 
atmospheric carbon sequestration may be enhanced through the manipulation 
of the overturning circulation of the oceans (The Royal Society, 2009; Vaughan 
and Lenton, 2011; Yool et al., 2009).  This could be accomplished by either 
enhancing upwelling rates locally, using vertical pipes to bring nutrient-rich deep 
waters to surface waters to promote phytoplankton growth (Lovelock and 
Rapley, 2007; Karl and Letelier, 2008), or by enhancing downwelling  of CO2-rich 
waters from the surface layers of the oceans to lower depths (Zhou and Flynn, 
2005). A recent study of the first of these proposals reveals that, "under the 
hypothetical and most optimistic assumptions of a massive deployment of 
perfect ocean pipes", climate engineering by artificial ocean upwelling would 
lead to a atmospheric CO2 sequestration rate of  about 0.9 PgC yr–1 (Oschlies et 
al., 2010) 24. According to the simulation results of the model used in this study25, 
23 The physical potential of CDR does not take into consideration the social, economic, and engineering 
constraints.  
24 This value corresponds approximately to one "stabilization wedge", as proposed by Pacala and Solow 
Pacala S and Socolow R. (2004) Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years 
with Current Technologies. Science 305: 968-972. 
25 The University of Victoria (UVic) Earth System Climate Model Weaver AJ, M. Eby, E. C. Wiebe, et al. 
(2001) The UVic Earth System Climate Model: Model description, climatology, and applications to past, 
present and future climates. Atmospheric Sciences 39: 361-428., in the configuration described by 
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 a sudden termination of artificial upwelling would lead to a concomitant rise in 
atmospheric concentration of CO2 and surface temperature. Because artificial 
upwelling is expected to increase the imbalance of the radiative energy budget of 
the Earth's climate system, the rise in atmospheric concentration of CO2 and 
surface temperature would be even greater than those experienced now26. In 
addition, most of the CO2 sequestered by artificial ocean upwelling would be 
stored on land and not in the ocean, which would make the monitoring and 
evaluation processes of this CDR method extremely difficult. Assessments of the 
second above described method also suggest that it is highly unlikely that 
modifying downwelling ocean currents may be considered a competitive method 
of carbon sequestration due to the combination of high costs and uncertainty of 
effectiveness (Zhou and Flynn, 2005; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011).  
 
• 2. Ocean fertilisation - Ocean fertilisation methods involved adding 'limiting 
nutrients' (especially iron, but also silicates, phosphorus, nitrogen, calcium 
hydroxide, and/or limestone) to the surface ocean to stimulate biological 
productivity and thus increase the uptake of CO2 from the atmosphere. The 
quantity of nutrients needed to have an effect on the carbon cycle is largely 
dependent on the relative amounts of elements which algae use in building their 
organic tissue (Sarmiento and Gruber, 2002; The Royal Society, 2009). The most 
widely studied method of artificial ocean fertilisation consists in the addition of 
iron to ocean regions that are nutrient rich but have low stocks of phytoplankton 
Schmittner et al Schmittner A, Oschlies A, Matthews HD, et al. (2008) Future changes in climate, ocean 
circulation, ecosystems, and biogeochemical cycling simulated for a business-as-usual CO2 emission 
scenario until year 4000 AD. Global Biogeochemical Cycles 22: GB1013. 
26 This is what has been called the "termination effect", i.e. the climatic consequences of a sudden halt or 
failure of a geoengineering systemUK House of Commons. Science and Technology Committee. (2010) The 
Regulation of Geoengineering. Fifth Report of Session 2009–10. London: The Stationery Office Limited: 
House of Commons. Science and Technology Committee, 116. Although it has been mainly used to 
describe the potential climatic impacts resulting from an abrupt termination of the use of SRM methods in 
the future Jones A, Haywood JM, Alterskjær K, et al. (2013) The impact of abrupt suspension of solar 
radiation management (termination effect) in experiment G2 of the Geoengineering Model 
Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP). Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 118: 9743-9752, Schultz 
C. (2013) Sudden geoengineering termination could cause a huge warming spike. EOS, Transactions 
American Geophysical Union 94: 512-512., the "termination effect" is also a valid concept when 
considering CDR methods.  
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 due to a lack of iron (the so-called High Nitrate Low Chlorophyll regions - HNLC). 
Adding massive amounts of iron to these low iron HNLC regions would stimulate 
the biological pump27 and potentially increase the transfer of carbon from the 
surface water into the deep sea-floor28.  
Ocean Iron fertilisation (OIF) differs from other geoengineering methods in two 
fundamental aspects. The first of these relates with the fact that several 
relatively large-scale scientific research experiments have already been 
conducted over the last two decades (Boyd, 2013; Boyd et al., 2007). Therefore 
the effectiveness of this geoengineering method not only relies upon simulation 
models of ocean biogeochemistry and iron fertilisation, but also upon 
experimental and observational data (Vaughan and Lenton, 2011). 
The second unique aspect of this geoengineering method stems from the first, 
for it refers to the efforts that have been conducted to address ocean 
fertilisation experiments at an international regulatory level. Indeed, the political 
controversy and public attention that surrounded some of the above mentioned 
OIF field experiments29 intensified those efforts and help explain why, to date, 
ocean fertilisation is the geoengineering method subject to the most detailed 
regulatory framework30 (Bodle, 2013).  
The experiments that have been conducted so far have not been able to 
demonstrate the practical effectiveness of this approach and show that it is 
27 For a detailed description of the biologic pump process see De La Rocha CL. (2003) The Biological Pump. 
In: Elderfield H (ed) Treatsie on Geochemistry - The Oceans and Marine Geochemistry. NY: Elsevier, 84-111. 
28 This CDR method draws upon the 'Iron Hypothesis' formulated by John H. Martin Martin JH. (1990) 
Glacial-interglacial CO2 change: The Iron Hypothesis. Paleoceanography 5: 1-13., according to which the 
"productivity in today's southern ocean (7.4 × 1013g yr−1) is limited by iron deficiency, and hence the 
phytoplankton is unable to take advantage of the excess surface nitrate/phosphate that, if used, could 
result in total southern ocean new production of 2−3 × 1015 g C yr−1".   
29 LOHAFEX was the largest OIF field experiment conducted so far. From January to March 2009 scientists 
from the German Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research and from the Indian Institute of 
Oceanography released six tons of dissolved iron over a 300-square-kilometre section of the southern 
Atlantic Ocean. The experiment attracted extreme opposition from environmental groups and non-
governmental organisations and, for a short period, the German government put a stop to the venture, 
before allowing it to proceed. 
30 Ocean fertilisation experiments are now regulated under the London Convention and London Protocol. 
See IMO Marine geoengineering including ocean fertilization to be regulated under amendments to 
international treaty (October 18, 2013) 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/EmergingIssues/geoengineering/Pages/default.aspx 
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 remarkably difficult to increase the sinking flux of carbon to the deep ocean 
(Buesseler K.O. et al., 2004; Martin et al., 2013). In addition, modelling studies 
indicate that even if global iron fertilisation could be deployed for a century, the 
potential role of ocean fertilisation in carbon sequestration would be modest, 
lowering it by, at most, around 30 ppm (Vaughan and Lenton, 2011). Lastly, 
because all ocean fertilisation methods involve a wide range of inextricably 
linked changes in ocean physics, chemistry, biology, and ecology, the possible 
side effects on both marine and adjacent terrestrial ecosystems remain largely 
unknown31. The indented and unintended biochemical and ecological impacts 
will never be local, spreading over large areas by ocean circulation. This makes 
the verification and assessment processes of these methods particularly difficult 
(The Royal Society, 2009; Boyd, 2013).   
 
• 3. Direct air capture - This CDR method refers to a chemical process by which a 
pure CO2 stream is produced by capturing CO2 from ambient air. The direct air 
capture (DAC) process comprises two main phases: absorption and regeneration. 
The absorption phase refers to the process of dissolving the CO2 contained in the 
atmosphere into solution or onto a solid sorbent. The regeneration phase refers 
to producing a concentrated stream of CO2 from the means used for absorption 
(Zeman and Keith, 2008). The resulting stream of pure CO2 is then used or 
sequestered in geological reservoirs or the deep ocean32, while the sorbent is 
regenerated and the CO2-depleted air is returned to the atmosphere (Socolow et 
al., 2011). 
Although not yet tested on a large-scale, several conceptual designs of DAC 
systems have already been proposed in the literature. According to the 
characteristics of the sorbent surface, they are usually subdivided into three 
31 Including the possible disruption in the lowest links of the food chains and the accelerated acidification 
in the deep ocean Cao L and Caldeira K. (2010) Can ocean iron fertilization mitigate ocean acidification? 
Climatic Change 99: 303-311. 
32 An alternative disposal or re-use strategy is to convert the  CO2 into a transport fuel by combining it with 
hydrogen Zeman FS and Keith DW. (2008) Carbon neutral hydrocarbons. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 366: 3901-3918. 
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 main categories (The Royal Society, 2009; IPCC, 2013b):  (i) adsorption on solids 
(Li et al., 2010; Gray et al., 2008; Lackner, 2009; Lackner, 2010; Lackner et al., 
2012; Choi et al., 2011) (ii) absorption into highly alkaline solutions (Stolaroff et 
al., 2008; Mahmoudkhani and Keith, 2009), and (iii) absorption into moderate 
alkaline solution with a catalyst (Bao and Trachtenberg, 2006).   
Although the DAC process described above seems to have minimal undesirable 
consequences (except those associated with handling process materials or 
chemicals) (GAO, 2011), some concerns have been raised about the energy 
penalties in capturing and compressing CO2 and its subsequent long-term storage 
(Vaughan and Lenton, 2011; The Royal Society, 2009). These and other 
limitations (as the thermodynamic barrier due to the low concentration of CO2 in 
ambient air and the estimated high costs involved in the DAC process) result in 
substantial uncertainties surrounding the scalability of direct air capture 
technologies. 
 
• 4. Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) - Bioenergy with carbon 
capture and storage draws upon existing technologies for bioenergy33 and for 
carbon capture and storage (CCS)34, inheriting both their advantages and  
33 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) defines bioenergy as "the energy 
derived from all forms of biomass, including forest biomass" Mabee WE and Saddler JN. (2007) Forests 
and energy in OECD countries, Rome: FAO. Bioenergy has the potential to have a large contribution 
towards energy needs in the immediate future - according to the  International Energy Agency (IEA), 
bioenergy offers the potential to meet 50% of our world energy needs in the 21st century. However, there 
are still important constraints on the development and diffusion of appropriate bioenergy technologies, 
such as: (i) tenure and land management constraints stemming from land ownership/land rights; (ii) 
competition for use of productive land between bioenergy and food crops; (iii) impacts on biodiversity 
resulting from large-scale production of biomass feedstocks, (iv) potential negative impacts on 
communities; (v) environmental impacts associated with biomass conversion processes; and (v) market-
place and economic problems (the potential bioenergy markets are dominated by well established 
technologies and influenced by the convenience of an existing supply network, and bioenergy applications 
remain currently too expensive to compete with fossil fuels) Lwin K. (2004) Policy Options and Strategies 
for Market Development of Biomass: an Asian-Pacific Perspective. In: Sims REH (ed) Bioenergy Options for 
a Cleaner Environment: in Developed and Developing Countries. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier 
B.V., 141-160, Gough C and Upham P. (2011) Biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS or 
Bio-CCS). Greenhouse Gases: Science and Technology 1: 324-334.  
34 Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a process that consists of separating and capturing CO2 from large 
power stations, transporting it to a storage site, and isolating it from the atmosphere - mainly in depleted 
oil or gas fields or in saline formations - for very long periods of time (on the order of several centuries to 
millions of years) IPCC. (2005) IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage. Prepared by 
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 disadvantages (The Royal Society, 2009). The combination of this pair of 
technologies leads to an energy system with negative emissions characteristics, 
holding out the prospect of reducing current atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations to pre-industrial levels (Gough and Upham, 2011; Read, 2008; 
Read and Lermit, 2005; Obersteiner et al., 2001). For Read and Lermit (2005), a 
portfolio based on BECCS technologies, yielding a negative-emissions energy 
system, "may be seen not only as benign geoengineering, free of the risks 
associated with other geoengineering, but also as one of the keys to being 
prepared for ACC [Abrupt Climate Change"].   
BECCS covers a variety of biomass and biofuel production pathways involving 
numerous sources of biomass raw materials (derived from wastes or from 
dedicated land used for energy plantations or annual energy crops), followed by 
capture of the CO2 produced in the fermentation process and in combustion at 
power plants, transport of the CO2 to the storage site, and long-term 
underground storage (Vaughan and Lenton, 2011; Read and Lermit, 2005; Gough 
and Upham, 2011). 
Rhodes and Keith (Rhodes and Keith, 2005) explored the possibility of integrating 
or combining the three technological approaches that have been advanced for 
CCS35 with biomass energy systems and suggested the feasibility and potential of 
Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, United Kingdom and 
New York, NY, USA Cambridge University Press, Watson RT and Aquino AR. (2010) The Road Forward. In: 
Schneider SH, Rosencranz A, Mastrandrea MD, et al. (eds) Climate Change Science and Policy. Washington 
D.C.: Island Press, 423-431.The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that CCS could contribute 
towards one sixth of CO2 emissions reductions required by 2050, and 14% of the cumulative emissions 
reductions through 2050 against a business-as-usual scenarioIEA. (2013) Technology Roadmap: Carbon 
Capture and Storage 2013, Paris: International Energy Agency. However CCS technologies have limitations 
that arise from three main barriers: (i) the high energy requirements to capture, run the coal gasification 
plants and compress the CO2 before it can be injected into the ground (iii) the costs involved in these 
activities (most estimates shows that CCS adds around 25% to 40% to the cost of a power plant 
Montgomery SL. (2010) The Powers That Be: Global Energy for the Twenty-first Century and Beyond, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.), and (iii) the lack of safe and permanent reservoirs to store large 
volumes of CO2 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee. (2006) Meeting UK Energy and 
Climate Needs: The Role of Carbon Capture and Storage. First Report of Session 2005-06. London: House 
of Commons Science and Technology Committee , Parker CL and Shapiro SM. (2008) Climate Chaos: Your 
Health at Risk, What You Can Do to Protect Yourself and Your Family, Westport, CT: Praeger.  
35 Three main technologies have been proposed to attain the goal of CCS technologies (Cf. footnote 34): 
(i) post-combustion capture, where CO2 is captured from the flue gases produced during combustion; (ii) 
oxyfueling, where combustion occurs in pure oxygen and CO2 is separated by condensing water from the 
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 the following biomass-CCS routes: (i) biological processing with capture of CO2 by-
products to produce liquid fuels; (ii) biomass gasification with shift and CO2 
separation to produce hydrogen; and (iii) biomass combustion to produce 
electricity with CCS—either by oxyfuel or post-combustion capture. 
According to Read and Parshotam (Read and Parshotam, 2007; Read, 2008), a 
Biomass-Biosphere Carbon Stock Management (BCSM) programme, where an 
initial transition period to a large biofuel energy system would be followed by the 
integration of bioenergy with CCS, could theoretically lead to pre-industrial 
atmospheric CO2 levels within a few decades. This holistic strategy assumes in its 
first stage the creation of a strategic reserve stock of biomass raw material in 
new plantation forests36 and the growth of a large-scale, global bio-energy 
market involving world trade in bio-fuels. The second stage would involve linking 
CO2 capture and sequestration to bio-energy, yielding a negative emissions 
energy system. Hence, with low-cost CO2 sequestration from fermentation 
starting in 2020 and CO2 capture from flue gases in 2025, up to 50 Pg C could be 
sequestered by 2035 and 298 Pg C by 2060 (Read and Parshotam, 2007).  Taking 
this scenario as an upper estimate, Lenton and Vaughan calculated that 124 PgC 
(58ppm) would be removed from the atmosphere in 2050 and 771 PgC (186 
ppm) in 2100. This would lead to a radiative forcing of  ≈− 0.60 W m−2 and 
≈−1.99W m−2 in 2050 and 2100 respectively (Lenton and Vaughan 2009). 
These optimistic estimates rely heavily on assumptions about (i) the basic 
logistics for supply of feedstocks, (ii) technological progress with biomass 
exhaust; and (iii) pre-combustion capture, which refers to the removal of the fuel embedded carbon in 
hydrocarbons to produce hydrogen, which then combusts in a gas turbine, emitting a relative pure stream 
of water vapour Herold J. (2008) Microeconomic Analysis of Investment Incentives Under Emission Control. 
The case of carbon capture and storage: GRIN Verlag, Baker E, Nemet G and Rasmussen P. (2012) 
Modeling the Costs of Carbon Capture. In: Zheng QP, Rebennack S, Pardalos PM, et al. (eds) Handbook of 
CO2 in Power Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 349-372, Rhodes JS and Keith DW. (2005) Engineering 
economic analysis of biomass IGCC with carbon capture and storage. Biomass and Bioenergy 29: 440-450. 
 
36 "Before 2035, the main out-of-atmosphere stock arises from the creation of a strategic reserve of 
biomass raw material through the development of 1bHa of new forest plantations. An area equal to about 
half the forest area  lost since the beginning of industrialisation" Read P and Parshotam A. (2007) Holistic 
greenhouse gas management:  mitigating the threat of abrupt climate change in the next few decades 
(with reviewers comments and author rejoinders). Institute of Policy Studies Working Paper 07/1. 
(accessed 02/06/2014). 
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 production and conversion, (iii) greater energy efficiency, (iv) increased use of 
non-fuel renewables, (iv) accessible and efficient CCS infrastructures, (v) costs of 
operation, (vi) price trajectories of oil, timber, food and other co-produced 
outputs, (vii) growth of a large-scale, global bio-energy market involving world 
trade in bio-fuels, and (viii) availability of CO2 storage (among others). Therefore, 
if such a strategy were to be implemented, these assumptions would have to be 
supported by strong political, regulatory, industrial, and social will.  
BECCS technology has not been tested on an industrial scale37, but is commonly 
included in Integrated Assessment Models and future scenarios that aim to 
achieve low CO2 concentrations38. Accordingly, and despite the limited evidence 
on the potential for large-scale deployment of these technologies and their 
unpredictable (but almost certain) side effects and long-term consequences on a 
global scale, the Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios used as 
a basis for future projections in the AR5 already include this geoengineering 
option39. The political implication of this is clear, as recognised by IPCC Working 
Group II (WGII): "the increasing dependence of pathways on CDR options 
reduces the ability of policymakers to hedge risks freely across the mitigation 
technology portfolio" (IPCC, 2014a).   
 
• 5. Biochar and biomass burial methods - Sequestration of biomass and biochar 
have been proposed as a method for intervening in the global carbon cycle . The 
37 However, some small dedicated BECCS projects are currently in the construction or operation phase 
(located in the USA and the Netherlands), all of which are ethanol production facilities Gough C and 
Upham P. (2011) Biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS or Bio-CCS). Greenhouse Gases: 
Science and Technology 1: 324-334. 
3838 In fact, long-term mitigation scenarios typically rely on the availability and widespread use of BECCS 
and large-scale afforestation in the second half of the century IPCC. (2013b) Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
39 To achieve the RCP2.6 CO2 peak and decline the IMAGE integrated assessment model simulates 
widespread implementation of BECCS technology to achieve globally negative emissions after around 
2080 (Cf. AR5 WGI Section 6.4.3). RCP4.5 also assumes some use of BECCS to stabilise CO2 concentration 
by 2100. 
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 aim of these CDR methods is to increase the net primary productivity (NPP)40 and 
store a larger fraction of the biomass and biochar produced into ecosystem 
carbon pools with long turnover times (The Royal Society, 2009; IPCC, 2013b).  
Biomass has long been recognised as a potential source of renewable energy that 
could reduce the dependency on fossil fuels and other non-renewable resources 
(Demuynck et al., 1984). In addition, biomass can act as a means of offsetting 
emissions by sequestering carbon in terrestrial ecosystems. Indeed, feedstock 
biomass that otherwise would not be used for habitat preservation, crops, or 
energy production could be buried in the land and deep ocean to slow the rate at 
which CO2 is released to the atmosphere (Bracmort et al., 2010). 
As biomass is one of the most contested accessible resources, a fundamental 
tension exists between utilising biomass for CDR and using it to attain one of the 
other ends mentioned above (Haszeldine and Scott, 2014). In addition, the 
methods involving burying biomass in the land or deep ocean require additional 
energy consumption for transport, burying, and processing and may disrupt 
growth, nutrient cycling and the viability of the ecosystems involved (The Royal 
Society, 2009). For these reasons it is unlike that biomass for sequestration could 
make a large contribution to a geoengineering approach aimed at enhancing the 
global carbon sink. 
Carbon capture via biochar involves producing from pyrolysis41 of plants and 
organic waste42 a charcoal-like substance (called biochar) high in organic carbon 
40 Net primary productivity (NPP) is defined as "the uptake of CO2 by photosynthesis less that released by 
autotrophic (plant) respiration. This primary production provides the energy sources and substrates for 
virtually all major ecosystems on Earth" Beerling DJ and Butterfiel NJ. (2012) Plants and Animals as 
Geobiological Agents. In: Knoll AH, Canfield DE and Konhauser KO (eds) Fundamentals of Geobiology. 
Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwekk, 188-204. 
41  Pyrolysis processes deal with the rapid thermal decomposition of organic material (in this case biomass) 
at high temperatures in the absence of oxygen. The decomposition process produces both biochar and 
bio-oil. The bio-oil can be converted to a biofuel after a costly  conversion process, and the biochar can 
serve as bio-sequester (i.e. atmospheric carbon capture and storage). 
42 In addition to plant biomass, there is a wide range of other potential biochar feedstocks, including waste 
materials such as poultry litter and sewage sludge Chan KY and Xu Z. (2009) Biochar: Nutrient Properties 
and Their Enhancement. In: Lehmann J and Joseph S (eds) Biochar for Environmental Management. 
London: Earthscan, 67-84, Shackley S, Sohi S, Ibarrola R, et al. (2013) Biochar, Tool for Climate Change 
Mitigation and Soil Management. In: Lenton TM and Vaughan NE (eds) Geoengineering Responses to 
Climate Change. Springer New York, 73-140. 
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 and largely resistant to decomposition. The resultant biochar could then be 
buried underground where it would remain for a centennial to millennial 
timescale, acting as a recalcitrant carbon reservoir (Vaughan and Lenton, 2011). 
In addition to the potential for carbon sequestration, biochar amendment of soil 
could improve soil fertility and crop productivity, enhancing nutrient retention 
and bioavailability (Chan and Xu, 2009; Shackley et al., 2013).  
Estimates of the global potential for enhanced primary productivity over land, 
the residence time of carbon converted to biochar, and the additional effect of 
biochar on soil productivity are very uncertain. This is so because the potential of 
any specific method will be severely constrained by competing land needs (e.g., 
agriculture, biofuels, urbanization and conservation) and sociocultural 
considerations  (The Royal Society, 2009; IPCC, 2013b). 
Notwithstanding, based on published projections of the use of renewable fuels in 
the year 2100, Lehmann et al. (2006) estimated that biochar sequestration would 
potentially yield an amount of 5.5–9.5 PgC yr–1 if pyrolysis were to be used. The 
maximum potential sequestration of 9.5 PgC yr–1 would exceed current 
anthropogenic emissions from fossil fuels (5.4 PgC yr–1 in 2006). Such fluxes 
assume that there will be enormous growth in the resources devoted to the 
production of biofuels, and that some large fraction of this carbon would be 
converted to biochar. However, the use of crops for renewable fuels on such a 
scale would very likely conflict with the use of agricultural land for the 
production of food and/or biofuels (The Royal Society, 2009; Vaughan and 
Lenton, 2011). Some concerns have also been raised that inappropriately applied 
incentives to encourage biochar might increase the cost and reduce the 
availability of food crops. 
International law does not specifically address the production of biochar and 
biomass, or the biochar and biomass burial methods here discussed. 
Nevertheless, as these methods entail considerable large-scale land use changes, 
the current international legal regime for the protection of biodiversity, 
ecosystems and habitats may indirectly impose restrictions to large scale 
deployment of these geoengineering options (Bodle, 2013). 
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• 6. Afforestation/Reforestation - The conversion of land from its natural state has 
had profound effects on terrestrial ecosystems and Earth system dynamics over 
the past three centuries (Turner II et al., 1990)43. The effects of land use and 
land-cover change (LULCC) on the Earth systems include alterations in the 
surface albedo, distribution of sources and sinks of carbon over the land surface, 
flux of carbon between terrestrial ecosystems and the atmosphere, radiative 
forcing, surface roughness, atmospheric turbulence, rates of evapotranspiration, 
latent heat flux, etc. (Hurtt et al., 2006; Pielke et al., 2011; Adams, 2008). 
The cumulative net CO2 emissions from land use changes between 1750 and 
2011 are estimated at approximately 180 ± 80 PgC (IPCC, 2013b)44. Two-thirds to 
three-quarters of the total carbon losses to the atmosphere due to land-use 
change resulted from the conversion of forests to cropland or other land uses 
(House et al., 2002; Canadell and Raupach, 2008). Assuming that the total carbon 
loss resulted from forest conversion could be restored to the terrestrial 
biosphere, an order of magnitude of the upper potential of 
afforestation/reforestation45 would be ≈120 to 135  PgC. This is an extreme 
estimate that does not take into account the "rebound effect"46, economical 
43 Hurtt et al. Hurtt GC, Frolking S, Fearon MG, et al. (2006) The underpinnings of land-use history: three 
centuries of global gridded land-use transitions, wood-harvest activity, and resulting secondary lands. 
Global Change Biology 12: 1208-1229. estimate that 42 to 68% of the global land surface was impacted by 
land use activities (crop, pasture, wood harvest) during the 1700–2000 period.  
44The global net CO2 emissions from land use change are  estimated at 1.4, 1.5 and 1.1 PgC yr–1 for the 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s, respectively Houghton RA, House JI, Pongratz J, et al. (2012) Carbon emissions 
from land use and land-cover change. Biogeosciences 9: 5125-5142. The cumulative net CO2 emissions 
from land use change have been dominated by deforestation and other land use change in the mid-
northern latitudes prior to 1980s, and in the tropics since the 1980s, largely from deforestation in tropical 
America and Asia with smaller contributions from tropical Africa IPCC. (2013b) Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
45 "Afforestation is the direct human-induced growth of forest on land that has not historically been 
forested. Reforestation is the direct human-induced conversion on nonforested land to forest land that 
had been previously converted from forest to other uses" Caldeira K, Bala G and Cao L. (2013) The science 
of geoengineering. Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences. 231-256. 
46 When CO2 is removed from the atmosphere, the CO2 concentration gradient between atmospheric and 
land/ocean carbon reservoirs is reduced, leading  to a reduction or reversal in subsequent inherent rate of 
removal of CO2 from the atmosphere by natural carbon cycle processes on land and ocean. This is what is 
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 factors, competing land needs or other social and political considerations. 
However, over the last decades efforts have been undertaken to obtain more 
realistic estimates of the upper limit of CO2 sequestration by global afforestation 
and reforestation activities47 (Nilsson and Schopfhauser, 1995; IPCC, 2000; House 
et al., 2002; Canadell and Raupach, 2008). House el al. (2002) estimated that the 
maximum feasible reforestation and afforestation activities over the next 50 
years would result in a reduction in CO2 concentration of about 15-30 ppm by the 
end of the century. A more optimistic estimate is that an irrigated afforestation 
project in the Sahara and Australian Outback could sequester each year amounts 
of atmospheric CO2 at least equal to that released from burning fossil fuel 
(Ornstein et al., 2009). It is under these seemingly disparate estimates that large-
scale afforestation and reforestation projects have been proposed as a near-term 
route to reduce atmospheric CO2 concentrations and a strategy to control 
human-induced global warming (and therefore seen as a form of 
geoengineering48). Despite the uncertainties surrounding the long-term 
effectiveness of these CDR methods under continued changes in atmospheric 
CO2, large afforestation/reforestation programmes are already underway at a 
global scale, with around 264 million hectares having been planted in recent 
decades (FAO, 2010; Lenton, 2014; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011). Like any large-
known as "rebound effect" IPCC. (2013a) Annex III: Glossary. In: Stocker TF, D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. 
Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (ed) Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1447-1466. According to the last IPCC WGI assessment report "The ‘rebound 
effect’ in the natural carbon cycle is likely to diminish the effectiveness of all the CDR methods" IPCC. 
(2013b) Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, United Kingdom and 
New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
47 The maximum amount of carbon that might be sequestered by global afforestation and reforestation 
activities for the 55-year period 1995-2050 was estimated at 60-87 Gt C, with about 70 percent in tropical 
forests, 25 percent in temperate forests, and 5 percent in boreal forests IPCC. (2000) Land Use, Land-Use 
Change, and Forestry, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,. 
48 Given the distinction made between mitigation and geoengineering (See for instance Keith DW. (2000) 
Geoengineering the climate: history and prospect. Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 25: 245-
284, Vaughan N and Lenton T. (2011) A review of climate geoengineering proposals. Climatic Change 109: 
745-790, The Royal Society. (2009) Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and uncertainty. 
London: The Royal Society, 98.), large-scale forest management for the purpose of removing atmospheric 
CO2 is considered a form of geoengineering, in contrast to avoided deforestation, which prevents 
anthropogenic CO2 and is therefore a mitigation action. 
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 scale transformation of land use patterns, afforestation/reforestation can lead to 
unintended environmental and socioeconomic impacts. Concerns include 
changes in surface albedo, changes in evapotranspiration that have the potential 
to affect cloud cover and reflectivity, ecosystem-carbon loss over time through 
erosion and the degradation of soil-carbon pools, loss of biodiversity, reduced 
stream flows, decreased food security, and intensification of conflicts with 
current strategies for conservation and habitat management (Keith, 2002; 
Lenton, 2014; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011; Haszeldine and Scott, 2014). 
 
• 7. Land-based enhanced weathering  - Although the total magnitude of natural 
weathering-associated carbon fluxes is smaller than other fluxes in the modern 
carbon cycle (Peters et al., 2012), these weathering reactions play an important 
role in regulating climate (Hartmann et al., 2013; Hartmann et al., 2009). The 
removal of CO2 by chemical weathering49 ranges from 0.22 to 0.29 PgC yr–1 
(Gaillardet et al., 1999; Hartmann et al., 2009). The rate at which these chemical 
reactions take place is currently too small to offset the rate at which fossil fuel 
CO2 is being emitted50. For this reason, CO2 sequestration by the weathering of 
silicate and carbonate minerals has long been neglected in the global climate 
change debate (Schuiling, 2013). Over the last few years, however, it has been 
suggested that artificially increasing by large factors the mineral weathering rates 
could effectively accelerate the rate of transfer of carbon out of the atmosphere, 
thus leading to a gradual decrease in atmospheric CO2 concentrations (Schuiling, 
2013; Hartmann et al., 2013). The basic understanding of how silicate and 
49 Chemical weathering is the process by which individual minerals are dissolved or transformed to new 
minerals. This process occurs due to several chemical reactions initiated by water or acids in the soil 
solution. The dominant type of chemical weathering is by carbonic acid (H2CO3) formed in soil from water 
(H2O) and carbon dioxide (CO2). Chemical weathering plays an important role in global biochemical cycles. 
Of particular interest is the role of chemical weathering in regulating climate through its effects on the 
drawdown of atmospheric CO2. Bonan G. (2008) Ecological Climatology: Concepts and Aplications, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, Allen PA and Allen JR. (2013) Basin Analysis: Principles and 
Application to Petroleum Play Assessment, Chichester, UK: Wily-Blackwell. 
50 In 2011, fossil fuel emissions were 9.5 [8.7 to 10.3] PgC IPCC. (2013b) Climate Change 2013: The Physical 
Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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 carbonate weathering acts to drawdown atmospheric CO2 is relatively well 
known51 and  a number of CDR proposals aimed at increasing the rates of these 
reactions have already been suggested.  
For instance, Shuiling and Krijgsman (2006) suggested that probably the cheapest 
way to sequester large volumes of CO2 would be by spreading large volumes of 
fine-powdered olivine or crushed basalt to farmland or future woodland 
threatened by acid rain. This would not only contribute to reduce current levels 
of CO2 in the atmosphere, but would also provide an effective way of 
counteracting the effect of acid rain on forests, and of improving the quality of 
the forest soil. In the idealised case where olivine could be distributed as a fine 
powder over all land areas of the humid tropics, potential removal rates of up to 
1 PgC yr–1 have been estimated. This estimate considers the limitation by the 
saturation of silicic acid and assumes a complete dissolution of all distributed 
olivine (Köhler et al., 2010). 
Alternatively, it has suggested that the rate of the reaction of CO2 with basic 
minerals (such as basalts and olivine) could be enhanced through methods of in 
situ mineral carbonation that exploit the chemical potential energy inherent in 
tectonic exposure of mantle peridotite at the Earth’s surface. According to 
Kelemen and Matter (Kelemen and Matter, 2008; Kelemen et al., 2011) this 
method could consume >1 billion tons of CO2 per year in Oman alone, affording a 
low-cost, safe, and permanent method to capture and store atmospheric CO2 . 
Besides the geoengineering potential of enhanced weathering, some "collateral 
benefits" of this CDR method have already been identified, including: (i) increase 
the alkalinity of the soil and water on a global scale, which would reduce CO2 
induced acidification of the terrestrial and marine environments (ii) accelerate 
nutrient supply to terrestrial ecosystems, improving soil productivity, and thus 
leading to greater sequestration of CO2 in terrestrial biomass (The Royal Society, 
2009; Schuiling, 2013; Hartmann et al., 2013). 
51 See for instance Hartmann J, West J, Renforth P, et al. (2013) Enhanced Chemical Weathering as a 
Geoengineering Strategy to Reduce Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, a Nutrient Source and to Mitigate Ocean 
Acidification. Reviews of Geophysics. 
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 Although agricultural practices that have long been in use on a small scale (such 
as tilling, mineral fertilization, or liming to adjust soil pH.) offer promising 
prospects regarding the ability of land-based enhanced weathering to drawdown 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations, it is almost impossible to predict how much the 
fluxes of carbon and nutrients between compartments in the Earth System would 
change following large-scale deployment of this geoengineering method 
(Hartmann et al., 2013).  Moreover, the application of large quantities of rock 
powder to the land surface would incur significant changes, both predictable and 
unpredictable, to the entire ecosystem. In addition, to have a significant 
geoengineering impact, most of these proposals involve large mining and 
transportation activities, which require considerable energy inputs. 
Solar Radiation Management 
The second major geoengineering approach  ̶  solar radiation management (SRM)  ̶  seeks 
to reduce the amount of incoming short-wave solar radiation received by Earth's 
atmosphere, surface and oceans by deflecting sunlight, or by increasing the reflectivity 
of the atmosphere, clouds or Earth's surface (i.e., enhancing the planetary albedo) (IPCC, 
2013b; The Royal Society, 2009; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011).  SRM methods proposed to 
produce these effects can be subdivided into three subcategories, according to the scale 
in which they operate, namely: i) space-based techniques, operating in outer space; ii) 
atmospheric-based techniques, operating in the atmosphere, and iii) surface-based 
techniques, operating in the Earth's surface (Humphreys, 2012). Contrary to what 
happens with CDR methods, SRM approaches do not address the very root cause of 
human-induced climate change; that is, a perturbation of the global carbon cycle 
through the increased concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere (Lenton and Vaughan, 
2013; Richardson et al., 2011). Indeed, all SRM techniques would leave the carbon cycle 
largely untouched in the first instance and would also do nothing to slow ocean 
acidification (Hartmann et al., 2013; The Royal Society, 2009). Although remaining 
uncertainties in important climate processes underlying SRM methods, relative scarcity 
of studies, and differences in model physics and experimental design preclude a 
comprehensive assessment of the efficacy and side effects of SRM, the IPCC concluded 
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 in its last assessment report that "SRM in concert with aggressive CO2 mitigation might 
conceivably help avoid transitions across climate thresholds or tipping points that would 
be unavoidable otherwise" (IPCC, 2013b: 635). 
The following is a brief description of the most widely discussed SRM methods, as 
illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 - Illustration of the most widely discussed Solar Radiation Management methods. (Source: GAO, 
2010: 11). 
1. Space-based reflective mirrors - Perhaps one of the most extravagant 
geoengineering options is the positioning of sun-shields in space to reflect or 
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 deflect incoming solar radiation52.  The basic underlying principle is that placing 
reflectors or scatters between the Earth and the Sun could significantly diminish 
the amount of solar radiation incident on the top of the Earth’s atmosphere. The 
amount of reduction in solar radiation proposed is close to that required to 
offset the global warming induced by increased greenhouse gases (Lunt, 2013; 
Vaughan and Lenton, 2011). Accordingly, it has been assumed that to offset a 
doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations above preindustrial levels53 a 
decrease in incoming solar radiation of roughly 1.8 percent would be required 
(Angel, 2006; Govindasamy and Caldeira, 2000). Numerous techniques have been 
proposed to achieve this goal, all of them centred on fabricating and deploying a 
single sunshade superstructure, or an array of millions of tiny reflectors or 
refractors (McInnes, 2010; Lunt, 2013). Some involve fabricating a sunshade on 
Earth and transporting it to space, while others consist in building a sunshade out 
in space from materials available on asteroids (Lunt, 2013). Several options have 
been considered regarding the location of the sunshade along the Sun–Earth 
line.  
One proposal suggested installing 55.000 mirrors (each with an area of 100 km2) 
in random orbits (National Academy of Sciences, 1992). An alternative suggestion 
is to create an artificial ring of passive scattering particles with a mass of order 2 
x 109 tonnes in the Earth's orbit (Mautner, 1991; McInnes, 2002). Pearson et al 
(2006) proposed to create an artificial planetary ring above the Earth's equatorial 
orbit (similar to Saturn’s B ring), composed of passive particles (derived from the 
Earth, moon, or asteroids) or controlled spacecraft with parasols. This flat ring 
from 1.2 to 1.6 Earth radii would shade mainly the tropics, moderating climate 
extremes, and providing sufficient opacity to reduce insolation by 1.6 percent.  
52 According to Lunt Lunt DJ. (2013) Sunshades for Solar Radiation Management. In: Lenton TM and 
Vaughan NE (eds) Geoengineering Responses to Climate Change. Springer New York, 9-20., one of the first 
references to the use of this technology can be found in the James Oberg's book New Earths: 
Restructuring Earth and Other Planets Oberg JE. (1981) New Earths: Transforming Other Planets for 
Humanity, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books. However, as the title of the book suggests, the idea of placing 
sunshades in space was not intended to alter the Earth's climate, but rather modifying the climates of 
extraterrestrial planets, with the aim of making them habitable. 
53 The pre-industrial level of CO2 in the atmosphere is estimated to have been 280 ppm. A doubling of CO2 
would then be 560 ppm. 
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 An alternative to placing sunshades in low Earth orbit is to place them near the 
“first Lagrange point” (also known as the “L1 point”), which is an equilibrium 
point directly between the Earth and sun, about 1 .5 million kilometres above the 
planet, where the forces pulling an object toward the Sun are exactly balanced 
by the forces pulling an object toward Earth (The Royal Society, 2009; Caldeira et 
al., 2013; Lunt, 2013)54. Angel (2006) suggested that a cloud of scattering 
particles positioned near the Earth–sun inner Lagrange point (L1) could block 1.8 
percent of the incoming solar radiation. This sunshade would be manufactured 
entirely on Earth and then launched to space, and it would take the form of 
many small autonomous spacecraft, or ‘‘flyers’’. These flyers would weigh a gram 
each, be launched in stacks of 800,000, and remain for a projected lifetime of 50 
years within a 100,000- km-long cloud.  
All these space-based techniques involve major uncertainties regarding costs, 
effectiveness, timescales of implementation, and potential side-effects (The 
Royal Society, 2009; Govindasamy et al., 2002). Moreover, deployment of such 
space-based proposals could prove extremely changeling, both in technological 
and economic terms. Because these proposals would require an unprecedented 
scale of production, with extremely high costs of deployment, it would take 
several decades before any of them could be fully implemented (The Royal 
Society, 2009; Caldeira et al., 2013; Lunt, 2013; McInnes, 2010). For these 
reasons - not to mention other legal55, moral, and ethical considerations - "it 
54 According to Lunt Lunt DJ. (2013) Sunshades for Solar Radiation Management. In: Lenton TM and 
Vaughan NE (eds) Geoengineering Responses to Climate Change. Springer New York, 9-20., however, a 
sunshade placed at the L1 point is unstable, in that if it is displaced slightly due to the pressure exerted by 
the Sun’s radiation itself, it will be accelerated further in the same direction. Therefore Lunt suggests that 
a more suitable location for a sunshade would be slightly closer to the Sun than the L1 point, allowing the 
radiation pressure to balance the offset in gravitational attraction. 
55 As stated in the Working Group III contribution to the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report the 1967 Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (United Nations, 2002) may apply to the use of sun-deflecting mirrors in space 
Stavins R, Zou J, Brewer T, et al. (2014) International Cooperation: Agreements and Instruments. In: 
Edenhofer O, Pichs-Madruga R, Sokona Y, et al. (eds) Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.: Cambridge University Press. 
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 seems unlikely that a giant sunshade will be launched into space any time soon" 
(Lunt, 2013: 19).  
• 2. Stratospheric aerosol injection - Perhaps the most widely discussed 
geoengineering option is the injection of sulphate aerosols into the lower 
stratosphere to mimic the cooling effect caused by large volcanic eruptions.   
One of the first proposals was made by Mikhail Budyko, a Russian climatologist, 
 in 1974 (Budyko, 1977). Inspired by the cooling effect of Mount Tambora's 
eruption56, Budyko suggested that burning some 100.000 tons of sulphur per 
year could generate an artificial cloud of 600.000 tons of sulphuric acid with 
potential to reduce the Earth's temperature by several degrees (Fleming, 2010; 
Keith, 2000). This idea was recently revived by Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen, who 
wrote an influential editorial essay in the Journal Climatic Change (2006) calling 
for active research into geoengineering and, particularly, into the effectiveness 
and possible side effects of stratospheric albedo modification schemes57. Since 
then several proposals have been suggested to artificially increase aerosol levels 
in the stratosphere, and thus enhance the planetary reflectivity (albedo) (Brühl et 
al., 2013; Jones et al., 2010; Kalidindi et al., 2014; McCusker et al., 2012; Rasch et 
al., 2008; Tuck et al., 2008; Volodin et al., 2012; Davidson et al., 2012; Jones et 
al., 2011; Pitari et al., 2014; Kravitz et al., 2012). 
56 The eruption of Tambora in 1815 (the largest volcanic eruption ever recorded) sent tons of volcanic ash 
into the atmosphere, profoundly altering global weather patterns. The year after the eruption is known as 
"the year without summer" in reference to the global cooling caused by the eruption Klingaman W and 
Klingaman N. (2013) The Year Without Summer: 1816, and the Volcano That Darkened the World and 
Changed History, New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
57 Crutzen's editorial reignited the debate about whether we should explore geoengineering solutions 
Schneider SH. (1996) Geoengineering: Could— or should— we do it? Climatic Change 33: 291-302. 
Because this essay helped to legitimise geoengineering research Thornes JE and Pope FD. (2014) Why do 
we need Solutions to Global Warming? In: Harrison R and Hester R (eds) Geoengineering of the Climate 
System. Cambridge, UK: The Royal Society of Chemistry, 1-21. the arguments therein presented have been 
subject to critical scrutiny Gardiner SM. (2010) Is ‘arming the future’ with geoengineering really the lesser 
evil? Some doubts about the ethics of intentionally manipulating the climate system. In: Gardiner SM, 
Caney S, Jamieson D, et al. (eds) Climate Ethics, Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press, 
284-312, Gardiner SM. (2011b) A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change: Oxford 
University Press, Moellendorf D. (2014) The Moral Challenge of Dangerous Climate Change: Values, 
Poverty, and Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press, Hamilton C. (2013a) Ethical Anxieties about 
Geoengineering. In: Sandler RL (ed) Ethics and Emerging Technologies. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
439-455. 
50 
 
                                                      
 A stratospheric aerosol injection scheme designed to counteract the radiative 
forcing due to a doubling of atmospheric CO2 would require an average global 
increase in atmospheric albedo of 0.012 (Vaughan and Lenton, 2011; Vaughan et 
al., 2009). The way this could be accomplished would depend on the types of 
aerosol used to scatter sunlight back to space, the particle size, the methods by 
which the aerosols would be placed in the stratosphere58, and the rate and 
frequency of injection (IPCC, 2013b; The Royal Society, 2009; Kravitz, 2013). 
Although most proposals have focused on the use of sulphate aerosols59  ̶ 
(hydrogen sulphide (H2S) or sulphur dioxide (SO2)  ̶  other potential options have 
been considered, including black carbon aerosols (Kravitz et al., 2012; Ban-Weiss 
and Caldeira, 2010) and special engineered particles (Keith, 2010; Teller E. et al., 
1997; Benford and Benford, 2005).  
Insights into the effectiveness and possible side effects of sulphate aerosol 
schemes have been mainly gained by numerical simulation models and/or 
natural analogues (Robock et al., 2008; Robock et al., 2012; Rasch et al., 2008; 
Ban-Weiss and Caldeira, 2010).  
Recent studies indicate that injection of sulphate aerosol precursors of at least 
the amount of sulphur dioxide injected by the Mount Pinatubo eruption60 would 
58 Several methods of placing the aerosol precursors into the stratosphere have been proposed, including: 
airplanes, artillery shells, and stratospheric balloons Robock A, Marquardt A, Kravitz B, et al. (2009) 
Benefits, risks, and costs of stratospheric geoengineering. Geophysical Research Letters 36: L19703. 
59 This is mainly due to the well-studied analogue of large volcanic eruptions. Indeed, the natural cooling 
episodes produced in the past by volcanogenic sulphate aerosols, provide direct evidence that these 
particles would have the desirable cooling effect. The most significant eruption in recent times was Mount 
Pinatubo in the Philippines (12-16 June 1991), which reduced the GMST by ≈0.5 K within the year 
following the eruption The Royal Society. (2009) Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and 
uncertainty. London: The Royal Society, 98, Pope FD, Braesicke P, Grainger RG, et al. (2012) Stratospheric 
aerosol particles and solar-radiation management. Nature Climate Change advance online publication, 
Kravitz B. (2013) Stratospheric Aerosols for Solar Radiation Management. In: Lenton TM and Vaughan NE 
(eds) Geoengineering Responses to Climate Change. Springer New York, 21-38.  
60 Although Mount Pinatubo's eruption represents a stratospheric aerosol injection of the same order of 
magnitude as a full-scale deployment of a SRM scheme via sulphate aerosol injection, the analogy 
between the two cases is still imperfect Caldeira K, Bala G and Cao L. (2013) The science of 
geoengineering. Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences. 231-256. As explained by Rasch et al. 
Rasch PJ, Tilmes S, Turco RP, et al. (2008) An overview of geoengineering of climate using stratospheric 
sulphate aerosols. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and 
Engineering Sciences 366: 4007-4037. "The aerosol forcing from an eruption lasts a few years at most, and 
eruptions occur only occasionally. There are many timescales within the Earth system, and their transient 
response to the eruption is not likely to be the same as the response to the continuous forcing required to 
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 be needed annually to maintain a RF of –4 W m–2, i.e. to offset the global-mean 
radiative forcing from a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations above 
preindustrial levels (Niemeier et al., 2011; Heckendorn et al., 2009; Pierce et al., 
2010). However, a SRM strategy of this kind would likely affect the hydrological 
cycle (Trenberth and Dai, 2007)61 and the atmospheric chemistry (Harris et al., 
1997)62. Tilmes et al. (2008) showed that an injection of stratospheric sulphate 
aerosols of this scale would strongly increase the extent of Arctic ozone 
depletion and would cause a considerable delay (between 30 and 70 years) in the 
expected recovery of the Antarctic ozone hole (Tilmes et al., 2008). Robock et al. 
(2008) used a comprehensive atmosphere-ocean general circulation model 
(AOGCM) to further investigate the climate response to a SRM scheme via 
sulphate aerosol injection. The results of the modelling study suggest that "both 
tropical and Arctic SO2 injection would disrupt the Asian and African summer 
monsoons, reducing precipitation to the food supply for billions of people".  
Finally, an abrupt termination of a sulphur aerosol injection scheme (or any other 
SRM approach) after 50 years of offsetting a 1 percent annum increase in CO2 
concentrations, would likely result in a rapid increase in global-mean 
temperature (with warming rates up to 4.1 times greater than the maximum 
rates under the business-as-usual CO2 scenario), accompanied by increases in 
global-mean precipitation (mean acceleration factor of 6.9) and decreases in sea-
ice cover (Jones et al., 2013) 63.  
counter the warming associated with greenhouse gases. Furthermore, we have no precise information on 
the role the eruptions might have on a world warmer than today". 
61 Following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo there was a substantial decrease in precipitation over land 
and a record decrease in runoff and river discharge into the ocean. These results suggest that major 
adverse effects, including drought, could arise from the deployment of these SRM schemes.  
62 The authors suggested that the increase of halogen compounds following the eruption of Mount 
Pinatubo led to major ozone depletion in polar regions and to some extent in mid-latitudes.  
63 This is what has been termed the “Termination effect”, i.e. "the consequences of a sudden halt or 
failure of the geoengineering system. For SRM approaches, which aim to offset increases in greenhouse 
gases by reductions in absorbed solar radiation,  failure could lead to a relatively rapid warming which 
would be more difficult to adapt to than the climate change that would have occurred in the absence of 
geoengineering. SRM methods that produce the largest negative changes, and which rely on advanced 
technology, are considered higher risks in this respect" UK House of Commons. Science and Technology 
Committee. (2010) The Regulation of Geoengineering. Fifth Report of Session 2009–10. London: The 
Stationery Office Limited: House of Commons. Science and Technology Committee, 116.  
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 Despite these risks, injecting hydrogen sulphide (H2S) or sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
into the stratosphere is at present not prohibited or significantly restricted by the 
main international treaties governing the emission of those substances (Bodle, 
2013).  
 
• 3. Marine cloud-brightening - Observations from clean marine air masses show 
that anthropogenic aerosols may enhance both cloud reflectivity and cloud 
cover, particularly for low-level marine clouds, which tend to cool the planet 
(Twomey, 1977). This has led some scientists to speculate about the possibility of 
increasing the number of droplets in - and hence the reflectivity of - marine 
stratocumulus clouds64 to enhance the albedo of the Earth (Matthews and Keith, 
2009). 
Accordingly, marine cloud brightening, also referred to as cloud albedo 
enhancement, cloud whitening or cloud seeding, describes a SRM technique by 
which clouds are increased and whitened over parts of the ocean to enhance 
clouds albedo, thus contributing to offset global warming by reflecting sunlight to 
space. The basic idea behind this technique is to enhance the reflectivity of low-
level marine stratocumulus clouds by increasing the number of cloud 
condensation nuclei (CCN) (The Royal Society, 2009; Caldeira et al., 2013). 
Because present levels of anthropogenic pollution already provide a significant 
source of aerosols that affect cloud droplets, this SRM technique would be most 
effective in remote marine areas with a dust-free atmosphere (Vaughan and 
Lenton, 2011). Regions of persistent marine stratocumulus off the west coasts of 
Africa and North and South America, and other extensive regions of the southern 
oceans have been identified as regions where marine cloud brightening 
approaches would be effective (Latham et al., 2008). The successful 
implementation of cloud albedo enhancement strategy  is dependent on other 
64 Marine stratocumulus clouds exert a large influence on the radiation balance of the Earth due to their 
large aerial extent, temporal persistence, and high reflectivity of solar radiation King MD. (1993) Radiative 
Properties of Clouds. In: Hobbs PV (ed) Aerosol-Cloud-Climate Interactions. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 
123-149.  
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 two key aspects: i) the creation of a supply of particles of an appropriate 
diameter and quantity to serve as CCN, and ii) the means used to deliver them 
(The Royal Society, 2009). Proposals aimed at addressing these issues have 
focused on the development of wind-driven spray vessels which would "sail back 
and forth perpendicular to the local prevailing wind and release micron-sized 
drops of seawater into the turbulent boundary layer beneath marine 
stratocumulus clouds" (Salter et al., 2008). 
Recent model simulations indicate that up to 35% of the radiative forcing due to 
current levels of GHG could be offset by stratocumulus modification. This would 
delay the simulated global warming by about 25 years (Jones et al., 2009). 
However, if this SRM strategy were abruptly halted, the global mean 
temperature would return to a nongeoengineered value in around 5 – 10 years. 
This study concludes that while some areas of sub-Saharan Africa and Australia 
could benefit from large-scale cloud modification, with an increase in rainfall of 
10-30 percent, the Amazonia and Nordeste regions of South America would 
experience decreases in precipitation, with reductions amounting to more that 
50 percent in some places. This would affect the distribution of NPP, with 
reductions corresponding to 50-100 percent over a considerable area. The 
authors conclude that while some areas could benefit from this form of 
geoengineering, there are significant areas where the response could be very 
detrimental with implications for the practical applicability of such a scheme.  
In another idealized scenario, where cloud droplets are reduced in size over all 
oceans uniformly to offset the temperature increase from a doubling of 
atmospheric CO2, the global-mean precipitation and evaporation decreases by 
about 1.3 percent, but the runoff over land increases by 7.5 percent (Bala et al., 
2010).  These different results in climate modelling of marine cloud brightening 
SRM have led the IPCC to conclude that "there is no consensus on its efficacy, in 
large part due to the high level of uncertainty about cloud radiative responses to 
aerosol changes" (IPCC, 2013b: 635). 
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 • 4. Painting Roofs white - Some authors have suggested that the albedo of urban 
regions can be increased by using highly reflective roofs and altering the material 
used in paving roads (Hamwey, 2007; Akbari et al., 2009; VanCuren, 2012; Oleson 
et al., 2010). A global albedo amplification effort may assume - at least in theory -  
that the total surface area of human settlements is capable of being ‘whitened’ 
(Jacobson and Ten Hoeve, 2011; Hamwey, 2007; Oleson et al., 2010).  
Akbari et al. (2009) suggested that urban albedo amplification technologies can 
raise roof albedos by about 0.25, and paved surface albedos by 0.15, resulting in 
a net albedo increase for urban areas of about 0.1. According to the authors, 
increasing the world-wide albedos of urban roofs and paved surfaces might 
induce a negative radiative forcing on the earth of -0.044 W m−2,  equivalent to 
offsetting about 44 Gt of CO2 emissions. 
However, in addition to affecting albedo, conversion of rooftops worldwide to 
white roofs would change energy use, thus greenhouse gas and warming and 
cooling pollutant aerosol particle emissions (Jacobson and Ten Hoeve, 2011; 
Oleson et al., 2010). 
Oleson et al. (2010) examined the effects of globally installing white roofs using 
an urban canyon model coupled to a global climate model. This model also 
estimated large-scale space heating and air conditioning (HAC) fluxes by 
controlling internal building temperatures within specified comfort levels. The 
results indicated that global space heating increased more than air conditioning 
decreased.  Nevertheless the annual mean heat island decreased by 33 percent 
over all urban areas. Although this model included feedbacks to the larger scale, 
the differences of temperatures were only estimated for urban areas and nearby 
areas (the globally-averaged temperature change due to white roofs was not 
estimated). 
To help bridge this gap, Jacobson and Hoeve (2011) estimated the climate 
response of theoretically converting all roofs within urban areas, taking into 
account both local heating and large-scale feedbacks. The results of this study 
suggest that "white roofs may reduce temperatures locally but may or may not 
reduce overall global warming worldwide". Indeed, the conversion of rooftops 
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 worldwide to white roofs, accounting for their albedo effect only, was  calculated 
to cool population-weighted global temperatures by ≈0.02 K but to warm the 
Earth overall by ≈0.07 K.  
 
• 5. Planting more reflective crops - Geoengineering schemes to increase the 
albedo of vegetation have also been proposed as a potential strategy for helping 
counteract the warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions (Hamwey, 2007; 
Ridgwell et al., 2009; Doughty et al., 2011).  The basic principle behind 
biogeoengineering or crop albedo geoengineering is to plant more reflective 
crops as a means to produce a net cooling effect on the planet. The effectiveness 
of vegetation albedo modification methods depends greatly on the albedo 
enhancement technique to be used and the area it would be applied to. There 
are several currently available possibilities for modifying the albedo of 
vegetation, including changes in choice of crop type, crop phenology and timing 
of practices. Additional strategies that could be developed in the future could 
include modifications of plant morphology such as modifying leaf characteristics 
to increase leaf pubescence, surface waxes, or canopy architecture to maximize 
albedo (Doughty et al., 2011). 
Recent proposals of crop albedo modification have been focused on grasslands, 
including open shrubland and savannah (Hamwey, 2007), and on croplands 
(Ridgwell et al., 2009; Doughty et al., 2011). The estimates for the potential 
increase in albedo vary greatly among these proposals. 
Hamwey (2007) suggested using either light-coloured shrubs, grass with 
variegated leaf colours or bioengineering grasses to increase by 25 percent the 
albedo of the world’s grasslands (7.5 percent of the Earth’s surface). Lenton and 
Vaughan (2009) estimated the radiative forcing of this proposal to be −0.51 W 
m−2 based on a surface albedo change of 0.003.  Ridgwell et al. (2009) and 
Doughty et al. (2011) restricted their proposals to croplands and estimated 
albedo increases with ranges of 0.02–0.08 and 0.05–0.15, respectively.  
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 Research on these SRM schemes is very much in its infancy and it is, therefore, 
difficult to assess these estimates and the feasibility of these proposals (The 
Royal Society, 2009; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011).  
Potential side-effects, including i) reduced of overall primary productivity and 
crop yields; ii) reduced carbon uptake; iii) reduced evapotranspiration and 
precipitation; iv) loss of biodiversity; v) decreased food security; and vi) added 
sources of social conflict, also remain to be determined (Idem). 
 
• 6. Covering desert surfaces with reflective material - In theory, the albedo of 
deserts could also be enhanced to offset global warming. Hot deserts (including 
Sahara, Arabian, Australian deserts and Gobi) largely uninhabited, sparsely 
vegetated, and with a stable surface have been suggested as the most suitable 
areas for albedo modification (Gaskill, 2004). These areas cover about 2% of the 
Earth’s surface area and have the highest insolation levels. Therefore SRM 
schemes aimed at enhance present albedo of the deserts (≈0.2 to 0.5) may have 
the potential to produce fairly large negative radiative forcings (The Royal 
Society, 2009).  
Gaskill (2004) suggested that an albedo increase from 0.36 to 0.8 over 4 million 
square miles of desert could be obtained with the addition of a reflective surface 
made of white plastic polyethylene film backed by aluminium foil65. The radiative 
forcing estimated for this project  ̶ The Global Albedo Enhancement Project 
(GAEP)  ̶  is −2.75 W m−2. This estimate was later reduced to −1.45 W m−2 in 
improved calculations worked out by Lenton and Vaughan (2009).  
Using a series of AOGCM simulations Irvine et al. (2011) simulated the climatic 
effects of the GAEP project and concluded that global desert geoengineering, 
which is associated with significant global-scale changes in circulation and the 
hydrological cycle, would cause large regional-scale changes in precipitation with 
65 The proposed desert modification material would require periodic replacement (every 3 years) and 
cleaning. It would be installed over a 60-year period and kept in place 150 years. An estimate of the cost 
of the GAEP, based on the maximum possible coverage of 4 million square miles done equally over 60  
years, is $500 billion/year, or $75 trillion at the end of 150 years (Gaskill 2004). 
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 a large reduction in the intensity of the Indian and African monsoons in 
particular. 
With these examples in mind one can already get a sense of the scope and 
far-reaching ethical and social implications of geoengineering. This is clearly reflected by 
the way geoengineering has become a focus of theoretical speculation and controversy. 
In fact, the development of new geoengineering research initiatives, the rapid expansion 
of the scientific literature in the field and the growing number of policy reports over the 
past few years not only reveal the ever more plausible role that solar radiation 
management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods are likely to play in the 
portfolio of solutions to address climate change, but also reflect the growing concerns 
about the ethical and social issues that we need to address when considering the use of 
these technologies to avert the climate crisis. 
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 3.3 Why is there a need to consider the social and ethical implications of 
geoengineering proposals? 
"Any substantive advance in science or the introduction of a 
new technology is, in and of itself, a societal impact insofar as 
it has added to the body of knowledge or the technological 
capabilities of society in general. The depth and breadth of the 
impact may be small or large, but it is an impact nonetheless 
with moral and ethical implications. Impacts of any kind are 
rarely value neutral" (Bennett-Woods, 2008: 50). 
As the previous section suggests, the different technological characteristics of 
geoengineering proposals, the different costs estimated for each method, the potential 
efficacy of their use, the levels of uncertainty associated with their deployment, and the 
distinctive risks they raise result in a multitude of solutions that seem difficult to bring 
together under the broad umbrella of the term geoengineering. For that reason some 
authors have been suggesting that the term "geoengineering" should be set aside, while 
also calling for the different CDR and SRM approaches to be analysed individually within 
a larger continuum of responses to climate change - Box 1. 
"The term "geoengineering" is overbroad, unhelpful, and misleading, and should be set aside. I 
propose "climate management" or "CM" instead. (...) "Climate management" is less scary than 
"geoengineering," while still sinister enough to temper our enthusiasm; it is more accurate; and 
it fits within existing matrices of risk management and risk calculation" (Michaelson, 2010: 225; 
229). 
"Geoengineering is controversial—indeed, the term  itself is controversial because it is both 
broad and imprecise. (...)  We prefer the term “climate remediation,” which describes  
technologies that are intentionally designed to  counteract the climate effects of past 
greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere" (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011). 
"Because of the longstanding ambiguity surrounding the term geoengineering, it is suggested 
that in the AR5, when assessing geoengineering options, the individual methods discussed might 
be referred to more specifically, i.e., by CDR and SRM rather than geoengineering, or when 
appropriate by the specific terms, e.g., cloud brightening, stratospheric aerosols, ocean 
fertilization, etc. (...) The risks and impacts of geoengineering techniques might be best assessed 
within the context of the risks and impacts of climate change and other responses to climate 
change such as mitigation and adaptation, rather than in isolation " (IPCC, 2012: 3-4).  
"Concepts cease to be helpful when they are too broad, or too vague, and geoengineering is one 
such concept. Let future research and debate cease to be about “geoengineering” and instead 
focus on the specific features of proposed technologies, and the appropriate mix of emission 
reductions, CDR, SRM, adaptation, and rectification" (Heyward, 2013: 26).  
Box 1 - Some attempts to redefine current proposals to intentionally engineer the Earth’s climate. 
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 Contrary to these views, I stress the relevance and importance of keeping the term 
geoengineering on foot, otherwise losing the conceptual basis from which some 
important epistemological, ontological, and ethical questions can be raised. In fact, 
"disaggregating" the term in order to better focus on the specific risks, technological 
issues, economic aspects, or legal and regulatory frameworks that each geoengineering 
approach seems to imply must not come at the cost of bypassing the fundamental 
questions that these proposals encompass - and if not, the change in questions ought to 
be critically scrutinised. 
Therefore, the significance of maintaining the term "geoengineering" extends beyond 
the need to take into account the three distinguished features that geoengineering 
proposals seem to encompass: global, intentional, and unnatural interventions (Schelling 
1996). It also enables us to question the very essence of these proposals, inasmuch as all 
approaches to geoengineer the Earth's climate express an implied ontology (an 
embedded theory of who we are, how we are situated in the realm of being) and a 
presumed ethics (an embedded theory of how we ought to behave) (Weiskel, 2012). I 
thus share Hamilton's view that "the essence of geoengineering is nothing 
technological", and that beneath all emotional and ethical judgments lies an 
unexamined conception of the Earth (and of the human role in earthen nature) that 
makes geoengineering imaginable (Hamilton, 2013b: 3). It is precisely here that I see the 
need to consider the social and ethical implications of the "first technology of 
intentional planetary control" (Idem, ibidem). From this perspective I demarcate myself 
from the dominant features of the consequentialist worldview that have begun to 
‘exhaust’ and ‘entrench’ the ethical debate on geoengineering into a ‘process of rational 
calculation’ – a process that has been largely informed by the ‘language of risk’66 (Adam 
and Loon, 2000) and for which "the most ethical course is the best one determined by 
summing the value of the costs and benefits, perhaps weighted by risks, and maybe with 
some account of distributional effects" (Hamilton, 2011).  
66 Whether by focusing on the risks of geoengineering technologies, or, in an almost paradoxical way, by 
assuming some of its specific methods as useful tools to manage climate risks  
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In this chapter I will summarize and discuss the main findings of Papers I–VI in light of 
the research questions and point of departure presented in Chapter I. Therefore it 
comprises the following five sub-sections:  
• Why is geoengineering becoming a part of the portfolio of response options to 
anthropogenic climate change? 
• What ‘imaginaries’ of science and technology underlie geoengineering debates? 
• How plausible are current geoengineering proposals? 
• What are the expectations, the embedded values, and the ways of making sense 
of a geoengineered world? 
• What kind of ethical framework can serve as a basis for assessing geoengineering 
proposals and inform policy responses to geoengineering governance? 
 
4.1 Why is geoengineering becoming a part of the portfolio of response 
options to anthropogenic climate change? 
The inertia of governments across the world to deliver tough action on climate change, 
the recent failures of the Doha round on trade agreements and the Copenhagen 
conference on climate change, the incapacity of short term national planning horizons to 
address long term climate change, the absence of effective policy levers to address the 
scale and complexity of the challenges involved in the transition to a low-carbon 
economy, the difficulty in realising the transformative requirements of social change 
that would come with effective climate change policy, and the prospect of a dramatic 
climate shift over the next century or two, are all factors that may help explain why we 
have arrived at the perilous juncture described in section 3.2, and why geoengineering 
has recently emerged as a topic of interest and discussion within the climate science 
community. 
4. MAIN FINDINGS 
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 However, and as suggested in PAPER IV,  to achieve a better understanding of  why 
“geoengineering has been transformed from a topic discussed largely in science fiction 
and esoteric scientific papers into mainstream scientific and policy debate” (Macnaghten 
and Szerszynski, 2013: 465) it is necessary to critically examine the salient narratives that 
by capturing the shift in the relationship between humans and the global environment 
suggest the beginning of a potentially new geological epoch where human beings appear 
to have become a driving force in the evolution of the planet and geoengineering starts 
to look acceptable in preventing the worst effects of climate change.  
Indeed, since the mid-1980s, when the Earth System Science Committee of the NASA 
Advisory Council put forward a more complete and unified approach to Earth studies a 
new way of understanding and studying the Earth system began to gain ground among 
scientific institutions around the world – Earth System Science (Earth System Sciences 
Committee, 1988; Earth System Sciences Committee, 1986). This new approach to Earth 
studies and global change, the recognition that humanity itself has become a global 
geophysical force, allied with new approaches and a growing commitment to achieving 
successful and effective planetary stewardship, are leading to a profound reorientation 
of the global environmental change research agenda, thereby opening up a wide range 
of new practices, techniques and mechanisms for global governance. 
"The advent of the Anthropocene, the time interval in which human 
activities now rival global geophysical processes, suggests that we 
need to fundamentally alter our relationship with the planet we 
inhabit. Many approaches could be adopted, ranging from 
geoengineering solutions that purposefully manipulate parts of the 
Earth System to becoming active stewards of our own life support 
system" (Steffen et al., 2011: 739). 
It is against this background that the idea of geoengineering, as a potential new tool for 
addressing climate change, is gaining ground. In fact, each new step in the direction of 
an integrated Earth System Science seems to have reinforced the plausibility of 
geoengineering proposals within the wide range of options “towards good planetary 
management” (The Global Environmental Change Programmes, 2011). This is made clear 
by considering the impetus for geoengineering that came from novel structural concepts 
of Earth system science. Indeed, the intrinsically prescriptive nature of concepts such as 
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 ‘climate stabilisation’ and ‘Anthropocene’ seem to provide the ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings that brought geoengineering to the centre of the climate 
change debate. 
4.2 What ‘imaginaries’ of science and technology underlie geoengineering 
debates? 
Different conceptions, understandings, and value assumptions concerning the changing 
relationships between science and society, science and technology, and science and 
nature tend to inform the geoengineering debate and sustain a variety of discursive 
frames that shape the way geoengineering has been problematised (Scholte et al., 2013; 
Sikka, 2012; Huttunen and Hildén, 2013; Luokkanen et al., 2013; Nerlich and Jaspal, 
2012). Hence, the analysis of the geoengineering debate cannot be considered in 
isolation and apart from the context of its production; its full meaning can only be 
grasped in the context of the larger social imaginary of science and technology in which 
geoengineering narratives are rooted. 
As the discussion of PAPER VI suggests, the Cartesian mechanistic worldview, with its 
emphasis on the instrumental mastery of nature, is deeply embedded in the dominant 
techno-scientific framing of climate change and in the range of practices that have 
produced the "coupled human and ecological system" as a "thinkable" and governable 
domain. This reinforces the need to unbind the geoengineering debate from the deeply 
embedded narratives of science, technology, and society which present technoscientific 
innovation as the solution to our most critical problems and as a substitute for social 
change. Similarly, the construction of narratives giving meaning to human action within 
nature, and providing guidance for humans’ domination of nature, deserves a more 
critical and open reflection than has been the case to date.  
This was the focus of PAPER I, in which three interconnected areas of current debates 
on geoengineering were identified: geoengineering research and experimentation, 
geoengineering regulation and governance, and geoengineering implementation and 
misuse. Within these areas we have identified the main arguments called into question 
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 in the geoengineering debates and the underlying ‘master narratives’ in which they are 
embedded (Figure 9). 
As suggested in PAPER I, the analysis of geoengineering debates may contribute not only 
to uncovering the variety of knowledge, values, and interests that compete in the 
climate change science, but also to mapping the dynamics of these debates in the 
context of the major narratives that are emerging in our society — thus seen as a 
valuable approach to understanding the mutual coproduction of science and society, in 
which "scientific knowledge both embeds and is embedded in social identities, 
institutions, representations and discourses" (Jasanoff, 2004b).  
In this context, approaching geoengineering in a holistic manner is another way of 
looking at the problem of climate change and the ‘scalar dislocations’ it introduces in 
modern systems of experience and understanding (Jasanoff, 2010). In fact, the ethical, 
political, environmental, and social considerations that surround the debates on 
geoengineering tend to express political tensions and moral conflicts between experts, 
decision-makers, and the public, whether about the political control over the 
development of science and technology, whether about the values and principles 
underlying certain scientific practices and technological applications to pursue the 
common good. A reflection on these issues suggests the relevance of developing 
alternative approaches to furthering the ‘democratisation and de-alienation’ of 
geoengineering debates, thus responding to a perceived need for more careful 
consideration of the normative assumptions that lie behind the idea of deliberately 
manipulating Earth's climate to offset anthropogenic climate change. 
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Figure 9 - The three interconnected areas in which geoengineering debates are taking place: main arguments and underlying master narratives. 
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 4.3 How plausible are current geoengineering proposals? 
Why question the plausibility of geoengineering? Given the current state of affairs, in 
which geoengineering is receiving increasing consideration from academics and policy 
analysts as a possible means by which to offset human-induced climate change, this 
might seem a rather elementary or needless question. Yet, given the conflicting 
arguments and the variety of theses that inform the current debates on geoengineering, 
I was compelled to acknowledge that not only the need to address this question has to 
be taken more seriously, but also that answering it is inevitably far from straightforward. 
"The current debate on climate engineering is far more complex and 
multilayered than a purely scientific-economic analysis would indicate. To 
understand the complexity of the debate, it is necessary to collect, structure, 
and interrelate the wide range of arguments advanced in favor of or against 
climate engineering. (…) As the analysis reveals, individual arguments can 
frequently only be assessed for validity and plausibility when different 
disciplines are taken into account" (Rickels et al., 2011: 14). 
Indeed, although plausible reasoning seems to play an important role in the ongoing 
debates on geoengineering, there is still a lack of understanding of how this “practical 
epistemic device” (Rescher, 2009) is being used within the context of the disputed 
arguments and controversial theses on the pros and cons of geoengineering research 
and deployment. 
While some authors emphasise the plausible assumptions supporting the need for 
further and more in-depth research into the field of geoengineering — be it to increase 
our ability to access this topic, or ultimately, to deploy (in case of a climate emergency) 
the associated technologies — others draw attention to the highly inconsistent and 
implausible features that dominate the geoengineering debate (Table 1). 
WHAT IS PLAUSIBLE IN GEOENGINEERING? WHAT IS IMPLAUSIBLE IN GEOENGINEERING? 
‘(…) And as climate change impacts worsen with 
only tepid efforts to avoid it, geoengineering 
proponents can make increasingly plausible 
arguments that we may have little choice than to 
use geoengineering at least to some extent’ 
(Wold et al., 2009: 119).  
 
‘Certainly, geoengineering seems to offer a 
‘The idea of geoengineering has a decades-long 
history, but it has until recently been relatively easy to 
dismiss it as implausible’ (Stilgoe, 2012: 201). 
 
‘It would be wrong simply to assume that all 
geoengineering projects are liable to the same problems. 
However, even if we do this and even if some geo-
engineering projects can meet the preceding fours 
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 WHAT IS PLAUSIBLE IN GEOENGINEERING? WHAT IS IMPLAUSIBLE IN GEOENGINEERING? 
plausible solution to the possibility of climate 
catastrophe in a way that attempting to reduce 
emission simply doesn’t’ (Morris, 2008: 145). 
 
‘Geoengineering appears to be a plausible means 
of “buying time” while humanity undergoes the 
profound changes in its use of energy and choices 
in transportation that are needed to eliminate 
GHG emissions’ (Hemming and Hagler, 2011: 
274). 
 
‘It is plausible that, after exhausting other 
avenues to limit climate risks, such a nation might 
decide to begin a gradual, well monitored 
programme of SRM deployment, even without 
any international agreement on its regulation’ 
(Keith et al., 2010: 427). 
 
‘Given common estimates of the monetized cost 
of climate damages, the value of reducing climate 
change by geoengineering could exceed 1% of 
GDP. It is, therefore, plausible that the costs of 
geoengineering will be all but irrelevant to 
decisions about deployment, which will focus on 
the risk-to-risk trade-off between the risk of 
geoengineering and the risk of climate damages’ 
(Keith, 2010: 16430).  
 
´If the objective of governance is to address risks 
and potential impacts of an activity, then 
activities involving the same risks and potential 
impacts should be treated the same regardless of 
whether an activity is carried out as “science” or 
as “deployment”. On the other hand, some argue 
that following certain procedures and 
implementing safeguard is what constitutes 
research, and that therefore such activities should 
be treated differently. In contrast to the former 
view, this latter understanding appears to include 
plausible conditions for privileging 
geoengineering research to some extent’ (Bodle, 
2013: 468). 
 
‘The moral hazard argument has been important 
in earlier debates about geoengineering and is 
plausible. It directly parallels arguments made in 
earlier years to oppose adaptation policy (Pielke 
et al. 2007). However there is little empirical 
evidence to support or refute the moral hazard 
argument in relation to geoengineering, 
(although there has been little research in this 
area), and it is possible that geoengineering 
actions could galvanise people into demanding 
more effective mitigation action’ (The Royal 
challenges, it would be highly implausible to think that a 
policy of geoengineering would entirely obviate the need 
for lowering greenhouse gas emissions’ (Caney, 2011: 
83). 
 
‘Attempts to stave off ecocrisis through industrial-scale 
renewable energy, nuclear power and/or geo-
engineering are deeply implausible if you admit the 
simple truth that “you can't grow your way out of a crisis 
if growth is what's causing the crisis in the first place’” 
(Curry, 2011: 217). 
 
‘(…) there remains the problem of governing solar 
radiation management and of ensuring that the 
technology is deployed for good purposes – for example, 
to combat global warming rather than for national or 
regional advantage. Our participants regarded this 
prospect as highly implausible. Whether their judgement 
turns out to be justified, only time will tell, though it is 
quite possible’  (Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013: 
472). 
 
‘Officially, climate policy is all about energy efficiency, 
renewables and nuclear power. Officially, the target of 
keeping global temperatures within two degrees of the 
pre-industrial revolution average is still in our sights. But 
the voices whispering that we might have left it too late 
are no longer automatically dismissed as heretical. 
Wouldn’t it be better, they ask, to have at least 
considered some other options — in case things get 
really bad? 
This is the context in which various scary, implausible or 
simply bizarre [geoengineering] proposals are being put 
on the table’. (Corner, 2013). 
 
‘It has been suggested that iron fertilization could 
represent an inexpensive carbon storage option; 
however, widely discussed cost estimates are 
questionable as they typically have been based on 
implausible assumptions including that exported carbon 
has high C/Fe ratios, that all of the added organic carbon 
exported from the euphotic zoneis balanced by a 
corresponding CO2 influx from the atmosphere, and that 
CO2 taken up by the ocean through iron fertilization 
remains there for a long time’ (Caldeira et al., 2004: 122-
123). 
 
‘This claim that the moral permissibility of ocean 
fertilization cannot be adequately assessed 
independently of the actions that have necessitated it, 
we note, may seem prima facie implausible, as it seems 
to make dubious metaphysical suppositions. However, 
we should stress again that this is not a metaphysical 
position. Rather, the general idea is that the 
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Society, 2009: 39). 
 
‘It is also plausible that a major country, suddenly 
experiencing a serious local or regional climate 
disaster such as prolonged drought, could decide 
to do SRM unilaterally, thus imposing its 
consequences on the entire planet’ (Morgan and 
Ricke, 2010: 16). 
 
‘I highlight the divergent results not to argue that 
one is more correct than other but to point out 
that in this case, two different research teams 
using very similar methods and just by varying 
assumptions about “deep uncertainties” arrived 
at results that are completely at odds with each 
other. 
The conclusion, then, is that while it is certainly 
plausible that techniques of geoengineering could 
lead  to very large benefits in relations to costs, it 
is also possible that those same techniques could 
lead to very large costs with respect to benefits’ 
(Roger Pielke Jr., 2010: 127). 
 
‘But what we know so far does suggest that, 
should the effects of climate change prove severe 
or even catastrophic—scenarios which are far 
from certain, but which appear increasingly 
plausible—geoengineering could be the only way 
of cooling the planet quickly, substantially, and 
sustainably’ (Thernstrom, 2010). 
 
‘I use a simple game theoretic model to 
demonstrate the following results. First, a credible 
threat that countries will deploy a geoengineering 
scheme can increase aggregate abatement to the 
level that the threat dissipates; the world reduces 
emissions to a level where geoengineering no 
longer makes sense. Second, the same credible 
threat can sustain a self-enforcing climate 
agreement with full participation and higher 
abatement than the non-cooperative scenario. I 
do not claim that these results are inevitable, but 
rather that they are just as plausible as a scenario 
under which geoengineering undermines 
abatement efforts’ (Millard-Ball, 2012: 1048). 
 
‘Stratospheric aerosols are perhaps the most 
plausible solar geoengineering method thus far 
proposed, in part because they mimic a natural 
process that is known to cool the planet 
significantly – large volcanic eruptions which send 
sulphate aerosols high into the stratosphere for a 
period of about a year’ (Low et al., 2013: 175). 
 
permissibility of an action is best established by appeal 
to and analysis of its most suitable description’ (Hale and 
Dilling, 2011: 205). 
 
‘It has always struck me as implausible that any national 
leader would argue that geoengineering offers a safe 
alternative to emissions reductions — or that the 
American people would go along with the idea. Such a 
claim would require an extraordinary — indeed, I would 
say unobtainable — level of confidence in an unproven 
and manifestly imperfect technology’ (Thernstrom, 
2010). 
 
‘But the dispersion of authority to different institutions 
will make it more difficult to consider geoengineering in 
an integrated manner. Suggestions to do so under the 
banner of the UNFCCC (for example, Lin 2009) are 
implausible, since the UNFCCC is seen as dysfunctional 
by many countries, and few trust its ability to make 
decisions’ (Bodansky, 2012). 
 
‘Economic assessments are particularly open to 
instrumental framing effects relating to their treatment 
of sensitivities and the discounting of time. Whilst the 
BCA conducted by Bickel &Lane (2009) does include a 
number of different emission controls scenarios as well 
as market and ethical discount rates, these assumptions 
rely upon huge uncertainties in the literature. 
Furthermore in a demonstration of these methodological 
framings influencing outputs, another BCA using the 
same Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the 
Economy (DICE) but different assumptions led to 
conflicting conclusions. Where stratospheric aerosol 
injection achieved an admirable benefit-cost ratio of 25 
to 1 in Bickel & Lane (2009), Goes et al. (2011) concluded 
that the solar geoengineering proposal failed benefit-
cost analysis under no less plausible assumptions (see 
Pielke Jr., 2010)’ (Bellamy et al., 2012: 18). 
 
‘DAC [direct air capture] could at best be deployed 
slowly. Therefore, it is not at all matched to the task of 
reacting quickly to an abrupt climate emergency, for 
which the required rates of construction of facilities 
above and below ground are implausible’ (Socolow et 
al., 2011: i). 
 
‘All sorts of ideas have been proposed, from filling the 
stratosphere with reflective particles to giant space-
borne parasols designed to shade the Earth from the 
sun. The idea of such a technological last chance, even if 
it sounds implausible, is a secret comfort to many of 
those frustrated by the lack of progress around the world 
in cutting emissions of greenhouse gases’ (MacCracken, 
2009). 
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 WHAT IS PLAUSIBLE IN GEOENGINEERING? WHAT IS IMPLAUSIBLE IN GEOENGINEERING? 
‘Suppose, for example, that current political 
inertia on climate change is partly caused by a 
resistance to the kinds of norms of global justice 
and community that dealing with the problem 
might suggest. Then, it seems plausible that any 
geoengineering policy likely to emerge will be 
similarly constrained’ (Gardiner, 2011a: 168). 
 
 
‘There was similar scepticism about the possibility of 
ascertaining how much, of what, needs to be injected 
into the atmosphere to effectively and safely manage 
the climate system. For our participants, it was 
implausible to imagine that the effects of particulate 
injection could be known except in the context of full 
deployment, at a planetary level and across considerable 
timescales’ (Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013: 470). 
Table 1 - The geoengineering debate: balancing the plausibility and implausibility of geoengineering 
proposals. 
A close reading of these quotations illustrates how the concept of plausibility has been 
invoked in a variety of contexts, such as those related with: i) the description, or 
formulation, of the conditions that justify acknowledging the arguments in favour of 
research into and possible deployment of geoengineering; ii) the attempts to bring into 
prominence the epistemic and nonepistemic values attached to geoengineering 
proposals; iii) the disentanglement of the kinds of world that geoengineering might bring 
into being; iv) the critical exploration of the assumptions that underpin governance 
debates around these technologies; and finally v) the discussion about the underlying 
assumptions of technical and economical assessments conducted in this field.  
As discussed in PAPER V,  in the field of geoengineering, where knowledge is 
incomplete, uncertain, and inconsistent, the inductive and deductive arguments that 
one would expect to encounter in the scientific model of justification — the positivistic 
model of scientific verification of empirical and analytic propositions — seem to 
intermingle with a third class of arguments, the so-called abductive, presumptive, or 
plausibilistic forms of argumentation (Walton, 2003). This class of arguments is based on 
a kind of plausible reasoning that combines normative or value-stating premises 
(premises stating general rules) with premises drawn from the presumed facts of a case 
— be it a simulation model that seeks to address the climatic consequences of 
geoengineering proposals (Matthews and Caldeira, 2007; Lenton and Vaughan, 2009), a 
limited and controlled real-world geoengineering experiment (Pidgeon et al., 2013), or 
an assessment of different geoengineering techniques in terms of efficiency, 
affordability, safety, controllability, timeliness, or reversibility (The Royal Society, 2009; 
Vaughan and Lenton, 2011; Boyd, 2008).  
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 Indeed, the contexts in which the concept of plausibility has been used and the set of 
things it refers to67 not only reveal “a very large class of plausibility reckonings deeply 
embedded in actual cognitive practice” (Gabbay and Woods, 2005a: 237), but also 
expose the dual nature of plausibility in hypothetical reasoning:  
"Plausibility trisects reasoning in characteristic ways. We can conceive of 
the plausible as that which is reasoned from and as that which is 
reasoned to. We can also see it as characterizing the inference link 
between what is reasoned from and what is reasoned to. Seen this 
way, a piece of reasoning may have premisses that are plausible; it may 
have a plausible proposition as its conclusion; and its conclusion may be 
plausibly inferred from its premisses. It is also notable that plausibility is 
ambiguous as between propositions and what we might call the 
“engagement of propositions”. The two are logically independent. 
Planck famously thought that his quantum hypothesis was radically 
implausible, but he conjectured it all the same, illustrating that it can 
sometimes be reasonable to accept (if only tentatively) the 
unreasonable. Given the linguistic tie between the reasonable and the 
plausible, a like concurrence affects the plausible. Accordingly we shall 
distinguish propositional plausibility from strategic plausibility" 
(Gabbay and Woods, 2005b: 68, emphasis added).  
This distinction points to the ambiguous cognitive and epistemic status of plausibility 
and highlights the importance of considering both the explanatory and instrumental 
aspects of abductive reasoning (Magnani, 2009) in the context of the geoengineering 
debate, where the two different kinds of plausible contentions (propositional and 
strategic plausibility) are being brought into play to answer two very different kinds of 
questions: What is it reasonable to believe? and What is it reasonable to do?  
According to Hodgson, these two questions involve the type of decisions that  "cannot 
be made by overt calculation or computation or any other way involving the overt 
mechanical application of conclusive rules" (Hodgson, 2012: 39). As he argues, these are 
rather the typical questions that can only be answered by the exercise of reasonable 
67 Of which the following are just a few examples: the plausible, or implausible, ideas of controlling the 
global climate; the plausible, or implausible, conjectures about future institutional arrangements and the 
appropriate policy mechanisms to address the geoengineering governance challenges; the plausible, or 
implausible, assumptions about deep uncertainties underlying economic assessments in the field; the 
plausible, or implausible, social and ethical implications regarding the use of certain geoengineering 
methods, etc. 
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 (albeit fallible) judgment. In fact, the need to engage in this kind of (inconclusive) 
plausible reasoning cannot be eliminated by the ability to use the logical structure of 
scientific knowledge – or what Walter Fisher refers to as the “logic of reasons” 
associated with the “rational world paradigm” (Fisher, 1987). In this sort of situation – 
when we are confronted with these kinds of questions, when we need to make 
judgments on the basis of inconclusive reasons, when we need to “transform the logic of 
reasons into a logic of good reasons” – the “narrative paradigm” offers a means of 
transcending the “uncompromising and irreducible oppositions presented by all kinds of 
absolutisms: dualisms of reason and imagination, of knowledge and opinion, of 
irrefutable self-evidence and deceptive will, of a universally accepted objectivity and an 
uncommunicable subjectivity, of a reality binding on everybody and values that are 
purely individual” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 510). 
This goes some way toward recapturing “the Aristotelian question of balancing 
instrumental rationality with value-rationality” (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 53; Flyvbjerg, 2004). 
Accordingly, when analysing the various qualities of plausible claims deemed important 
in the field of geoengineering, I stressed the relevance of considering the 
neo-Aristotelian accounts of practical reasoning that, rooted in a critique of modern 
instrumental technical rationality, seek to redress the imbalance between the 
intellectual virtues of episteme, techne and phronesis68 (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
68 The intellectual virtue that Aristotle calls episteme concerns universals and the production of knowledge 
that is invariable and context-independent. It corresponds to the modern scientific ideal as expressed in 
natural sciences, being generally translated as “science” or “scientific knowledge”. Techne can be 
translated into English as “art” in the sense of “craft”. Its objective concerns the applications of technical 
knowledge and skills according to a pragmatic instrumental rationality. It is therefore an activity that is 
variable and context-dependent. Whereas episteme concerns theoretical know why, techne denotes 
technical know how. Phronesis concerns values, and goes beyond analytic rationality (episteme) and 
technical knowledge (techne). It involves judgements and decisions made in the manner of a virtuoso 
social actor; the ability “to deliberate nobly about things good and advantageous for himself, not in a 
partial way—for example, the sorts of things conducive to health or to strength—but about the sorts of 
things conducive to living well in general” Bartlett RC and Collins SD. (2011) Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics. Translated, with Interpretive Essay, Notes, and Glossary, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Thereby, it is often translated as “prudence”, “practical common sense” or “practical wisdom” Flyvbjerg B. 
(2001) Making Social Science Matter. Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again, Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, Flyvbjerg B. (2004) Phronetic Planning Research: Theoretical and 
Methodological Reﬂections. Planning Theory & Practice 4: 283-306. For further discussion, see: Eikeland 
O. (2008) The Ways of Aristotle.  Aristotelian phrónêsis, Aristotelian Philosophy  of Dialogue, and Action 
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 With this background in mind, I now return to the quotations in Table 1 to suggest that 
the considerations of reasonability and plausibility that lie at the heart of the 
geoengineering debate should be understood as manifestations of a reasoning process 
in-between two theoretical traditions, namely:  i) the instrumental technical rationality 
of modern conceptions of scientific reasoning  (the epistemological stance engendered 
by enlightenment rationality and logical positivism) and ii) the tradition of practical 
reasoning that draws on practical value-rationality to challenge the logical empiricism, 
its ontological privileging of scientific knowledge, and the adequacy of “instrumental 
rationality alone”.  
These kinds of considerations are also embedded in the pictorial narratives of 
geoengineering, with their implied reasoning corresponding in many ways to a form of 
narrative rationality pertaining to rhetorical action - PAPER V. As the four images 
included in this paper suggest, plausibility not only plays a central role in the discovery, 
pursuit, and justification of geoengineering hypotheses, but also constitutes the 
fundamental practical epistemic device for seeking the answers to the two 
above-mentioned questions:  What is it reasonable to believe? and What is it reasonable 
to do? 
 
4.4 What are the expectations, the embedded values, and the ways of 
making sense of a geoengineered world? 
In PAPER II and PAPER V I focused on the entanglement of imaging and imagining  ̶  
“imag(in)ing” 69 ̶  with a view to exploring the potential of a visual narrative approach for 
Research, Bern: Peter Lang AG, MacIntyre A. (1984) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame University Press. 
69 The word “imag(in)ing” aims at capturing the continuum between imaging and imagining, referring to 
something that has not only to do with the way an image may bear some resemblance to that which it 
represents, but also with the way it might “stand for’” and is able to “act for” (Ruivenkamp and Rip 2011, 
p.185). It thus refers to the realm of symbolic action, in the sense that visual representations “have 
sequence and meaning for those who live, create, or interpret them”  (Fisher 1987, 1985) and might 
provide a meaning and a rationale for decision and action. 
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 better understanding the expectations, the embedded values, and the ways of making 
sense of a geoengineered world.   
As I hope to have been able to demonstrate, the visual representations of 
geoengineering offer a privileged perspective from which to address this question. In 
fact, the images that populate the world of geoengineering tend to balance the past, 
present, and future in order to communicate the results of recent experiments, as well 
as to present the potentialities, drawbacks, and risks associated with its associated 
technologies. By combining present achievements in this field with visions of what it 
may become, the visual representations of geoengineering draw attention to the 
anachronism that tends to be associated with innovation processes in the context of 
knowledge production. These are entanglements of the present and the future, of the 
world in which we live and of worlds that might be realised; of a science that has to deal 
with our incomplete, inconsistent, and uncertain knowledge and a science that aspires 
to precision and exactitude; of a humanity constrained by its very nature and a humanity 
that aspires to transcend its own nature.   
This last aspect is clearly illustrated in an article, published in Tikkun magazine, by Paul 
Wapner about the “moral character of two environmentalisms”, namely: the traditional 
environmentalism, which strives for naturalism, and the new environmentalism, which 
strives for mastery. 
"Traditional environmentalism taught us to live humbly within nature’s 
limits. A new environmentalism, which assumes we can’t learn fast 
enough to live humbly, embraces geo-engineering ideas as our main hope 
for cooling the planet" (Wapner, 2010). 
According to Wapner, the new environmentalists are “now admitting that global 
capitalism, incessant technological innovation, endless consumption, and pervasive 
anthropocentrism are here to stay. So, rather than continue to battle against these 
dynamics in the service of living more harmoniously with the natural world, many argue 
that it is time to embrace them and align ourselves with their power” (idem). Figure 10 
shows the image included in this article to illustrate the inconsistencies of a new 
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 environmentalism that ignores naturalism – an image that has the power to confront us 
with the implausible story that portrays the “little prince” as a “little geo-engineer”. 
 
Figure 10 - The Little Geo- engineer. Source: Wapner, P. (2010)  
It seems a contradiction, but the idea is clear, the little prince lives in a universe 
populated with planets dominated by those he has met throughout the story (the king, 
the vain man, the businessman, the lamplighter, the geographer) — those that in the 
book were concerned with “matters of consequence”. But if the narrator of the book 
says that “the little prince's ideas about what was important were very different from 
those of grown-ups” (Saint-Exupéry, 1995: 56), it seems here that he has given up those 
ideas. The concerns of the little prince have shifted from essential matters and his 
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 personal affairs — the quiet pleasure of looking at the sunset, his dedication to 
“cleaning out his volcanoes” and “to attend the toilet of his planet with the greatest 
care” — to “matters of consequence” that is: brightening the clouds, fertilising the 
ocean with iron, pumping aerosols into the upper atmosphere, and so forth.  
And it is precisely this new little prince, the little geo-engineer who personifies the “New 
Environmentalism”, the one who says that “the problem is not that we are doing too 
much —  pumping too much carbon into the atmosphere —  but that we’re doing too 
little  - we are not working hard enough to alter the atmosphere” (Wapner, 2011: 184). 
This might seem an implausible perspective and a twisted way of looking at the climate 
change problem. However, some more elaborated, and seemingly plausible, versions of 
this perspective are not difficult to find: 
"We have been actively engaged in a massive programme of global 
geoengineering for many decades or centuries. We need to recognize this 
activity and change the way we think about the earth - not just our impact 
on the planet, but how (or if) we should manage the situation. (...) Once we 
recognize our environmental imperative to carefully and thoughtfully 
manage our planet for maintaining the health of all component earth 
systems and tackle the ethical issues of geoengineering, we can move away 
from accidental or poorly planned geoengineering into an era of conscious 
geodesign" (Artz and Dangermond, 2011: 4-5). 
By revealing the contradictions of a new environmentalism that ignores naturalism, the 
implausible story that portrays the little prince as a little geo-engineer confronts us with 
a situation of aporetic inconsistency, that is a situation where a group of contentions 
seem individually plausible but are collectively incompatible (Rescher, 2009). 
The root idea of aporetics — the theory of rational deliberation in the face of 
inconsistencies — “lies in the combination of reductive control in situations where we 
have succumbed to the cognitive overcommitment of inconsistency and find ourselves 
having to salvage some part of what must be abandoned” (Rescher, 2009: ix). According 
to Rescher, the tendency to hypertrophy that arises from the conjunction of conflicting 
propositions can only be countered by a plausibility analysis, a process that enables the 
“chain of inconsistency” to be broken by abandoning one or more of the contentions 
(the weakest links) that cannot be maintained together. Because this process of analysis 
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 encompasses a variety of cognitive endeavours, Rescher proposes a method to 
synthesise and systemise an aporetic procedure — coherence tropism via plausibility 
analysis — that can be used whenever we are confronted with threatening situations of 
cognitive dissonance and/or inconsistency. In this context, “plausibility-tropism” can be 
seen as an instrument of epistemic prudence, closely analogous to the prudential 
principle of action — that is, opting for the available alternative from which the least 
possible harm can result (Rescher, 2003: 87). Accordingly, a possible prudential means 
for coming to terms with the inconsistencies that prevail in the geoengineering debate is 
through rational management of its apories. Here is another example of a fundamental 
apory in geoengineering that can only be resolved by simply abandoning some (or all) of 
the commitments whose conjoining creates a contradiction: 
"A serious effort on geoengineering looks like a wonderfully secure 
employment program for climate scientists, yet many climate scientists are 
very worried about geoengineering. Some pundits and other people 
express doubts about the quality of climate science and our understanding 
of global warming, while expressing confidence that we can easily and 
safely geoengineer our way out of global warming if it becomes a big 
problem. However, these two ideas are highly inconsistent — confidence in 
geoengineering requires confident climate science" (Alley, 2011: p. 311). 
Although the resolution of this apory does not seem a very difficult task, there is still a 
resistance to consider the far-reaching implications of its result. 
 
4.5 What kind of ethical framework can serve as a basis for assessing 
geoengineering proposals and inform policy responses to geoengineering 
governance? 
In PAPER III and PAPER IV two different contextual frameworks from which to address 
the ethical issues in geoengineering were presented and analysed. The first represents 
the mainstream Earth system science perspective, while the second one corresponds to 
an alternative view from the field of social studies of science and technology. Central to 
both is the concept of an ‘epochal break’, in the former in terms of the Human-Earth 
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 relationship, in the latter in terms of the relationship between science, technology and 
society. 
By stressing the relevance of considering the close links between thought and 
intervention, in PAPER IV I drew upon the analytical concept of Earth system 
governmentality (Lövbrand et al., 2009) to suggest that the large continuum of possible 
government programmes for sustainability should constitute the backbone of the 
analytical framework to address the ethical issues of geoengineering. Indeed, the 
analysis of geoengineering within this continuum may provide valuable insights for 
addressing what have been tentatively agreed as the five main properties of "ethically 
sound frameworks", namely:  
• Inclusion of values at stake – making explicit the values at stake in any decision;  
• Transparency – overcoming the ‘opaqueness’ of moral decision-making; 
• Multiplicity of viewpoints – taking into account the multiplicity/plurality of 
known ethical viewpoints; 
• Exposition of case-relevant ethically relevant aspects – taking into consideration 
all ethically relevant aspects of the issue, including the factual information that 
potentially contributes to strengthening or weakening a particular outcome or 
judgment; 
• Inclusion of ethical arguments – understanding the arguments behind a 
particular decision, in order to enable rational critique and debate. 
The fundamental assumptions underlying the design of the proposed framework were 
as follows: i) the need to be sufficiently comprehensive in order to capture the different 
perspectives on geoengineering and allow access to all relevant facts and normative 
considerations that lie behind a particular position; ii) the need to identify the salient 
ethical concerns according to which the social and ethical impacts of geoengineering can 
be assessed; iii) the possibility of subjecting the conflicting moral accounts to rigorous 
examination in the light of agreed ethical principles; and, last but not least, iv) the need 
to provide substance for ethical deliberation, so as to help decision-makers reach sound 
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 judgments and responsible decisions about the ethical acceptability of geoengineering 
research and deployment. 
Thus, building upon previous efforts to identify an appropriate tool for rational ethical 
analysis, I adopted (with the necessary adaptations) the approach developed by Prof. 
Ben Mepham and his colleagues at the University of Nottingham in the early 1990s for 
translating some of the criteria of "ethically sound frameworks" into a procedural and 
substantive tool 70 –  the Ethical Matrix (Kaiser et al., 2007; Mepham, 2000; Mepham, 
2005; Mepham, 1996; Mepham et al., 2006; Mepham et al., 1996).  
In line with the approach developed by Beauchamp and Childress in the field of 
biomedical ethics, the ethical matrix (EM) uses a "principled" approach to ethics, 
appealing to a set of prima facie principles (i.e. rules of action that are "valid at first 
appearance"). Hence, the three basic principles employed in the EM were chosen to 
represent the major traditional ethical theories, namely: i) respect for wellbeing, 
representing the major utilitarian principle; ii) respect for autonomy, representing the 
major deontological principle; and iii) fairness, representing respect for justice (Rawls, 
1951; Rawls, 1972), which is derived from both utilitarian and deontological theories 
(Mepham, 2005). These three prima facie principles together represent what is referred 
to as common morality, i.e. "moral norms that bind all persons in all places" 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2001: 3), and their inclusion in the framework acknowledges 
the plurality of perspectives that might be brought to an ethical analysis (Mepham, 
2010). As we can see in Table 2, this ethical component of the method forms the 
columns of the EM.  
The second component of the method, listed in rows, consists of a set of selected 
interest groups or parties affected by the issue in question. In the case of 
geoengineering, the list of potentially affected interest groups is broad (including most 
nations, subnational groups, nongovernmental organisations, corporations and civil  
70 "By bringing ethical considerations to the fore, it acts as a substantive ethical tool; and by requiring 
policy-makers to articulate their assessments of impacts on each cell of the matrix, it acts as a procedural 
tool" Mepham B. (2010) The Ethical Matrix as a Tool in Policy Interventions: The Obesity Crisis. In: Franz-
Theo Gottwald, Ingensiep HW and Meinhardt M (eds) Food Ethics. Dordrecht: Springer, 17-30. 
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Table 2 - The ethical matrix revisited: towards an analytical framework for evaluating the ethical 
dimensions of geoengineering research and deployment. 
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 societies). Thus, and because "the global impacts of geoengineering activities – both its 
benefits and risks – may be unevenly distributed across stakeholders" (Bracmort et al., 
2011: 21), I suggested that the best way to capture the explicit listing of stakeholders’ 
viewpoints is to consider the large spectrum of possible government programmes for 
sustainability that the concept of Earth system governmentality encompasses. 
Accordingly, the first and last rows of Table 2 depict the extremes of this continuum, i.e. 
the two types of government programme for sustainability (‘management first’ and 
‘ethics first’) that occupy the end-points of the Anthropocene imagery (Lovbrand et al., 
2009).  
The ‘management first’ approach "draws upon the optimistic view of human control and 
self-determination embedded in Earth System thinking and focuses on options and 
caveats for technological fixes and geoengineering" (Idem). The first row of the EM 
(structured around established ethical theories) sets out the main arguments that have 
been advanced under this approach in the geoengineering debate, which, together, tend 
to sustain the idea that we need to go further and faster in researching and deploying 
these technologies.  
The counterpoint of this extreme interpretation of the Anthropocene is set out in the 
last row of the EM, which represents the ‘ethics first’ approach – "humbled by the scale, 
complexity and vulnerability of the Earth System, this political programme highlights the 
need for a new ethical framework for Earth stewardship" (Idem). Accordingly, this lists 
the main arguments that have been advanced against geoengineering research and 
deployment - direct justification of a research ban and an international moratorium on 
deployment (Rickels et al., 2011). 
The outline of this framework underlines the importance of facilitating deliberative 
assessments in order to map the plurality of perspectives and explore qualitative aspects 
of uncertainty in and around geoengineering. Thus, the empty spaces between these 
two extreme end-points of the Anthropocene imagery reflect the scope for democratic 
decision-making and public engagement in the field of geoengineering.  
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"(...) with certain developments of our powers the nature of 
human action has changed, and, since ethics is concerned 
with action, it should follow that the changed nature of 
human action calls for a change in ethics as well: this not 
merely in the sense that new objects of action have added to 
the case material on which received rules of conduct are to 
be applied, but in the more radical sense that the 
qualitatively novel nature of certain of our actions has 
opened up a whole new dimension of ethical relevance for 
which there is no precedent in the standards and canons of 
traditional ethics" (Jonas, 1984: ix). 
5.1 Conclusion 
Questions concerning how human beings ought to behave with regard to the natural 
world can hardly be said to be new. Prescriptions concerning human attitudes and 
behaviour toward the natural world have existed throughout human history (Palmer, 
2003). By translating our values, these prescriptions are typically connected to both our 
moral standards and our beliefs (Kaiser, 1997).  
As the results of this study suggest, a particular conception of the world and of our place 
in it needs to be questioned if the ethical and social issues of geoengineering are to be 
taken seriously. The point here is not simply to question the risks that geoengineering 
proposals may bring as a response to the escalating climate change problem,  but rather 
to question the "axiomatic beliefs" that underpin these proposals.  As Kaiser pointed out 
(1997: 329), the more fundamental beliefs about both nature and society are largely 
unaffected by science, assuming a more axiomatic status and forming part of the "myths 
of nature"  that lie at  the roots of our behaviour and ethics.  
The myths of nature are a typology that captures different interpretations of ecosystem 
stability, translating how agencies managing ecosystems have adopted different 
strategies in the face of similar environmental problems (Holling, 1979; Timmerman, 
5. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
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 1986; Holling, 1986). The four myths of nature - nature capricious,  nature benign, 
nature ephemeral, and nature perverse/tolerant - can be graphically represented by 
adopting the metaphor of a sphere rolling in a landscape (Schwarz and Thompson, 
1990), where the rolling ball represents the state of nature and the line/curve 
represents the system's behaviour (Figure 11). The position of the ball indicated in 
Figure 11 represents the state where human beings live in harmony with nature 
(Hofstetter, 1998). 
 
Figure 11 - Depiction of four myths of nature (derived from Thompson et al. 1990, p. 5). 
Each of these myths are the result of different beliefs of how nature functions, which in 
turn is closely related with the fundamental beliefs about the ways human beings can 
act upon the natural world in which they live. The most static view is that of  "nature 
capricious"  or "nature flat" (Holling et al., 2002). This myth describes a random world in 
which there are few or no forces affecting stability. In such a view of nature there are no 
consequences of human actions and, therefore, policies and politics are random. The 
second myth, "nature benign" refers to the equilibrium-centred view. "Such a world is 
wonderfully forgiving: no matter what knocks we deliver the ball will always return to 
the bottom of the basin" (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990: 5). The third view, "nature 
perverse/tolerant", assumes that multiple equilibrium states are possible, or even 
necessary. The word is robust within certain limits and is forgiving of most events. 
However, crossing some thresholds may produce changes that are either irreversible or 
extremely difficult to reverse. The agencies managing ecosystems must therefore 
regulate against the risk of crossing thresholds that will trigger non-linear and abrupt 
environmental changes.  Finally, "nature ephemeral", or the "myth of instability", is one 
where the system is globally unstable. In this view the world is a "terribly unforgiving 
place", where the least jolt may cause its complete collapse (Schwarz and Thompson, 
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 1990). "It is a view dominated by hyperbolic processes of growth and collapse, where 
increase is inevitably followed by decrease" (Holling et al., 2002: 13), and where 
managing institutions must treat the ecosystem with great care in order to prevent a 
catastrophic collapse. 
As I hope to have shown throughout this study, geoengineering combines the narratives 
of risk, inevitability and stewardship of the two last myths of nature with ideals of 
mastery and control to suggest that it is indeed possible to alter the way nature works. 
The perversity of nature, or its ephemerality, can definitely be changed by 
geoengineering - we no longer have to wait for its forgiveness (Figure 12).   
 
Figure 12 - The myths of nature (and of the human being) that underpin the idea of a geoengineered 
world. 
Although these ideals of mastery and control have their roots in the Enlightenment and 
in the Cartesian mechanistic worldview that marked the modern scientific project 
(PAPER VI), geoengineering seems nonetheless to entail a particular way of thinking 
about the world, leading to different assumptions about stability, different processes 
that affect that stability, and different policies that are deemed appropriate - i.e., the 
three kinds of assumption that, according to Holligan et al. (2002:10), differentiate each 
of the four myths of nature depicted in Figure 11. My point here is to argue that the 
fundamental beliefs, both about nature and about the human being, underlying 
geoengineering proposals need to be questioned if the social and ethical implications of 
these proposals are to be taken seriously. In fact, the fundamental issues of fairness, 
justice, and responsibility that are deemed important in the ethical debate on 
geoengineering can only be considered if we move beyond the dominant rhetoric of risk. 
From this perspective I could not be in more agreement with Hamilton: 
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 "The failure to appreciate the scale of the threat of climate change or to 
take in the Promethean nature of geoengineering is reflected in the 
question that ―climate ethics  believes it must answer, viz., what are the 
consequences for human wellbeing of  transforming the earth‘s climate? It 
is not so much the anthropocentrism of the question that is of interest, but 
the unrecognized assumption about the kind of anthropos that asks such a 
question—a rational being who gathers evidence on the good and bad  
consequences, evaluates it and decides on how to act in a way that most 
improves human  wellbeing. In short, climate ethics (including 
geoengineering ethics) is dominated by a  consequentialist approach that 
naturally shies away from questions about how we ended  up in this mess 
and what it means for humanity. In so doing, I will argue, it risks  
entrenching the very ways of thinking that lie at the heart of the climate 
crisis" (Hamilton, 2011: 2). 
In this dissertation, I have presented and analysed two different frameworks within 
which to address the ethical issues in geoengineering (PAPER III and PAPER IV). The first 
represents the mainstream Earth system science perspective, while the second 
corresponds to an alternative view from the field of social studies of science and 
technology. Central to both is the concept of an epochal break, in the former in terms of 
the human-earth relationship, in the latter in terms of the relationship between science, 
technology, and society. I suggested that these two epochal breaks should constitute the 
fundamental axes from which a fully integrated history of geoengineering should be told 
and analysed. It is a history that not only places the evolution of this (and other) 
enterprise(s) in the context of a very long Earth history – nature changed by human 
action – but critically reflects upon it, to understand and interpret fundamental 
transformations in the relationships between science and society, science and nature, 
and science and technology – changed nature of human action. 
Indeed, the history we are talking about is not only the history of geoengineering, the 
Anthropocene or the major epochal-making realignment of science and technology in 
society; it is the history of human action, in which scientists have become passionate 
protagonists of their individual beliefs, enlarging "the realm of human affairs to the 
point of extinguishing the time honoured protective dividing line between nature and 
the human world" (Arendt, 1958: 13). But because this capacity for action has become 
"the exclusive prerogative of the scientists" (Idem: 323), it lacks the revelatory capacity 
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 to illuminate the realm of human affairs in its specific phenomenal reality, and to endow 
this reality with meaning (Villa, 1996): 
"But the action of the scientists, since it acts into nature from the 
standpoint of the universe and not into the web of human relationships, 
lacks the revelatory character of action as well as the ability to produce 
stories and become historical, which together form the very source from 
which meaningfulness springs into and illuminates human existence. In this 
existentially most important aspect, action, too, has become an experience 
for the privileged few, and these few who still know what it means to act 
may well be even fewer than the artists, their experience even rarer than 
the genuine experience of and love for the world" (Arendt 1958, 324). 
In the context of these "policy vacuums", characterised by "a growing sense of urgency 
coupled with a lack of knowledge of what to do and a lack of institutions where the 
issues could be addressed" (Rommetveit et al., 2010: 150), the recurrent claims that 
argue for a closer connection between science and society, with the purpose of exposing 
to public scrutiny the hidden assumptions, values and visions that are deeply embedded 
in science and technology, seem more than justified. 
For science and technology studies (STS) the far-reaching implications of those claims 
rely on a set of "boundary concepts" (Irwin 2008), of which I highlight the concept of 
coproduction, that suggests that the "products of technoscience not only influence but 
also incorporate and reaffirm social values and institutional practices" (Jasanoff, 2011: 
11), and which draws attention to "the often invisible role of knowledge, expertise, 
technical practices and material objects in shaping, sustaining, subverting or 
transforming relations of authority" (Jasanoff, 2004a: 4). 
This explanatory power of thinking of natural and social order as being produced 
together leads the participatory ideals of public engagement, with all the reservations 
pointed out by Wynne (2007), far beyond narrow perspectives of problematising the 
relationship between science and democracy. Indeed, a more sophisticated model of 
public engagement with science (PES) and technology has been suggested for some 
time, one that acknowledges that "public engagement needs to move upstream" to 
consider new ways of listening to and valuing more diverse forms of public knowledge 
and social intelligence (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004; Felt and Fochler, 2009). The basic 
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 assumption underlying the notion of "upstream public engagement" relates with the 
necessity of replacing the one-way normative model of public "understanding" of (or 
"deference"  to) science (Wynne, 2007: 100) to a more substantive model of 
engagement, which aims at creating more socially-robust scientific and technological 
solutions by way of opening up questions, furthering debates, exposing differences and 
interrogating assumptions. 
The ultimate challenge is "to generate new approaches to the governance of science 
that can learn from past mistakes, cope more readily with social complexity, and harness 
the drivers of technological change for the common good" (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004: 
24). What seems to be at stake is not only the need to clarify the assumptions and 
arguments that sustain the positions that tend to stick between hope and fear on 
science and technology – "For those promoting the technologies, such developments 
hold promises of a better world, for the sceptics they entail Faustian dangers and 
embody a lot of what is wrong with the modern world" (Hansen, 2010: 1) – but to go 
beyond these polarised positions to further explore the context of political uncertainty, 
public debate and societal decision-making in which science and technology have been 
operating (Irwin, 2008). 
Against this background many authors have been arguing about the importance of 
considering public perceptions of geoengineering, thus helping to further unveil the 
perceived moral orders underlying these proposals  (Bracmort et al., 2011; Miller, 
2010a; Miller, 2010b; Cicerone, 2006; Pidgeon et al., 2012; Corner et al., 2012; Mercer et 
al., 2011; Rayner et al., 2013) 
Therefore, in supporting the need to subject the scientific debate on geoengineering to a 
more open and critical reflection, I highlight the importance of rebuilding the 
"geoengineering scientific worldview" on social processes of trust and credibility, in this 
way impelling climate change science to better reveal competing social interests, values, 
and assumptions. I also see this as an opportunity to promote critical thinking about 
social problems that tend to be "circumvented" and reduced to technological fixes 
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 (Weinberg, 1991), thus "alienating" and "diverting" our attention from an essential 
question, that of our place in nature. 
5.2 Further Developments 
An important direction for further research is already indicated above, and concerns the 
work that I have been developing in the last two years in order to engage the public at 
large in the online debate on geoengineering71. Some additional ideas for further 
research are indicated below. They are presented in the form of questions, as they arose 
in the course of this dissertation. 
When I began this dissertation I had an initial meeting with my colleagues to present the 
scope and objectives of my project, and to discuss possible research paths.  After I 
finished my presentation one of my colleagues presented several examples of human 
actions that, for some time now, have been changing the face of the Earth. Afterwards, 
he asked me whether those actions were substantially different from current 
geoengineering proposals - What is new in geoengineering? 
I believe he was not expecting an answer, but rather trying to help me find the vantage 
point from which some fundamental questions regarding geoengineering could be 
raised. As if to attest its relevance, the question emerged several times throughout my 
investigation, suggesting the need to place the evolution of this human enterprise in the 
context of a much longer history. Now, that I am concluding this dissertation, I realise 
that probably the best approach to address this question is to investigate what is not 
new in geoengineering. And this leads me to a second question: Is it possible to talk 
about the memories of emerging technologies, such as those of geoengineering? 
As discussed in PAPER I, the concept of geoengineering evolved from much earlier 
proposals to modify the climate. Accordingly, some authors who have been studying the 
history of weather and climate modification emphasise the importance of looking at 
geoengineering holistically — "of integrating social considerations with technical 
71 https://sites.google.com/site/geoengineeringdebate/ 
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 promise, and scientific study with human and moral dimensions" (Bonnheim, 2010: 
891). From this perspective, exploring the affinities between climate engineering 
proposals and many past technologies may bring new insights into the social and ethical 
implications of geoengineering. For instance, the idea of terraforming, which once 
informed dreams about exploring and exploiting other planets, seems to have been 
reinvented under the aegis of Earth system science to re-centre on Earth itself the 
proposals for the wholesale rearrangement of a planet’s environment to support human 
life. Like space exploration in the 1970's and 1980's, geoengineering proposals challenge 
the basic concept of limits that underpins the environmental movement, holding out 
new prospects for enhancing and expanding our current lifestyles. 
The memories of past technological innovations may not only expand the range of moral 
issues deemed important to geoengineering, but can also add considerable depth to the 
discussion about the conditions that must be satisfied if geoengineering is to proceed 
ethically and responsibly. Therefore, I suggest these memories should be seen as an 
essential part of the proposed approaches to govern geoengineering research.  And this 
leads me to a third question:  How can we maintain an active memory of the past in 
new areas of research and innovation? 
The concept of "Responsible Research and Innovation" marks the recent evolution of the 
European Commission's Science in Society Programme and translates its focus on the 
development of more integrative approaches throughout the whole innovation process. 
Engaging the stakeholders in early stages of research and  seeing "ethical considerations 
not as constraints, but as drivers from innovation" (Schuurbiers et al., 2014: 6) are two 
key aspects that lie beneath this concept.  
According to Owen et al. (2013: 36) "responsible innovation is a collective commitment 
of care for the future through responsive stewardship of science and innovation in the 
present". Four dimensions of responsible innovation have been identified in the context 
of this broad definition: 
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 • anticipatory - describing and analysing those intended and potentially 
unintended impacts that might arise, be these economic, social, environmental, 
or others. 
• reflective - reflecting on underlying purposes, motivations, and potential 
impacts, what is known and what is unknown, associated uncertainties, risks, 
areas of ignorance, questions, and dilemmas. 
• deliberative - inclusively opening up visions, purposes, questions, and dilemmas 
to broad collective deliberation through processes of dialogue, engagement, and 
debate, inviting and listening wider perspectives from publics and diverse 
stakeholders. 
• responsive - using this collective process of reflexivity to both set the direction 
and influence the subsequent trajectory and pace of innovation, whilst focussing 
on effective mechanisms of participatory and anticipatory governance. 
An explicit reference to the present and the future is contained in this definition of 
responsible innovation and implicit in its four dimensions ̶ "which when integrated 
together may allow such a commitment of care and stewardship to be enacted" (Idem: 
37). Although no explicit reference is made to the past, these four dimensions suggest 
the important role past memories play when reflecting and deliberating on both the 
"products" and "purposes" of (von Schomberg, 2011) science and innovation. 
Furthermore, the idea of collective commitment presupposes an account of the history 
of the institutions to which one belongs, and which shape who one is. In fact, as 
Grinbaum and Groves  suggest "collective political responsibility rests on historical 
continuity, flowing from the past and reaching out to embrace the future" (2013: 133).  
It is in line with this notion of collective political responsibility that I argue that an active 
memory of the past should constitute a key part of the comprehensive governance 
framework for responsible research and innovation. Three assumptions sustain the 
important role I believe memory (and forgetting) play in the processes of research and 
innovation:  
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 • First, that the turn towards memory and the past involves not only the attempt 
to secure the future, but also the no less perilous task of taking responsibility for 
maintaining an active memory of the past (Huyssen, 2003: 16). 
• Second, that learning from experience (including the lessons learnt from past 
mistakes) must constitute a key aspect of the strategies which have been 
proposed for strengthening Responsible Research and Innovation. This is so not 
only "for the instrumental reasons of avoiding harmful mistakes, but also for the 
democratically-accepted legitimacy of our institutions of policy and politics, and 
of the science which shapes these" (Felt et al., 2007: 64). 
• Third, the need to subject the commitments to a particular knowledge-trajectory 
to more critical and open reflection, insofar as these commitments carry with 
them epistemological consequences, and responsibilities about the "unlearning 
processes", i.e. "the non-pursuit of alternative possible knowledge-trajectories 
that could have been developed" (Idem: 67). 
Thus, by sharing the view that "narratives teach continuity and comparison", and that it 
is "through developing such reflective skills about the cultural meaning of innovation 
that the virtue of responsibility can be developed" (Grinbaum and Groves, 2013: 139), I 
intend to further explore the narratives of geoengineering, so as to bring to light the 
limits of foresight and rational prudence and the concomitant implications for 
responsibility.  
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Abstract: In this paper we propose to investigate the current debates on geoengineering, here considered as an 
illustrative metaphor of particular technoscientific promises and ‘techno-fix’ narratives that are emerging in our society. 
After a brief introduction, where we provide the necessary background to understand the complex issues surrounding 
geoengineering, we discuss the relevance of this investigation. We then proceed to explore the controversies behind 
geoengineering, which start with its own definition. The analysis of the current debates around geoengineering 
experimentation, regulation and deployment reveal some of the dominant narratives of technoscientific progress and 
highlight important tensions and frictions in the relationship between science, policy and society. A reflection on these 
issues suggests the relevance of developing alternative approaches to furthering the ‘democratisation and de-alienation’ 
of geoengineering debates, thus responding to a perceived need for more careful consideration of the normative 
assumptions that lie behind the idea of deliberately manipulating Earth's climate to offset anthropogenic climate change. 
Keywords: Climate Engineering, Geoengineering Debates, Climate Change, Narrative Inquiry, Master Narratives 
Introduction 
he idea of weather modification and climate manipulation is not new, nor is it associated 
with a particular discipline, branch of knowledge or area of expertise. For this reason, the 
(hi)story of geoengineering – i.e. ‘the deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s 
climate system in order to moderate global warming’ (The Royal Society 2009) – may have 
different beginnings, may explore (or omit) a variety of episodes and may be told from a 
particular point of view. These ‘qualities’ are visible in the fairly recent literature on the topic, 
where we find a variety of references introducing and contextualising the emergence of 
geoengineering technologies: the image of Ulysses assisted by, or being a victim of, deliberate 
weather modification schemes brought about by various gods and goddesses; the tempest 
conjured up by Prospero in William Shakespeare’s play of the same name (Schneider 1996); the 
diabolical plan to tilt the Earth’s axis and melt the polar ice in Jules Verne’s novel The Purchase 
of the North Pole (Fleming 2006); the various attempts at artificial rainmaking (Fountain 2003, 
Fleming 2010, 2007), in what Robert DeCourcy Ward called the stage of ‘production’ (Ward 
1930); the weather control fantasies of military planners and the way these visions shaped some 
of the weather modification programmes in the Cold War era (Bonnheim 2010, Fleming 2010, 
2006, Keith 2000); the common links with the concept of ‘terraforming’ (Fleming 2010, 
Yanarella and Rice 2011) and the way its literature (both scientific and fictional) is trying to fill 
the gaps that still exist in geoengineering literature (Keith 2000). 
These are but a few examples of the ubiquitous and eclectic ideas that, in some way, share a 
common theme with current geoengineering proposals: that which relates human expectations, 
fears and fantasies with the recurring appeal of the control of nature. Hence, even though some 
may appear unconnected with the history of geoengineering, such ideas are nonetheless useful in 
reminding us that recent proposals to geoengineer the climate are just one contemporary 
manifestation of man’s long-standing desire to control nature – an early-twenty-first-century 
embodiment of the ‘Baconian project’ of human mastery over nature. 
By looking at ‘the long history of deceptive and delusional attempts to control nature’, 
Fleming identifies three cycles ‘of promise and hype’ that capture the pathological features of 
weather and climate control schemes (Fleming 2006, 2007). 
The first cycle, the ‘Pluviculturalists’, began in the 1840s with the work of the meteorologist 
James Pollard Espy, who propounded a theory of artificial rainmaking by lighting huge fires. 
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The second cycle, ‘Cloud seeding in the Cold War and Vietnam War eras’, began in 1946 
with the pioneer experiments in cloud seeding by Irving Langmuir and his associates at the 
General Electric Research Laboratory, which rapidly evolved from lab science experiments to 
commercial rainmaking applications, and ultimately ‘the attempted weaponization of the clouds’ 
(Fleming 2006).  
Three decades later, the term geoengineering was coined by the physicist Cesare Marchetti 
to describe a proposal for tackling the problem of CO2 control in the atmosphere with a CO2 
management system, where ‘CO2 is collected at proper fuel transformation points and finally 
injected into the deep seas taking advantage of natural thermohaline circulations’ (Marchetti 
1977, vi). Almost at the same time, on the other side of the globe, the Russian climatologist 
Mikhail Budyko was probing the potential of different techniques to modify the aerosol layer of 
the stratosphere to prevent the warming of the climate (Schneider 1996, Bonnheim 2010, Budyko 
1977). 
However, it was only at the beginning of this century that geoengineering entered the 
mainstream debate on climate change. According to Fleming, the beginning of the third cycle, 
‘Weather modification in the 21st century’ – in which ‘discussion of weather and climate 
modification has returned to the science-policy agenda, framed as seemingly inevitable responses 
to killer storms and global warming’ – coincides with the publication of the U.S. National 
Research Council report titled “Critical Issues in Weather Modification Research” (National 
Research Council 2003), and the report commissioned by the U.S. Pentagon, “An Abrupt 
Climate Change Scenario and its Implications for United States National Security” (Schwartz 
and Randall 2003). But perhaps the most important impetus came in 2006, with the publication 
of an editorial essay by Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen in the journal Climatic Change (Crutzen 
2006) that brought discussions of geoengineering more squarely into the focus of scientific 
debates (Roger Pielke Jr. 2010).  
Yet, to fully understand these events, we have to consider them in the context of increasing 
doubt and disbelief regarding the commitment of the international community to adequately 
respond to the problem of global warming. In fact, throughout the 21st century, the 
geoengineering discourse has been closely coupled with the climate change agenda, being 
affected by its major convulsions in the scientific and political arenas.  
Lastly, the continued misunderstanding and disbelief in the science of climate change, the 
recognition that global warming is the net result of various institutional failures, and the recent 
tendency to favour transformational (rather than incremental) responses to this problem, appear 
to have combined with the major uncertainties of climate change to provide the conditions for 
geoengineering to emerge as a paradigmatic case ‘where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, 
stakes high and decisions urgent’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, 1994a). 
Exploring Geoengineering Debates 
Though the idea of weather and climate control is not new, the purpose and extent of climate 
modification proposals since the beginning of this century seem to have overtaken the original 
concepts and the scientific questions from which they arose, and have been appropriated by the 
competing interests that surround climate change science.  
The environmental problems and scientific uncertainties that many of the climate 
engineering schemes evoke are being brought to the centre of the climate change debate, feeding 
environmental controversies and bringing to light value disputes at the same time as the 
discourse becomes more and more politicised (Sarewitz 2004).  
Against this background, the analysis of geoengineering debates may contribute not only to 
uncovering the variety of knowledge, values and interests that compete in the climate change 
science, but also to mapping the dynamics of these debates in the context of the major narratives 
that are emerging in our society — thus seen as a valuable approach to understanding the mutual 
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co-production of science and society, in which ‘scientific knowledge both embeds and is 
embedded in social identities, institutions, representations and discourses’ (Jasanoff 2004).   
In this context, approaching geoengineering in a holistic manner is another way of looking at 
the problem of climate change and the ‘scalar dislocations’ it introduces in modern systems of 
experience and understanding (Jasanoff 2010). In fact, the ethical, political, environmental and 
social considerations that surround the debates on geoengineering seem to offer a privileged 
perspective for rethinking the human place in nature. 
Debates around the Definition of Geoengineering 
We start the analysis of current debates on geoengineering by focusing on the major disputes 
around the definition of geoengineering – a term on which the scientific community seems far 
from reaching a consensus, as has been pointed out by several authors and was made clear in the 
2011 IPCC expert meeting on geoengineering. 
‘A substantial amount of time in the Expert Meeting was spent in discussing 
terminology in and around geoengineering. This underlines the ambiguities associated 
with the term geoengineering and the range of opinions on the subject’ (Boucher, 
Gruber, and Blackstock 2011, 2). 
In fact, many of the controversies surrounding geoengineering start with the lack of 
consensus regarding the broadness and significance of the term. A look at the recent literature on 
the topic (scientific articles, books, policy reports and media articles) reveals two major sources 
of disagreement. The first of these is the different meanings attributed to the term. One example 
of this may be seen in the confrontation between those authors that suggest that we began 
geoengineering the Earth’s climate when we started causing significant disturbances to the 
planetary environment (resulting in a definition of geoengineering closely related to that of the 
‘Anthropocene’1 (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000)), and those espousing definitions that highlight
the particular characteristics of the actions carried out with different climate engineering 
techniques. 
‘In its broadest sense, geoengineering involves deliberately modifying the Earth system 
and its processes to suit societal needs and improve the planet’s habitability. During 
recent years, discussions of this controversial concept have been confined largely to 
global-scale engineering approaches intended to counteract the effects of anthropogenic 
climate change. Proponents of geoengineering point out that humans have been 
modifying the Earth system and its processes unintentionally for some time; therefore, 
why not do it in a deliberate manner with specific goals in mind?’ (Greene, Monger, and 
Huntley, 2010). 
As the above quotation suggests, a broad definition of geoengineering tends to underestimate 
the arguments against the most controversial schemes to modify the energy balance of the 
atmosphere. By contrast, a narrow definition of the term highlights the intentionality of 
geoengineering actions, thus calling for a critical examination of the ethical, social, and political 
issues raised by these proposals. 
But even if general agreement could be achieved on the particularities of geoengineering 
actions, the different types of proposals that the term encompasses seem to be a second source of 
1 Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer coined the term Anthropocene to describe a new geological epoch, 'in which 
humankind has emerged as a globally significant — and potentially intelligent — force capable of reshaping the face of 
the planet' (Clark, Schellnhuber, and Crutzen 2004) .
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fuzziness more difficult to address. To illustrate this, we briefly present the two different families 
of methods into which geoengineering schemes are usually classified (The Royal Society 2009):  
i. Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) methods, which aim to reduce the concentration
of CO2 in the atmosphere and transfer it to long-lived reservoirs, and
ii. Solar Radiation Management (SRM) methods, which aim to reduce the amount of
solar energy absorbed by the Earth.
The first family of methods includes large-scale engineering approaches, which use either 
chemical or physical processes to directly remove CO2 from the atmosphere or the oceans, (e.g. 
engineered air capture and enhanced weathering techniques), and biologically-based methods 
seeking to simulate or enhance natural carbon storage processes (e.g. afforestation and 
reforestation, biomass and biochar, ocean fertilisation methods, among others). 
The second family of methods includes some of the most controversial geoengineering 
proposals. Four groups of techniques have been proposed to reduce the incidence and absorption 
of incoming solar radiation: i) Space-based approaches – reducing the amount of solar energy 
reaching the Earth by positioning sun-shields in space with the aim of reflecting or deflecting 
solar radiation; ii) Changes in stratospheric aerosols – injecting sulphates or other types of 
particles into the upper atmosphere, with the aim of increasing the scattering of sunlight back to 
space; iii) Increases in cloud reflectivity – increasing the concentration of cloud-condensation 
nuclei in the lower atmosphere, particularly over ocean areas, thereby whitening clouds with the 
aim of increasing the reflection of solar radiation; and iv) Increases in surface albedo – 
modifying land or ocean surfaces with the aim of reflecting more solar radiation out to space 
(The Royal Society, 2009; Williamson et al. 2012, p.26). 
As this brief overview suggests, the different technological characteristics of these proposals, 
the different costs estimated for each method, the potential efficacy of their use, the levels of 
uncertainty associated with their deployment, and the distinctive risks they raise result in a 
multitude of solutions that seem difficult to bring together under the broad umbrella of the term 
geoengineering. 
One of the first attempts to clarify the ambiguity of the term was made in 1996 by Thomas 
Schelling, who identified the features that geoengineering seems to imply: global, intentional and 
unnatural interventions (Schelling 1996). Four years later, David Keith took this proposal further 
by pointing to the three core attributes that serve as ‘markers of geoengineering’ actions: the 
scale (global or continental), the intent (the deliberate nature of the action rather than a side effect 
of it) and the degree to which the action is a countervailing measure (Keith 2000). The reasons 
for replacing ‘unnatural’ features by the ‘degree to which the action is a countervailing measure’ 
were not properly explained − even though this had implications for the type of proposals that the 
term encompasses2.
2 In order to exemplify these implications it seems appropriate to refer briefly to the use of weather modification 
techniques (such as cloud seeding and hurricane suppression) that are taking place in many countries around the world. 
As recently stated by the World Meteorological Organisation: ‘since the 1980’s there has been a decline in support for 
weather modification research, and a tendency to move directly into operational projects’ (WMO 2010). Given the 
similarities between weather modification (WM) techniques and some geoengineering methods, the concerns raised by 
the increasing number of WM operational programmes (fog dispersion, rain and snow enhancement and hail suppression) 
have gained momentum in the context of the contemporary debates on geoengineering — leading, almost inevitably, to a 
discussion on the criteria that differentiate these two domains. However, although widely mentioned, the scale marker 
seems to be insufficient to exclude WM techniques from the vast range of methods that the term geoengineering 
encompasses. This becomes clear from the way the ‘countervailing measure criterion’ has been evoked, namely by 
drawing attention to the differences between ‘weather’ and ‘climate’ modification techniques, and to the far-reaching 
consequences of the latter: ‘Weather modifications such as cloud seeding which affect the weather for no longer than a 
season, in our view, do not fall within the definition of geoengineering (…) We conclude that weather techniques such as 
cloud seeding should not be included within the definition of geoengineering used for the purposes of activities designed 
to effect a change in the global climate with the aim of minimising or reversing anthropogenic climate change’ (UK 
House of Commons. Science and Technology Committee 2010, 15). Nonetheless, it is telling that according to this same 
report: ‘Cloud seeding could affect climate when carried out over a long period’ (Idem). 
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Nevertheless, these three markers seem to translate the meaning of the term geoengineering 
as commonly used by the scientific community nowadays, furthering the conceptual distinction 
between geoengineering proposals and other responses to climate change.  
However, in considering the ethical issues raised by these technologies, it becomes clear that 
these markers tend to hinder the various values, rationales and normative assumptions underlying 
the range of CDR and SRM techniques considered under the broad umbrella of the term 
geoengineering. As mentioned by Gardiner, the ethical discussion of geoengineering is made 
more difficult by the complexity of the terrain: 
‘First, a number of interventions are already being proposed for combating climate 
change, and it is not clear that all of them should be classified together. For example, 
some suggest deflecting a small percentage of incoming radiation from the Sun by 
placing huge mirrors at the Legrange point between it and the Earth, some advocate 
fertilizing the oceans with plant life to soak up more carbon dioxide, some suggest a 
massive program of reforestation, and some propose capturing vast quantities of 
emissions from power plants and burying them in sedimentary rock deep underground. 
But do these interventions raise the same issues? Should we count all of them as 
“geoengineering”?’ (Gardiner 2010, 285). 
To overcome the obstacles raised by the broadness of the term, Bunzl appeals to the 
methodological distinction between small ‘g’ proposals and big ‘G’ proposals3. According to the
author, this distinction is fundamental to deconstructing some of the common arguments for 
advancing further and faster in geoengineering research. In fact, because big ‘G’ proposals fall 
into a specific class of scientific endeavours (where the object of interest is not ‘modular’ or 
‘encapsulated’), they generate a set of methodological challenges, allowing the moral argument 
as to ‘whether research should be done’ to give way to the methodological argument as to 
‘whether it could be done’ — thus shifting the burden of proof to the proponents of 
geoengineering. 
‘But what if the object of your interest is not modular or encapsulated? What do you do 
then? For that, after all, is the feature that big “G” geoengineering proposals have in 
common. They call for interventions on systems that lack just this characteristic. You 
cannot encapsulate part of the atmosphere and it is too complex to be able to build a 
realistic non-virtual model at scale. As such, it is reasonable to ask whether we could 
ever have a sound basis for moving to full deployment of any such proposed 
intervention. And if not, then why bother to even research such proposals in the first 
place?’ (Bunzl 2009, 2). 
It seems most reasonable to question the feasibility of geoengineering research in light of its 
object of interest. Indeed, the pressure of practice under which science operates today (Carrier 
2011) is giving rise to the emergence of new objects of research – ambivalent beings, hybrid 
products and theoretically constructed objects through which we gain a new understanding and 
control of nature – that call for a more careful consideration of the complex narratives and 
practices of science and technology (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, 1994b, Latour 1987, Law 
2002, Haraway 1997, Michael 2006).  
3 ‘Of course there is geoengineering and then there is GEOENGINEERING. Nobody gets very wound up about the idea 
of planting trees or painting roofs white as instances of geoengineering — which is not to say that they will necessarily 
do much good. The kind of geoengineering that elicits howls of disapproval is grander than this — it is things like space 
mirrors, sulphur injection into the upper atmosphere, and iron fertilisation of the oceans — it is the idea of intervention 
on a grand scale’ (Bunzl 2009).  
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Following this appeal, some authors have suggested that it is precisely at the level of these 
objects of research that we can find the meaningful distinction between science and 
technoscience, an ontological difference that ‘becomes more explicit when research results are 
presented in particular settings and when the objects of research are exhibited for the specific 
interest they hold’ (Bensaude-Vincent et al. 2011, 365). Accordingly, and by way of illustration, 
it could be said that when the result of a global climate model experiment is presented as 
scientific evidence for understanding the role of aerosols in climate forcing, this would conform 
to traditional conceptions of science. However, when sulphate aerosols are presented for their 
capacity to counteract the climate forcing of growing CO2 emissions, this should be seen as a 
‘hallmark of technoscience’. 
As we will see next, many of the controversies surrounding geoengineering go beyond the 
ambiguities of the term. However, and as pointed by Bunzl, some important questions regarding 
the research, governance and deployment of these technologies can only be properly answered if 
we consider the significant differences between the multitude of proposals that the term 
encompasses. 
Unveiling the Multiple Narratives behind Geoengineering Discourses 
An overview of the subject of geoengineering may be extremely illustrative, but also 
bewildering, with regard to the controversies that the term encompasses. At first glance, one may 
be frightened by the revisited version of Edvard Munch’s ‘The Scream’ on the cover of the report 
of the ETC Group, entitled ‘Geopiracy – The Case Against Geoengineering’ (ETC Group 2010). 
Perhaps one may also find this reference in a suggested comparison between the way the 
Krakatoa eruption inspired Munch to create this work and the way the eruption of Pinatubo 
inspired geoengineers to cool the Earth (Hamilton 2010). One may come across the variety of 
histories that feed ‘chemtrails’ theories4, or one of the scientific studies that compare different
geoengineering options (Keith and Dowlatabadi 1992, Keith 2000, National Research Council 
1992, Vaughan and Lenton 2011). By chance, one may stumble over a few of the various 
attempts to rank these options: some evocative but difficult to assess (Adam 2009), others 
suggesting a scientific asset (Boyd 2008, Lenton and Vaughan 2009, The Royal Society 2009), 
and yet others being sarcastic about this last possibility (Singer-Vine 2010).  Lastly, one will 
most likely end up with Meinrat Andreae’s decadent image of our society’s addiction to fossil 
fuels, ‘It’s like a junkie figuring out new ways of stealing from his children’ (Morton 2007), or 
with one of the many meaningful terms that populate the geoengineering world: ‘back-up plan’ 
(Inman 2010); ‘catastrophic climate change’(Gardiner 2011, Hegerl and Solomon 2009); ‘climate 
anxiety’ (Bonnheim 2010); ‘covert geoengineering’ (Lawrence 2006); ‘emergency brake’ 
(Brovkin et al. 2009); ‘fallback strategy’ (Keith 2002, Keith and Dowlatabadi 1992); ‘geohack’ 
(Singer-Vine 2010); ‘global thermostat’ (Goodell 2010); ‘planet-hacking techniques’ (Kintisch 
2010); ‘planetary medicine’ (Lovelock 2008, 2009); ‘predatory geoengineering’ (Gardiner 2011); 
‘retooling the planet’ (Bronson, Mooney, and Wetter 2009); ‘stopgap’ (Barrett 2008, Bunzl 
2009); ‘technological fix’ (Montenegro and Greenwood 2009)... 
Despite the confusion a first glance may suggest, a more detailed analysis of the literature in 
the field may be extremely valuable in understanding the particular kinds of knowledge, values 
and interests that are competing in the climate change debate and in uncovering some of the 
dominant narratives that operate at different levels of society.    
One reasonable and logical way of digging through the debates on geoengineering is ‘to 
collect, structure, and relate the very different arguments that have been advanced for and against 
climate engineering’ (Rickels et al. 2011): the ‘moral hazard argument’ (The Royal Society 
4 The term ‘chemtrail’ is derived from ‘chemical trail’ and specifically refers to chemical or biological agent trails left by 
aircraft for a purpose undisclosed to the general public, allegedly causing  respiratory illnesses and other health problems. 
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2009); the ‘the slippery slope’ argument; the ‘technical fix’ argument;  the ‘unpredictability’ 
argument (Keith 2000);  the ‘lesser evil’ argument; the ‘arm the future’ argument, the 
‘cost-effectiveness’ argument; the ‘research first’ argument; the ‘stalking horse’ argument 
(Gardiner 2010, Gardiner 2011); the ‘common sense’ argument (Jamieson 1996); the 
‘desperation argument’ (Gardiner 2012), etc. These different arguments tend to be linked around 
the main theses that have been identified in the debate on the pros and cons of geoengineering 
research and deployment (Betz and Cacean 2012, Rickels et al. 2011) and illustrate the diversity 
of attempts in this area. Many of these arguments emerge in the debates in and around the ‘grey 
zones’, or interfaces, between science, policy and society (Siune et al. 2009), and can be grouped, 
for systematisation purposes, into three interconnected domains: i) geoengineering research and 
experimentation; ii) geoengineering regulation and governance, and iii) geoengineering 
implementation and misuse (Figure 1) . 
Figure 1– Domains within which Current Debates on Geoengineering Can Be Grouped 
Geoengineering Research and Experimentation 
In this first domain, we have identified some of the most active disputes over geoengineering, 
which is not surprising given that research is the stage where much of the geoengineering 
proposals currently are at and experimentation is the expected next step. The construction of the 
arguments varies, but in general they fall into three major groups: 
i) The first group holds that geoengineering, along with mitigation and adaptation, is a valid
and unavoidable response to climate change, so we must invest in geoengineering research in 
order to be prepared for a likely climate emergency:  
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‘The rate of increase of climate change, along with the continuing increase in emissions 
of greenhouse gases, has created a very serious predicament for the world. Drastically 
reducing the world’s use of fossil fuels will take time and may raise near-term costs for 
energy, even after the effort gets seriously started and production costs for new energy 
technologies drop. As a result, global warming is likely to press up against or even 
exceed the level that the Commission of European Communities, for example, has 
concluded is likely to lead to dangerous and unacceptable consequences. For this reason, 
it seems prudent for the nations of the world to initiate an effort in geoengineering (...)’ 
(MacCracken 2009, 33). 
This argument finds its support in two inter-related narratives of technoscientific progress 
that tend to shape and frame key dimensions of science and governance: the risk of dismissing a 
‘promising technology’ and the ‘speed imperative’ that impels us to act immediately ‘before it is 
too late’ (Felt et al. 2007). Furthermore, this argument often appears coupled with another, that of 
the ‘incredible economics of geoengineering’ (Barrett 2008). 
ii) The second group, and perhaps the most significant, regards geoengineering with reserve
but considers it would be a mistake to ban geoengineering research without first reducing the 
uncertainties surrounding the associated benefits and risks, claiming that it is premature to 
discard these options without carrying out adequate, though ‘moderate’, research into the topic 
(Blackstock and Long 2010, Blackstock et al. 2009, Robock 2008, 2011).  
‘The reasons why geoengineering may be a bad idea are manifold, though a moderate 
investment in theoretical geoengineering research might help scientists to determine 
whether or not it is a bad idea’ (Robock 2008). 
This strong argument is sustained by the new credo of ‘evidence-based’ decision making, 
where facts must precede any exercise of values. 
iii) The third group comprises arguments against geoengineering research – particularly
research into SRM methods. The arguments are of two kinds:  
• those opposing geoengineering solutions on principle, on the basis of the common
sense belief that ‘two wrongs do not make a right’, and
• those challenging the soundness of the arguments in favour of geoengineering
research, in this way trying to deconstruct some of the narratives on which they are
based.
Since the first kind of argument concerns the validity of geoengineering solutions, it does 
not directly address the specific case of geoengineering research (which is assumed to be as 
doubtful as the concept itself). Here, we can find many of the arguments that try to demolish the 
‘techno-fix’ ideas behind geoengineering solutions: SRM methods do not address the root cause 
of anthropogenic climate change; geoengineering is ‘unnatural’ and SRM technologies are 
objectionable (Jamieson 1996, NERC 2010a, b); we have to find a place consistent with the 
limits of nature (Bunzl 2009) and technology cannot replace the process of ‘social engineering’ 
(Weinberg 1991) that this goal implies.  
The second kind of argument against geoengineering research tends to emerge in the ethical 
discussion of the subject (Keith 2000, Gardiner 2011, Bunzl 2009, Victor et al. 2009, Jamieson 
1996, Hamilton 2013). Morrow, Kopp and Oppenheimer present a clear synthesis of these 
arguments:  
‘There are four ethical reasons to worry about performing climatic SWCE5 research at
all, over and above its effects on humans, animals, and ecosystems. First, pursuing 
5 In this paper the authors refer to SRM as “short-wave climate engineering” (SWCE). 
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SWCE solutions to climate change may create a moral hazard, exacerbating the 
challenge of mitigating emissions. Second, SWCE research may lead to development of 
technologies that could be used for nefarious purposes. Third, beginning SWCE 
research in earnest may create interest groups within scientific or business communities 
that would have strong incentives to push for SWCE (or at least SWCE research) even if 
it turns out to be unwise. Finally, money spent on SWCE research is unavailable for 
other kinds of research, such as on the mitigation of or adaptation to climate change’ 
(Morrow, Kopp, and Oppenheimer 2009). 
Discussions about governance mechanisms and basic principles to guide future 
geoengineering research tend to highlight the profound reorientation of technoscientific practices 
in contemporary societies  –  of what has been seen as a major shift from the ‘laboratory ideal’ to 
the ‘field ideal’ of experimentation (Schwarz and Krohn 2011). Indeed, the recognition that 
‘several geoengineering technologies are demonstrably non-encapsulated’ (Bracmort and 
Lattanzio 2013, 5) tends to further polarise the debate. On the one hand, those who call for ‘a 
moratorium on all geoengineering activities outside the laboratory’ (ETC Group 2010, 40). On 
the other hand, those who consider that the ‘least risky option would involve starting with 
small-scale field experiments and gradually ramping up the scale’ (Eccleston and March 2011, 
358). 
‘Another key question is how to address further research. Proponents of further research 
argue that it is needed in order to obtain reliable information about the feasibility and 
risks. However, this would at some stage require real-world field experiments that 
would have to be gradually scaled up in order to know the impacts of a particular 
technique and whether it is effective. Apart from the difficulty of drawing the line 
between research and deployment, most existing rules of international law do not make 
this distinction’ (Bodle 2013, 468). 
And once again, Morrow, Kopp and Oppenheimer provide an interesting point of view on 
this subject, introducing the ‘narrative of ethics’ to the debate, and suggesting that climatic 
SWCE research6 is very similar to nuclear weapons testing. They thus propose careful ethical
consideration guided by three principles derived from the ethics literature on research with 
human and animal subjects:  
‘The Principle of Respect requires that the scientific community secure the global 
public’s consent, which would need to be voiced through their representatives and given 
for any studies within specified parameters, rather than on a case-by-case basis. The 
Principle of Beneficence and Justice requires that researchers strive for a favorable 
risk-benefit ratio and a fair distribution of risks and anticipated benefits, all while 
protecting the basic rights of the individuals affected. Finally, the Principle of 
Minimization requires that no study last longer, cover a greater geographical extent, or 
exert a greater influence on the climate than is necessary to test the specific hypotheses 
in question’ (Morrow, Kopp, and Oppenheimer 2009, 1). 
A similar position was articulated in the “Oxford Principles”, a set of five overarching principles 
for governance of geoengineering research: (i) geoengineering to be regulated as a public good; 
(ii) public participation in geoengineering decision-making; (iii) disclosure of geoengineering 
research and open publication of results; (iv) independent assessment of impacts; and (v) 
6 According to the authors, other kinds of climate engineering research (such as modelling studies and engineering 
studies) do not raise the same concerns as climatic studies – which aim ‘to determine the climatic response to climate 
engineering and therefore could have widespread impacts on both human populations and the biosphere’. 
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governance before deployment (Rayner et al. 2013, Rayner et al. 2009). This leads us to the 
second domain of the geoengineering debate: that of geoengineering regulation and governance.  
Geoengineering Regulation and Governance 
In this second domain, the debate revolves around two main concerns: the need i) to regulate 
specific geoengineering activities (large-scale research projects, small-scale field tests, field 
experiments, trial deployment and implementation) and ii) to balance carefully the technical, 
legal, ethical, economic and social concerns in a policy and governance framework, which is 
‘international in scope and remains flexible in light of fresh evidence’ (The Royal Society 2009). 
If the first domain suggests that we are in the sphere of geoengineering science, here we feel we 
are crossing into the sphere of geoengineering politics: 
‘As geoengineering is considered more seriously, the question of norms to govern 
deployment will arise. Norms might be needed not only to determine when such systems 
might be used but also the kinds of evaluations that geoengineers might be required to 
make before deployment, compensation for parties harmed, cost sharing, and 
commitments to maintain geoengineering systems once deployed’ (Victor 2008, 330). 
In fact, in this second domain the debate tends to move from the functioning of science to its 
interactions with policy and society, particularly by exploring three major narratives:  
i) The narrative of ethics, which introduces the questions of public value into the
geoengineering field to overcome the difficulties of ensuring ‘citizen representation’ and the 
concerns of legitimacy associated with this (thus providing the basis for discussing the 
permissibility of the most controversial schemes and becoming an important legitimising factor 
for geoengineering activities). In the debate on geoengineering regulation and governance, this 
narrative focuses primarily on the concepts of fairness and justice, drawing upon formulations of 
environmental ethics and ethical and legal guidelines for human and animal subjects research 
(Miller 2010a, Morrow, Kopp, and Oppenheimer 2009, Keith 2002): 
‘Yet, for me, phrases like “legitimate international process” and “all stakeholders” 
sound too much like climate scientists and government diplomats getting together to 
decide the fate of the planet. That hasn’t worked so well so far, and not only because 
vulnerable developing countries have not been adequately consulted. So what kind of 
governance process do we need? To my mind, a potentially potent analogy is that of 
informed consent in human subjects research. Just like geoengineering research, human 
subjects research brings potentially significant public and private benefits by alleviating 
disease, injury, and even death. Yet, because such research is also very dangerous, 
societies have adopted strict regulations for the conditions under which that research can 
be done’ (Miller 2010a). 
ii) The narrative of failure, which spotlights the side effects and unintended consequences of
geoengineering proposals, and therefore calls for the adoption of precautionary approaches and 
global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms. This narrative informs the 
politics of geoengineering, being particularly evident in the discussion of the risks surrounding 
field experiments with such technologies, concerns about unilateral attempts to conduct 
large-scale geoengineering actions, and the way they may weaken conventional mitigation and 
adaptation efforts, in what is referred to as the ‘moral hazard’ argument: 
‘In the context of geoengineering, the risk is that major efforts in geoengineering may 
lead to a reduction of effort in mitigation and/or adaptation because of a premature 
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conviction that geoengineering has provided ‘insurance’ against climate change’ (The 
Royal Society 2009, 37). 
iii) Lastly, the ‘valid science’ narrative, suggesting possible ways to promote further
‘strategic research’ in the geoengineering field, the establishment of appropriate institutions for 
geoengineering governance, and greater citizen involvement, and calling for climate change 
science to become more critically reflective about its own role and impact. The ‘valid science’ 
narrative, appears under different forms on discourses of geoengineering regulation and 
governance, being particularly prominent in the debate on the involvement of relevant 
international scientific organisations, the establishment of international bodies and the first 
attempts to devise possible configurations to govern the research and deployment of 
geoengineering technologies (Olson 2011, Bodansky 2011, 2012, Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013). 
‘Meaningful research may also require actual trial deployment of geoengineering 
systems so that norms are informed by relevant experience and command respect 
through use. Standard methods for international assessment organized by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are unlikely to yield useful 
evaluations of geoengineering options because the most important areas for assessment 
lie in the improbable, harmful, and unexpected side effects of geoengineering, not the 
'consensus science' that IPCC does well’ (Victor 2008, 321). 
Together, these intertwined narratives tend to invoke the concept of ‘good governance’, 
which refers to the ‘principles of openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and 
coherence’, and the need for science to function properly, i.e. ‘assuring the productive 
functioning of its endeavours, and the maintenance of scientific integrity’ (Siune et al. 2009). 
Geoengineering Implementation and Misuse 
The third domain includes the discussions surrounding the benefits and risks of using 
geoengineering to counteract global warming. While on the one hand we are still in the domain 
of empirical science, surrounded by simulation models that seek to address the climatic 
consequences of geoengineering schemes (Matthews and Caldeira 2007, Lenton and Vaughan 
2009) and attempts to assess and rank different geoengineering methods – in terms of efficiency, 
affordability, safety, controllability, timeliness, reversibility, among others (The Royal Society 
2009, Vaughan and Lenton 2011, Boyd 2008, Bellamy et al. 2012) – on the other hand we are 
also in the domain of ‘geoengineering plausibility’, where expectations, fears, fantasies, beliefs, 
and, of course, scientific expertise conspire to produce visions of geoengineered worlds.  
The discourses about geoengineering implementation range from expert reviews that 
examine the potential advantages, drawbacks and risks of the different schemes to recent 
participatory processes that seek to elicit public and/or stakeholder views and perceptions of 
geoengineering (Bellamy et al. 2012). In these discourses we find many of the narratives 
previously identified, now being used to fill the empty spaces left by the inherent uncertainties 
associated with geoengineering technologies and climate change science. The positions vary and 
are not consistent with the traditional divisions usually found in the climate change debate — a 
‘quality’ of the geoengineering debate that was already stressed by Dale Jamieson in 1996:  
‘The recent debate makes for strange bedfellows. Many of those who believe most 
strongly that climate change is occurring are reluctant to embrace geoengineering 
approaches to reversing it. This is because they believe that the ‘hand of man’ is 
implicated in most of our environmental problems and they see geoengineering as more 
of the same. Others, who are interested in exploring or developing geoengineering 
possibilities, are disinclined to believe that climate is changing. On their view planetary 
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systems are relatively insensitive to human behaviour and for that reason we shouldn’t 
worry too much about the risks of geoengineering. So to simplify: some people believe 
that there is a problem but that geoengineering is no solution; others believe that 
geoengineering is a solution but that there is no problem’ (Jamieson 1996, 323). 
This quotation is one of the many that emphasise the ambiguity and lack of correspondence 
between the various grey shades of geoengineering positions and the common black/white 
division between climate ‘alarmists’ and climate ‘sceptics’, which reinforces the importance of 
looking at geoengineering holistically.  
Such a look is particularly relevant in examining the discourses about the potential misuses 
of geoengineering technologies, which should be considered in the broader context of the history 
of weather and climate modification, where many of the attempts to advance these technologies 
did not have peaceful intentions (Keith 2000, Fleming 2006, 2007, 2010, Bonnheim 2010)7. In
fact, the narratives about the risk of hostile uses of geoengineering technologies should be seen 
not only in the context of climate modification history, but also in the context of other potential 
harmful technologies: 
‘It may be possible to reduce the risk of intentional misuse through governance 
arrangements such as those that have been used to control nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons. Similarly, it may be possible to prevent risks from unintentional 
misuse through sound regulation. However, in some cases the only effective measures 
for reducing risk may also forestall beneficial uses of geoengineering, for example by 
having a general chilling effect on scientific progress in this area’ (Powell et al. 2010, 
2). 
Concluding Remarks: Furthering the ‘Democratisation and De-alienation’ 
of the Geoengineering Debate 
Using the internet as a primary source of information, we started our investigation by collecting 
different kinds of materials, including scientific articles, books, policy reports, films, interviews, 
media news and blog comments. We then analysed them to identify the main debates around 
geoengineering technologies.  
Through this analysis we have identified three interconnected areas of current debate on 
geoengineering: geoengineering research and experimentation; geoengineering regulations and 
governance; and geoengineering implementation and misuse (Figure 1). Within these areas we 
have also identified the main arguments called into question in the geoengineering debates and 
the underlying ‘master narratives’ in which they are embedded (Figure 2). 
The significance of geoengineering proposals can only be grasped in the context of the wider 
‘imaginary’ of science and technology in which geoengineering narratives are rooted. Hence, we 
suggest examining those debates further, taking into consideration the dominant narratives of 
science, technology and society. 
7 Leading to the ratification of the UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) in 1978. 
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Figure 2 – The three interconnected domains in which geoengineering debates are taking place: 
main arguments and underlying master narratives. 
Different conceptions, understandings and value assumptions concerning the changing 
relationships between science and society, science and technology, and science and nature tend to 
shape the geoengineering debate and inform the analytical framework within which the 
geoengineering domain has been problematised (Scholte, Vasileiadou, and Petersen 2013, Sikka 
2012, Huttunen and Hildén 2013, Luokkanen, Huttunen, and Hildén 2013, Nerlich and Jaspal 
2012). This reinforces the need to unbind geoengineering discourses from the deeply embedded 
narratives of science, technology and society that present technoscientific innovation as the 
solution to our most critical problems and as a substitute for social change. Similarly, the 
construction of narratives that give meaning to human action within nature, and provide guidance 
for humans’ domination of nature, deserves a more critical and open reflection than has been the 
case to date. As a result, many authors have been highlighting how important it is to consider 
public perceptions of geoengineering and therefore to help reveal the perceived moral orders 
underlying geoengineering proposals (Boyd 2008, Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, Cicerone 2006, 
Miller 2010b, The Royal Society 2009). 
The need for democratic decision-making and public engagement in the area of 
geoengineering has been clear for some time now (Jamieson 1996). However, only recently have 
the practical implications and challenges of such demands begun to be properly considered 
(Morton 2007, Miller 2010a, b, Powell et al. 2010, Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, ETC Group 
2010, NERC 2010a, Orr et al. 2011, CSPO 2010, Debatepedia 2009, Parkhill and Pidgeon 2011, 
Macnaghten and Owen 2011, Corner, Pidgeon, and Parkhill 2012, Poumadère, Bertoldo, and 
Samadi 2011).  
In the context of current ‘policy vacuums’, characterised by ‘a growing sense of urgency 
coupled with a lack of knowledge of what to do and a lack of institutions where the issues could 
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be addressed’ (Rommetveit, Funtowicz, and Strand 2010), these initiatives assume critical 
importance. And though the scope, scale and complexity of the climate change issues tend to 
‘render the fulfilment of the deliberative ideal a practical impossibility’ (Idem), the recurrent 
claims that argue for a closer connection between science and society, with the purpose of 
exposing to public scrutiny the hidden assumptions, values and visions that are deeply embedded 
in geoengineering proposals, seem more than justified. 
Therefore, in supporting the need to subject the scientific debate on geoengineering to more 
open and critical reflection, we highlight the importance of rebuilding the ‘geoengineering 
scientific worldview’ on social processes of trust and credibility (Irwin and Wynne 1996), in this 
way impelling climate change science to better reveal the competing interests, values and 
assumptions of climate engineering proposals. We also see this as an opportunity to promote 
critical thinking about social problems that tend to be ‘circumvented’ and reduced to 
technological fixes (Weinberg 1991), thus ‘alienating’ and ‘diverting’ our attention from an 
essential question, that of our place in nature.  
In fact, the debates on climate engineering seem to offer an excellent framework within 
which to examine how modern science’s ‘alienation from the earth’ is leading to the ‘alienation 
from the world’ (Arendt 1958), a condition clearly depicted by Funtowicz and Strand:  
‘Barring and bracketing the environmentalist talk – which also has been an important 
part of our own talk – of planetary dangers, we would like to propose that the planet is 
indeed not the object at risk. The object at risk is we ourselves as a collective (present 
and future) subjectivity and agency: the human right behind the human rights: that of 
personhood and hope. With personhood and hope in focus, the challenge is not the usual 
of what to do but, more importantly, how to do it as certain avenues of action are now 
deemed unacceptable’ (Funtowicz and Strand 2011, 8). 
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Exploring the Ethics of Geoengineering through Images
Paula Curvelo, European Commission – Joint Research Centre –
IPSC, Italy
Abstract: Since the beginning of this century, the purpose and extent of intentional climate change
proposals seem to have surpassed its original concepts and been appropriated by the various competing
interests that inform the climate change debate. Indeed, many of the problems and uncertainties that
geoengineering schemes evoke are feeding environmental controversies, while discourses become
more and more politicized. In this context, the study of geoengineering narratives not only helps to
unveil the ethical issues surrounding climate engineering experimentation, regulation and deployment,
but also suggests an alternative way of looking at the climate change issue and the ‘scalar dislocations’
that it introduces into modern systems of experience and understanding [1]. Assuming that geoengin-
eering is an illustrative metaphor of a particular kind of technoscientific promises and “technological
fix” narratives that are emerging in our society, this paper seeks to analyse the value disputes hidden
in geoengineering debates by adopting expanded notions of narrative, which account for the particular
ways of rendering the world in both visual and verbal forms. It is hoped that this paper will contribute
to an understanding of the potential of visual narrative research, while also considering the ethical
issues in scientific and technological developments. In particular, it tries to suggest possible ways of
exploring the meaning-making practices of production (encoding) and interpretation (decoding) of
geoengineering images in order to analyse the contributions that visual methodologies can provide
to enable us to understand the nature and causes of scientific and technological developments, the
benefits and the risks, the perils and the promises of recent advances in science and technology and,
last but not the least, the limits of rational analytical methods when it comes to characterizing complex
problems.
Keywords: Narrative Theory, Visual Research Analysis, Geoengineering, Imag[in]ing, Ethics
From Geoengineering Narratives to Geoengineering Images
GEOENGINEERING IS THE deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’sclimate system, in order to moderate global warming. So far, most of the geoengi-neering technologies that have been explored fall into two main categories [2, p.
ii, 3, 4]:
• Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) methods, which aim to reduce levels of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere by creating new carbon sinks or by enhancing the existing land or
ocean carbon sinks.
• Solar Radiation Management (SRM) methods, which aim to reduce incoming solar radi-
ation, by deflecting sunlight or by increasing the reflectivity of the atmosphere, clouds
or the Earth’s surface.
In recent years, the role of climate geoengineering technologies within the “portfolio of re-
sponse options to anthropogenic climate change” has been the subject of increased discussion
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[5]. This new interest in the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment
is largely due to the ‘grossly unsuccessful’ attempts to lower the emissions of greenhouse
gases [6] and to the urgency appeal that consider alternative strategies to current climate
change mitigation efforts.
However, this so called ‘plan B’ is inevitably conditioned by the limited understanding
of the scientific basis of the climate science and by major uncertainties regarding the impacts
of these technologies on human and natural systems. Therefore, and in spite the conflicting
arguments that prevail in the debates surrounding geoengineering technologies, there is
widespread agreement on the need to consider the far-reaching ethical, political and social
questions that intentional climate change proposals entail.
And although some attempts have been made to address this need (and to further ethical
awareness amongst the scientific community), the development of an ethical framework that
could inform policy responses to geoengineering research, deployment and governance is
still missing.
In this sense, the overall objective of our research (which necessarily goes beyond the
limits and scope of this paper) is to address the need to develop an analytical framework that
can contribute to understanding the social, ethical and equity issues raised by geoengineering
proposals, i.e. one that can be used as the basis for further analysis into the development and
implementation of appropriate governance mechanisms to steer both geoengineering research
and deployment.
Because the debates that are taking place at the interface between science and society tend
to reveal the deeply held value assumptions that sustain geoengineering visions, as well as
the underlying principles that shape geoengineering problematization, we felt that one possible
way to fill the above mentioned gap was to explore the potential value of discourse analysis
and narrative inquiry as a way to broaden our understanding of the ethical, political and social
issues that geoengineering proposals raise.
Using the Internet as a major source of information, in a first stage of our investigation
we made a collection of different kinds of materials (scientific articles, books, political reports,
films, interviews, media news, comments on the blogosphere, etc.), which was subsequently
analysed in order to identify the main debates around climate geoengineering technologies.
Through that analysis we have identified three inter-connected areas within which current
debates on geoengineering are taking place: Geoengineering Research and Experimentation;
Geoengineering Regulations and Governance; and Geoengineering Implementation and Dual
Use. Within these areas we have also identified the main disputed arguments (and values?)
in the geoengineering debates, as well as the underlying master narratives in which they are
embedded (Fig. 1)
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Fig. 1: The Three Interconnected areas within which Geoengineering Debates are taking
Place-main Arguments and Underlying Master Narratives
However, while analysing the material collected during this first stage, we came across a
wide range of images which we were unable to consider properly within the documentary
analysis that we have been conducting. At first glance, some of these images seem to visually
translate the textual content that surrounds them and do not reveal any other additional
meanings to the discourses being analysed. Nevertheless, a significant number of images
seem not only to complement some of the ideas expressed in textual terms, but also to add
new and, somehow unexpected, meanings to these debates, thereby suggesting that there are
other analytical dimensions to our investigation.
In this way the results of the first stage of our investigation constitute the starting point
of a discussion that endeavours to understand the potential of visual narrative research, while
considering the ethical, political and social issues present in the early stages of scientific and
technological developments.
The rationale for following a narrative approach stems from three different but overlapping
fields: Narrative theory; Visual Communication; and Visual Representation of Science. The
literature on these fields provides the background for the discussion set out in the next section.
From Geoengineering Images to Geoengineering Narratives
The universe of Geoengineering abounds with images. From figures that attempt to represent
the main characteristics of the two categories of geoengineering methods (Fig. 2), to illustra-
tions that evoke human expectations, fears and fantasies about the control of nature (Fig. 3),
and from attempts that seek to warn against the risks of a “geoengineered world”, (Fig. 4),
to images that endeavour to compare and rank major climate engineering proposals (Fig. 5)
or claims that emphasize public involvement in discussion and decision-making in geoengi-
neering research and governance (Fig. 6), this universe seems not only to fill, but actually
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to go far beyond the visual science continuum which has, at one extreme, the set of figures
that convey data and, at the other, scientific illustrations, i.e. “representations of how some-
thing might or could be” [7].
Fig. 2: Geoengineering Methods. From Climate Central (Nov 5th, 2010): Geoengineering
Methods. Retrieved 02.08.2011, from http://www.climatecentral.org/gallery/graphics/geoen-
gineering_schemes/. Reprinted with kind permission of Climate Central
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Fig. 3: The Climate Engineers. Front Cover from The Wilson Quarterly, Spring 2007. Re-
printed with kind permission of The Wilson Quarterly
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Fig. 4: The Front Cover of the ETC Group’s Report Geopiracy, The Case against Geo-
engineering (2010). Design by Stig (www.shtig.net). Reprinted with kind permission
of ETC Group
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Fig. 5: A Preliminary overall Evaluation of the Geoengineering Techniques Considered in
Chapters 2 and 3 of the Royal Society’s Report (p. 49). From The Royal Society, Geoengin-
eering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty, 2009, The Royal Society: London.
pp. 98. Reprinted with kind permission of The Royal Society, London
Fig. 6: Hands Off Mother Earth (H.O.M.E). From ETC Group, H.O.M.E. Retrieved
02.08.2011, from http://www.handsoffmotherearth.org/. Design by Stig (www.shtig.net).
Reprinted with kind permission of ETC Group
By assuming that pictorial expressions are not qualitatively different from verbal expressions
[8, p. 330], we situate this visual science continuum in an expanded notion of narrative,
which includes not only verbal forms, but also all other symbolic forms of expression.
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Consequently, these images are now seen as part of the geoengineering story, by revealing
facts, knowledge, values, fears, desires, promises, anxieties and incredulity, not only about
the proposals for tackling climate change, but also and above all, by revealing what we know
about the world and how we make sense of our place in it. In this context, in which climate
geoengineering is seen as an illustrative metaphor of a particular kind of technoscientific
promises and ‘technofix’ narratives that are emerging in our society, we underline the rele-
vance of considering these images as narrative manifestations which reveal “how we think,
what we value, and why we act” [8]. By suggesting that geoengineering images should be
seen as visual narratives, i.e. as particular “ways of structuring thoughts” in order to make
sense of the world, we draw on Walter Fisher’s notion of the Homo narrans in the context
of the narrative paradigm:
‘The idea of human beings as storytellers posits the generic form of all symbol composi-
tion. It holds that symbols are created and communicated ultimately as stories meant
to give order to human experience and to induce others to dwell in them in order to
establish ways of living in common, in intellectual and spiritual communities in which
there is confirmation for the story that constitutes one’s life’ [9, p. 63]
Within the framework of this “narrative paradigm”, we argue that both the descriptive and
explanatory dimensions of geoengineering visual narratives need to be explored in order to
broaden our understanding of the ethical, political and social issues raised by climate engi-
neering proposals. These two dimensions of narrative research point towards the two different
types of investigation mentioned by Polkinghorne [10, p. 161]: the first kind of narrative
investigation aims “to render the narrative accounts already in place which are used by in-
dividuals or groups as their means for ordering and making temporal events meaningful”;
the second kind of narrative investigation aims “to construct a narrative account explaining
‘why’ a situation or event involving human actions has happened”. Considering these two
roles of narrative research, we sustain that a descriptive narrative investigation, in which we
include the visual representations of geoengineering, may help us to articulate the various
(conflicting?) narrative schemes that operate in the interfaces between science, policy and
society, and which are taking place not only in the realm of rationality, knowledge, and facts,
but also in the realm of subjectivity, values, intentions, imagination and fiction.
However, it is only within an explanatory narrative approach that we will be able to address
the imperative ethical issues regarding the causes, motivations and assumptions that conspired
towards the emergence of the idea of a “geoengineered world”, in an attempt to “to trace
back modern world alienation, its twofold flight from the earth into the universe and from
the world into the self, to its origins, in order to arrive at an understanding of the nature of
society as it had developed and presented itself at the very moment when it was overcome
by the advent of a new and yet unknown age” [11, p. 6]. Because explanatory narrative re-
search is retrospective and retrodictive1, the adoption of this kind of approach does not seem
an easy task whilst considering the ongoing debates on geoengineering. Notwithstanding,
1 “(…) in that: a) certain events in the past are interpreted as hanging together by being narrated into a story with
a beginning, middle, and end; and b) a story must be ended before it can be explained”. Sandelowski, M., Telling
Stories: Narrative Approaches in Qualitative Research. Image: Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 1991. 23(3): p.
161–166.
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we believe that an analogy can be made with other stories that have already ended, making
this task not only possible, but also an imperative:
I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question
‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human society, that is, with
one or more imputed characters-roles into which we have been drafted-and we have
to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and
how our responses to them are apt to be construed [12, p. 216].
In addition, we must confront the resistance offered by science to this kind of investigation.
In fact, explanatory narrative research is not typically used in the sciences, partly because
“narrative truth is distinguished from other kinds of formal science truths by its emphasis
on the life-like, intelligible and plausible story. Stories typically reflect a coherence (as op-
posed to correspondence) theory of truth in that the narrator strives for narrative probability
– a story that makes sense; narrative fidelity – a story consistent with past experiences or
other stories: and aesthetic finality – a story with satisfactory closure and representation
appeal” [13, pp. 164–165].
In the context of this discussion, which points to some of the presuppositions that underpin
W. Fisher’s narrative paradigm [14, pp. 64–65], it is important to reinforce the difference
between the elements of a narrative theory, a theoretical distinction that was stressed by
structuralists, who considered that each narrative has two parts: a story (the what in a narrative
that is depicted) and the discourse (the how). According to Chatman [15, pp. 19–22], the
story consists of the content or chain of events and the existents (characters and items of
setting), while the discourse refers to the means by which the content is communicated, thus
comprising two subcomponents: the structure of narrative transmission and its manifestation.
In order to capture all elements of the communicative situation, Chatman reminds us that
narrative is a semiotic structure, which presupposes that it should include a form and a sub-
stance of expression and a form and a substance of content (Fig. 7).
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Fig. 7: Elements of a Narrative Theory (Adapted from Chatman, 1978, p. 26).
These considerations forwarded by Barbatsis provide the theoretical basis to understand the
difference between the meaning–making role of an image’s pictorial content and its pictorial
form or syntax (Fig 8):
“In a visual discourse, then, the notion of author is recast as imager and the notion of
reader is recast as viewer. In this same mode, the textual properties that inscribe a
visual point of view are recast as implied imager and implied viewer. Finally, the tex-
tual properties that inscribe a sense of being told something are recast in terms of being
shown something, which can be thought of as the showing presence or “show-er” and
“show-ee” positions of a visually composed discourse. The terms of a visual narrative
syntax can be identified, then, as the inscription of a pictorial point of view (implied
imager) along with a pictorial vantage point from which to view the imaged storyworld
(implied viewer) as well as the organization of picturing elements (show-er) with an
implication of the way this organization is meant to be seen (show-ee) [8, p. 341].
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Fig. 8: Narrative Communication Structure (Adapted from Barbatsis, 2005, p. 339)
Besides the abovementioned distinction, which allows us to understand how a narrative
discourse mode may be recognized in the formal features of an image, there are other available
theoretical frameworks which should be taken into account when assessing visual representa-
tional practices in knowledge building and science communication. In this context, we make
a final reference to the conceptual framework proposed by Pauwels for the analysis of
visual representations in science [16]. This framework takes into consideration the “diversity
that exists with regard to types of translation processes and actors in the production cycle,
as well as the different purposes and intents of representations and specific contexts of use”
[Idem, p. 4], in order to address the complex process of meaning-making that has an “impact
on what can be known and how, on what is revealed or obscured, and on what is included
or excluded” [Idem, p. 5]. Moreover, the broad amplitude of intended or unintended choices
that may influence visual representation is a fundamental aspect to which a visual analyst
should be alert. This broad amplitude of the representational space, in what Pauwels refers
to as the “visual representational latitude”, is determined by the nature of the problem being
depicted (type of referent), by the intentional and unintentional choices of the author (the
context of production), and also by the characteristics of the audience in relation to a partic-
ular visual representation (the context of use) – Fig. 9.
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Fig. 9: A Conceptual Framework for Analysing and Producing Visual Representations in
Science (Adapted from Pauwels, 2006, p. 23)
Two Exercises on the Visual World of Geoengineering – Exploring the
Potential of Visual Research Analysis
Taking these theoretical considerations into account, we will now focus our attention on two
different geoengineering images with a view to exploring the opportunity and the potential
of a visual narrative approach in the context of our investigation.
The Visual Representation of Science and the Act of Communication
One of the first images that drew our attention for possible new dimensions of analysis was
included in the report issued in September 2009 by the UK Royal Society, the aim of which
was “to provide an authoritative and balanced assessment of the main geoengineering op-
tions” [2]-Fig. 5.
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The [con]text where this figure appeared is very explicit about its purpose and about the
uncertainties that surround different geoengineering methods: this figure was meant to
provide a provisional overall evaluation based on different methods discussed in the Royal
Society’s report, that “should be treated as no more than a preliminary and some what illus-
trative attempt at visualizing the results of the sort of multi-criterion evaluation that is
needed” [2, p. 49] and “It may serve as a prototype for future analyses when more and better
information becomes available” [Idem Ibidem]. As explained in the text “indicative error
bars have been added to avoid any suggestion that the size of the symbols reflects their
precision-but note that the error bars are not really as large as they should be, just to avoid
confusing the diagram)” [Idem Ibidem].
From the perspective of the reception theory, this textual explanation not only provides
the elements necessary to clarify the point of view of the author-imager, thereby guiding the
reader-viewer in the process of meaning-making, but also reveals the author-imager’s concerns
in terms of narrative probability (coherence) and narrative fidelity (truthfulness).
Despite the efforts to clarify its “functional adequacy”, i.e. the limits of its potential uses
in acts of communication and “the correct type of intentional relationship to its subject
matter” [17, p. 220], the narrative structure of this image and the contexts in which it has
been reproduced and analysed tend to underestimate the uncertainty that surrounded its
production and the precautions regarding its uses, thereby stretching its original purpose and
meaning, leading to a range of different considerations as to the most promising geoengin-
eering technologies and conclusions of this report (Fig. 10).
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Fig. 10: References retrieved from the Internet (Sep. 2011) related with figure 5 of this article-
included in the Royal Society’s Report (2009, p. 49)
The contexts in which this image is used point to the complex meaning–making role of an
image’s pictorial content and its pictorial form or syntax. Furthermore, they also highlight
the ever-growing circulation of information worldwide (mainly on the Internet) and how
easy it is to distribute, copy, transform and recombine images, thus facilitating a rapid appro-
priation (or misappropriation), sometimes for uses that were not originally intended. This
situation not only denatures the established rules of graphic communication, but also disrupts
the familiar practices of image production and exchange [Idem Ibidem].
In this case, a figure that was conceived as a starting point for a research that is still required
runs the risk of being seen as a culminating point of a research already done. In fact, this
single figure and the discourses that surround it seem to offer a wealth of opportunities for
reflection, not only about geoengineering science, but also about:
• the intertextuality associated with this type of representation;
• the roles that these kinds of images play in the process of knowledge production;
• the need to open up the process of scientific research to wider scrutiny;
• the challenges related to the visual representation of uncertainty;
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• the dissemination of knowledge, and the communication of science among professionals
and to the public;
• the need to tackle the dilemmas of the Science-Policy interface, i.e. the difficulty of ac-
commodating the “growing expectations for science” [18], which has to simultaneously
address issues of policy relevance, scientific quality and legitimacy, in a context where
“facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” [19, p. 1882].
In fact, this attempt to represent and visualize “systems uncertainties” [Idem] with the tradi-
tional ‘language of science’ seems to tie itself into a profound paradox: how can we address
what is not fully known in a scientific problem with the same (and expected?) quantitative
scientific tools and concepts that are used to communicate what is known? Science is for
definition related with knowledge and with what can be logically and rationally explained.
In this attempt to understand “systems uncertainties”, to explain the inexactness of scientific
knowledge, and to communicate the limits of what can be known, science has primarily been
using numerical language, the language of objectivity, namely what we have been educated
to think of as a ‘language of precision’:
A political demand for scientific consensus and unambiguous quantitative information
in the assessment process would be likely to grow as science moves nearer to the context
of policy making and the political process surrounding the climate negotiations [20, p.
59].
The risk is clear: we may have been led to overestimate what we know about uncertainty,
and to underestimate the inexactness, unreliability, and -most of all-the ignorance of it.
This paradox, linked with the imperative of precision in the field of scientific communi-
cation about ‘systems uncertainties’, is clearly seen in a recent article published in Science
about the challenges of visualization and communication of uncertainties resulting both from
incomplete or disputed knowledge and from indeterminacy about the future [21]. Although
drawing attention to the emphasis that has been given to probability and risk assessment
approaches, the authors question not only the uncertainties that those approaches may com-
prise (“What if we’re uncertain about probabilities?”), but also the inadequacy of adopting
such approaches in a context of ‘post-normal science’ [19, 22].
Many hazards facing society are subject to deeper uncertainties than are reflected in
probabilities and measures of statistical error. Counterterrorism, climate change, pesti-
cides, deep-sea drilling, and nuclear waste disposal are often characterized by funda-
mental disagreements, and even ignorance, about the likelihood and values of different
consequences, as well as by essential indeterminacy about a future governed by human
behaviour.
People’s understanding of these hazards depends on their beliefs about how the world
works and how society should be ordered. Here a language of caution and humility is
appropriate, and decisions are sought that are robust, resilient, and can adapt to possible
future surprises [21, p. 1400].
Thus, by assuming that “real science depends for its progress on continual challenges to
the current state of always-imperfect knowledge” [23], it is essential to understand the role
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that visual representation of science can play in “anchoring amid uncertainty” [24] and in
making sense of plausible interpretations, options, and scenarios imagined by experts.
Extending the Debate on Geoengineering – Expanding the Story, the
Discourse and the Visual
The second image on which we will briefly focus our attention was published in the cover
of the ETC Group’s2 report “Geopiracy, The case Against Geoengineering” (Fig. 4). As
mentioned in this report “the cover is an adaptation of the Scream by Edward Munch, painted
in 1893 3. Munch painted several versions of this image over the years, which reflected his
feeling of ‘a great unending scream piercing through nature’. One theory is that the red sky
was inspired by the eruption of Krakatoa, a volcano that cooled the Earth by spewing sulphur
into the sky, which blocked the sun. Geoengineers seek to artificially reproduce this process”
[26, p. i].
This image had been strategically used to strengthen the ETC Groups’ position and to attract
the lay public into desired positions: i) to institute a moratorium on all geoengineering
activities outside the laboratory, and ii) to promote a real governance discussion on geoen-
gineering, open to public scrutiny, with the full participation of civil society organizations,
indigenous peoples and social movements, and guided by the precautionary principle, in due
respect of existing international laws and free from corporate influence and private interests
[Idem].
The power of this image relies on its compositional structure, in which a central figure
exhibits the symptoms of fear described by Mentegazza and Mosso (pallor, open eyes, flared
nostrils, screams, trembling, and the whole body oscillating like a pendulum) [27, p. 56] and
on the structure of meaning relationships [28, p. 237] that have made this picture a symbol
of the anxiety and neuroses in our own society, “a great infinite scream passing through
nature” [27, p. 29].
This circumstance reinforces the need to consider the aspects of how and why an image
might come to “stand for” something else. Focused on nanotechnology representations,
Ruivenkamp and Rip mention that it is “the entanglement between imaging and imagining
which is the key to understanding what images do” [29, p. 185]. While imaging refers to the
creation of images based on data, aiming at resemblance and offering ‘a view on what is out
there’, imagining refers to the creation of impressions, offering visions of worlds that might
be realized. To capture the continuum between imaging and imagining, the authors introduce
2 ETC Group is an international civil society organization that aims to address the global socioeconomic and ecologi-
cal issues surrounding new technologies and is particularly concerned with their impact on indigenous peoples,
rural communities and biodiversity
3 According to Munch (2005) the inspiration for this image came from the following event: “One evening I was
walking out on a hilly path near Kristiania – with two comrades. It was a time when life had ripped my soul open.
The sun was going down – had dipped in flames below the horizon. It was like a flaming sword of blood slicing
through the concave heaven. The sky was like blood – sliced with strips of fire – the hills turned deep blue the fjord
– cut in cold blue, yellow, and red colors – The exploding bloody red – on the path and hand railing – my friends
turned glaring yellow white – I felt a great scream – and I heard, yes, a great scream – the colors in nature – broke
the lines of nature – the lines and colors vibrated with motion – these oscillations of life brought not only my eye
into oscillations, it brought also my ears into oscillations – so I actually heard a scream – I painted the picture
Scream then”. 25. Munch, E., The Private Journals of Edvard Munch: We Are Flames Which Pour Out On the
Earth. 1st ed, ed. J.G. Holland. 2005, Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. 224.
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the notion of ‘imag(in)ing’, which has to do with representation and its idea of ‘standing
for’ and being able to ‘act for’, as in political representation.
Nanotechnology and geoengineering seem to have little in common in terms of each
world’s view. At first glance, the nanoscale invisibility clashes with the heavily emphasised
(but also invisible) geoengineering global-scale expression. Nevertheless, and not considering
the numerous linkages between nanoscale and global-scale processes4, both technological
worlds have been challenged by attempts to provide scientific reliable representations of
possibilities. As in Nanotechnology, geoengineering images balance the past, present and
the future in order to communicate the results of recent experiments and major achievements,
as well as to present the potentialities, drawbacks and risks associated with these technologies.
Indeed, and as is likely, given what is happening with nanotechnology (and other emerging
technologies?), the visual representation of geoengineering also involves practices of ‘en-
tangling’ present achievements and future visions of what it may become, drawing attention
to the anachronism that tends to be associated with the innovation processes in the context
of knowledge production. This anachronism reinforces the relevance of the ‘idiom of co-
production’ [31] and the explanatory power it confers by thinking of natural and social orders
as being produced together. In this perspective, the anachronism one may find in geoengi-
neering imag(in)ing should be seen as a manifestation of the concept of co-production, taking
into consideration that “the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature
and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it” [31, p. 2].
Final Remarks
It has been suggested for a while now that there is a need for deliberative governance and
public engagement in the climate geoengineering field [32], although it is only recently that
the practical implications and challenges of such demands began to be addressed [33–37].
In this context, many authors have been arguing about the importance of considering public
perceptions of geoengineering, thus helping to further unveil the perceived moral orders
underlying these proposals [2, 35, 37–39].
As we attempted to demonstrate in the previous section, the full meaning of geoengineering
debates can only be perceived if it is connected with the larger social imaginary of science
and technology in which geoengineering narratives are rooted. Hence, it is suggested that
those narratives should be further interrogated by expanding its notion to include pictorial
forms of expression, in order to consider alternative ethical paradigms, such as discursive
or deliberative ethics [40, 41]. In doing so, we not only clear the path to more open and
critical reflection, but also assume the importance of rebuilding the ‘geoengineering scientific
worldview’ based on social processes of trust and credibility, in this way driving climate
change science to reveal more clearly the competing social interests, values and assumptions
[42].
In periods of uncertainty and change, where trust cannot be taken for granted and where
important values of humanity are put under pressure by scientific and technological hubris
[43], it is important to remember that “Modern natural science owes its great triumphs to
having looked upon and treated earth-bound nature from a truly universal viewpoint, that
4 Which have been explored by different authors (cf. 30. Brussaard, C.P.D., et al., Global-scale processes with a
nanoscale drive: the role of marine viruses. ISME J, 2008. 2(6): p. 575–578.
193
PAULA CURVELO
159
is, from an Archimedean standpoint taken, wilfully and explicitly, outside the earth” [11, p.
11]. Thus, we should also consider the potential of visual representations in science to usher
in a responsible “second Copernican revolution”, one that must be a reversal of the first,
enabling us “to look back on our planet to perceive one single, complex, dissipative, dynamic
entity, far from thermodynamic equilibrium—the ‘Earth system’” [44, p. C19].
As mentioned by Schellnhuber, this is an immense geo-cybernetic task that can be summed
up in three fundamental questions: i) what kind of world do we have? ii) what kind of world
do we want? iii) what must we do to get there? [Idem]. These three questions suggest the
enormous cross-disciplinary challenges posed by social problems that tend to be ‘circum-
vented’ and reduced to technological fixes [45], therefore claiming for a research ethics that
no longer can be dissociated from an environmental ethics if a ‘scientific stable society’ is
to be achieved:
«Knowledge is power, but it is power for evil just as much as for good. It follows that,
unless men increase in wisdom as much as in knowledge, increase of knowledge will
be increase of sorrow» [46, p. 1307].
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Abstract: Over the last few years, geoengineering, or the ‘deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate 
system, in order to moderate global warming’, has attracted increasing attention among strategies to limit the impact and 
consequences of climate change. However, the understanding of the physical science basis of geoengineering is still 
limited, and there are still major uncertainties concerning the impacts these technologies might have on human and 
natural systems. The self-assertive invasion of nature’s various domains, the scale and complexity of the technoscientific 
tasks involved, the unpredictable long-term impacts of geoengineering actions, and the huge uncertainties that these 
proposals raise point to a shift in the nature of human action that requires a commensurate ethics of foresight and 
responsibility. If there is a decision to embark on such an ambitious project, a major effort should be made to scrutinise 
and gain a deeper understanding of the geoengineering scientific worldview. In fact, the full meaning of geoengineering 
proposals can only be grasped in the context of the larger social imaginary of science and technology in which 
geoengineering narratives are rooted. In this paper, two different contextual frameworks from which to address these 
issues are presented and analysed. The first represents the mainstream Earth System Science perspective, while the 
second corresponds to an alternative view from the field of social studies of science and technology. Central to both is the 
concept of an ‘epochal break’. In the former, this is in terms of the Human-Earth relationship, in the latter, in terms of 
the relationship between science, technology and society. It is hoped that this approach may contribute to clearing the 
path towards more open and critical reflection about the competing interests, values and assumptions of climate 
engineering proposals. 
Keywords: Geoengineering, Climate Engineering, Earth System Science, Anthropocene, Technoscience, Epochal Break 
Why Geoengineering? 
he term ‘geoengineering’ was coined in the 1970s by the physicist Cesare Marchetti to 
describe a proposal for tackling the problem of CO2 control in the atmosphere with a CO2 
management system, ‘where CO2 is collected at proper fuel transformation points and 
finally injected into the deep seas taking advantage of natural thermohaline circulations’ 
(Marchetti 1977, vi). 
Almost at the same time, on the other side of the globe, the Russian climatologist Mikhail 
Budyko was probing the potential of different techniques to modify the aerosol layer of the 
stratosphere to prevent the warming of the climate (Schneider 1996; Bonnheim 2010; Budyko 
1977). Some wider implications of these early findings were immediately recognised: 
The possibility of ‘geo-engineering’ – large-scale climatic modification as a strategy to 
offset an ‘expected’ major global climatic change – may not be that far off in the future. 
(…) However, the risks of these climatic control measures must be considered along 
with any possible benefits that might be derived. First, in the face of the present 
theoretical uncertainties, any specific operation to compensate for an ‘expected’ climatic 
effect could conceivably produce an over-response in the system. It is quite possible 
with today’s rather crude estimates that the magnitude of the ‘expected’ climatic 
perturbation could be overestimated and the magnitude of the deliberate intervention 
could be underestimated. (…) if climatic deterioration were to follow climatic control 
operations, some nations could, in the absence of a definitive theory of climate, perceive 
that such climatic ‘corrective’ measures directly caused the deterioration. Thereby, these 
nations could demand restitution from the climate controllers, leading to a scenario in 
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which the political – and possibly military – implications might be difficult to foresee. 
(Schneider and Temkin 1978, 242-243) 
From that moment on, the dice were cast. Not only had these discoveries opened up a new 
chapter in the history of climate change, but also the dominant features of the consequentialist 
worldview began to ‘exhaust’ and ‘entrench’ the ethical debate on geoengineering into a ‘process 
of rational calculation’ – a process that has been largely informed by the ‘language of risk’1 
(Adam and Loon 2000), and for which ‘the most ethical course is the best one determined by 
summing the value of the costs and benefits, perhaps weighted by risks, and maybe with some 
account of distributional effects’ (Hamilton 2011).  
Thus, with questions regarding the deeper meanings of geoengineering proposals already 
undermined by dominant utilitarian thinking, the risks mentioned by Schneider and Temkin have 
not diminished. In fact, they have expanded, as the ‘possibility of geo-engineering’ is becoming 
increasingly real. 
Two Fundamental Questions 
Since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), responses to address climate change have until recently fallen within two major 
groups of strategies (IPCC 2007):  
I. mitigation measures, which comprise all human activities to reduce emissions or 
enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous 
oxide, and 
II. adaptation measures, which include any adjustments made to natural or human
systems in response to actual or expected impacts of climate change, with the aim
of moderating harm or exploiting beneficial opportunities.
Over the last few years, however, geoengineering, or the ‘deliberate large-scale intervention 
in the Earth’s climate system, in order to moderate global warming’ (The Royal Society 2009, 1), 
has attracted increasing attention among strategies to limit the impact and consequences of 
climate change. Accordingly, in June 2011, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) organised an expert meeting to discuss the latest scientific basis of 
geoengineering, its impacts and response options, and to identify key knowledge gaps that could 
be filled in the short and longer terms.  
As stated in the meeting report, ‘the understanding of the physical science basis of 
geoengineering is still limited and IPCC will, for the first time, assess this in several chapters of 
the WGI contribution to AR5. Improved scientific understanding of the impacts of 
geoengineering proposals on human and natural systems will be assessed by WGII. WGIII needs 
to take into account the possible impacts and side effects and their implications for mitigation 
cost in order to define the role of geoengineering within the portfolio of response options to 
anthropogenic climate change. Furthermore, this includes an evaluation by WGIII of options for 
appropriate governance mechanisms’ (Edenhofer et al. 2012, 19, emphasis added). 
Although the three IPCC Working Groups are expected to make a positive contribution to 
the current state of understanding of geoengineering in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), two 
fundamental questions are likely to be excluded from the scope of the AR5.  
• The first question draws attention to the role geoengineering technologies play in
ongoing climate change debates. Thus, in the light of the recent report of the IPCC
Expert Meeting on Geoengineering, it could be formulated as follows: Why is
1 Whether by focusing on the risks of geoengineering technologies, or, in an almost paradoxical way, by assuming some 
of its specific methods as useful tools to manage climate risks (Moreno-Cruz and Keith 2012). 
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geoengineering becoming a part of the portfolio of response options to 
anthropogenic climate change? 
• Having in mind the proper goal of technology use (Sandler 2009), the second
question is: How will geoengineering technologies improve the human condition
now and in the long term?
Though these are not typical of the scientific and technical questions facing the three IPCC 
Working Groups, it seems reasonable to consider that attempts to answer them would have had 
priority, or, in view of the risks perceived early on, would have taken place during the initial 
stages of geoengineering research.  
The formulation of these questions is intended to highlight the need to unlock the 
geoengineering debate from the path-dependent questions that, almost invariably, provide 
justification for more and more research. Thus, it takes the standpoint that scientific enterprise is 
not merely a matter of epistemic permissibility, but also of moral permissibility. An enterprise 
that entails methodological choices of perspective − ‘What is to be studied, by what means, for 
what purpose?’ −, which cannot be excused from moral consideration and cannot be thought of 
as something entirely outside the realm of action (Strand 2002).  
We have to choose what we want to know, imposing a context; research per se often 
irreversibly changes the world through its invention of technology; and the course of 
this development is not inevitable, but has a historical character. (Strand 2002, 172) 
Therefore, these fundamental questions demarcate themselves from the technically feasible 
and cost-effective responses that, within a utilitarian framework, have been advanced in 
geoengineering debates, suggesting that it is only within the development of a systematic 
discourse, involving ethics − as accompanying research (‘Begleitforschung’) (Hronszky 2005) − 
that the following far-reaching presuppositions which underpin our formulations can be 
considered: 
• the need to gain a deeper understanding of the theoretical assumptions, motivations,
and interests involved in the development of different geoengineering methods;
• the need to reflect on the goals and visions that shape geoengineering technologies;
• the necessity to explore and disentangle the imaginaries, commitments, and
representations of nature and of the human being that inform geoengineering
debates;
• the necessity to scrutinise the expectations, embedded values and ways of making
sense of a geoengineered world.
Though some recent works have contributed to a better understanding of these issues, there 
is still a lack of critical thinking about how the broad set of geoengineering methods and 
technologies might ‘contribute to human flourishing in socially just and environmentally 
sustainable ways’ – which, according to Sandler, should be the ultimate goal of any emerging 
technology (Sandler 2009). 
Therefore, in stressing the relevance of questioning the geoengineering scientific worldview, 
this paper aims to suggest possible ways of unveiling the complexity of the broader scientific, 
political and social context in which the geoengineering debate is taking place.  
The Complex World of Geoengineering: Moving between Scientific 
Terminology and Scientific Ideology 
Despite the diversity of positions adopted in the debates on geoengineering, there is widespread 
agreement on the need to consider the far-reaching ethical questions raised by intentional climate 
change proposals. However, if there is a decision to embark on this ambitious task, a major effort 
37 
169
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 
should be made to scrutinise and gain a better understanding of the geoengineering scientific 
worldview.  
To be properly understood, geoengineering proposals must be linked with the larger social 
imaginary of science and technology in which geoengineering narratives are rooted. One way of 
looking at the geoengineering issue and the scalar dislocations that it introduces into modern 
systems of experience and understanding is to explore the close affinity that intentional climate 
change proposals have with many other technologies that have emerged in the recent past. 
However, before we proceed along this route, we must first clarify what is meant by 
‘geoengineering’, a term on which the scientific community seems far from reaching a 
consensus, as has been pointed out by several authors and was made clear at the aforementioned 
IPCC expert meeting:  
A substantial amount of time in the Expert Meeting was spent in discussing terminology 
in and around geoengineering. This underlines the ambiguities associated with the term 
geoengineering and the range of opinions on the subject. (Edenhofer et al. 2012, 2) 
One of the first attempts to clarify the ambiguity of the term was made in 1996 by Thomas 
Schelling, who identified the features that geoengineering seems to imply: global, intentional and 
unnatural interventions (Schelling 1996).  
Four years later, David Keith built on this attempt by pointing out the three core attributes 
that should serve as ‘markers of geoengineering’ actions: the scale (global or continental), the 
intent (the deliberate nature of the action rather than a side effect of it) and the degree to which 
the action is a countervailing measure (Keith 2000).  
The reasons for replacing the ‘unnatural’ features by the ‘degree to which the action is a 
countervailing measure’ were not properly explained − even though this had implications for the 
type of proposals that the term encompasses2. Nevertheless, these three markers seem to translate 
the meaning of the term geoengineering, as commonly used by the scientific community 
nowadays, furthering the conceptual distinction between geoengineering proposals and other 
responses to climate change.  
But even if these markers draw attention to the ‘continuum of human responses to the 
climate problem’ (Keith 2000) − helping to reduce the fuzziness in the conceptual distinction 
between geoengineering methods and other proposals to tackle climate change − there is still no 
consensus on specific interventions that fall within the definition of geoengineering3. 
2 In order to exemplify these implications it seems appropriate to refer briefly to the use of weather modification 
techniques (such as cloud seeding and hurricane suppression) that are taking place in many countries around the world. 
As recently stated by the World Meteorological Organisation: ‘since the 1980’s there has been a decline in support for 
weather modification research, and a tendency to move directly into operational projects’ (WMO 2010). Given the 
similarities between weather modification (WM) techniques and some geoengineering methods, the concerns raised by 
the increasing number of WM operational programmes (fog dispersion, rain and snow enhancement and hail suppression) 
have gained momentum in the context of the contemporary debates on geoengineering – leading, almost inevitably, to a 
discussion on the criteria that differentiate these two domains. However, although widely mentioned, the scale marker 
seems to be insufficient to exclude WM techniques from the vast range of methods that the term geoengineering 
encompasses. This becomes clear from the way the ‘countervailing measure criterion’ has been evoked, namely by 
drawing attention to the differences between ‘weather’ and ‘climate’ modification techniques, and to the far-reaching 
consequences of the latter: ‘Weather modifications such as cloud seeding which affect the weather for no longer than a 
season, in our view, do not fall within the definition of geoengineering (…) We conclude that weather techniques such as 
cloud seeding should not be included within the definition of geoengineering used for the purposes of activities designed 
to effect a change in the global climate with the aim of minimising or reversing anthropogenic climate change’ (UK 
House of Commons. Science and Technology Committee 2010, 15). Nonetheless, it is telling that according to this same 
report: ‘Cloud seeding could affect climate when carried out over a long period’ (Idem). 
3 Of which a concrete example is provided by Decision X/33 of the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP10): ‘Without prejudice to future deliberations on the definition of geo-engineering activities, understanding that 
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Moreover, in considering the ethical issues raised by intentional climate change proposals, it 
becomes clear that these markers tend to hinder the various values, rationales and theoretical 
assumptions underlying the range of Carbon Dioxide Removal techniques (CDR) and Solar 
Radiation Management techniques (SRM) considered under the broad umbrella of the term 
geoengineering. As mentioned by Gardiner, the ethical discussion of geoengineering is made 
more difficult by the complexity of the terrain: 
First, a number of interventions are already being proposed for combating climate 
change, and it is not clear that all of them should be classified together. For example, 
some suggest deflecting a small percentage of incoming radiation from the sun by 
placing huge mirrors at the Legrange point between it and the earth, some advocate 
fertilizing the oceans with plant life to soak up more carbon dioxide, some suggest a 
massive program of reforestation, and some propose capturing vast quantities of 
emissions from power plants and burying them in sedimentary rock deep underground. 
But do these interventions raise the same issues? Should we count all of them as 
‘geoengineering’?(Gardiner 2010, 285) 
To overcome the obstacles raised by the broadness of the term, Bunzl appeals to the 
methodological distinction between small ‘g’ proposals and big ‘G’ proposals4. According to the 
author, this distinction is fundamental for deconstructing some of the common arguments made 
for advancing further and faster in geoengineering research. In fact, because big ‘G’ proposals 
fall into a specific class of scientific endeavours (where the object of interest is not ‘modular’ or 
‘encapsulated’), they generate a set of methodological challenges, allowing the moral argument 
as to ‘whether research should be done’ (the permissibility of research), to give way to the 
methodological argument as to ‘whether it could be done’ (the feasibility of research) − thus 
shifting the burden of proof towards the proponents of geoengineering. 
But what if the object of your interest is not modular or encapsulated? What do you do 
then? For that, after all, is the feature that big ‘G’ geoengineering proposals have in 
common. They call for interventions on systems that lack just this characteristic. You 
cannot encapsulate part of the atmosphere and it is too complex to be able to build a 
realistic non-virtual model at scale. As such, it is reasonable to ask whether we could 
ever have a sound basis for moving to full deployment of any such proposed 
intervention. And if not, then why bother to even research such proposals in the first 
place? (Bunzl 2009, 2) 
It seems most reasonable to question the feasibility of geoengineering research in the light of 
its object of interest. Indeed, the pressure of practice under which science operates today (Carrier 
2011) is giving rise to the emergence of new objects of research − ambivalent beings, hybrid 
products and theoretically constructed objects through which we gain a new understanding and 
any technologies that deliberately reduce solar insolation or increase carbon sequestration from the atmosphere on a large 
scale that may affect biodiversity (excluding carbon capture and storage from fossil fuels when it captures carbon dioxide 
before it is released into the atmosphere) should be considered as forms of geo-engineering which are relevant to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity until a more precise definition can be developed’. 
4 ‘Of course there is geoengineering and then there is GEOENGINEERING. Nobody gets very wound up about the idea
of planting trees or painting roofs white as instances of geoengineering—which is not to say that they will necessarily do 
much good. The kind of geoengineering that elicits howls of disapproval is grander than this—it is things like space 
mirrors, sulfur injection into the upper atmosphere, and iron fertilization of the oceans—it is the idea of intervention on a 
grand scale (…)’ (Bunzl 2009).
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control of nature − that call for a more careful consideration of the complex narratives and 
practices of science and technology (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, 1994b, 1994a; Latour 1987; 
Haraway 1997; Law 2002; Michael 2006).  
Following this appeal, some authors have suggested that it is precisely at the level of these 
objects of research that we can find the meaningful distinction between science and 
technoscience, an ontological difference that ‘becomes more explicit when research results are 
presented in particular settings and when the objects of research are exhibited for the specific 
interest they hold’ (Bensaude-Vincent et al. 2011, 365).  
Accordingly, to expand on an example provided by these authors, it could be said that when 
the result of a global climate model experiment is presented as scientific evidence for 
understanding the importance of aerosol forcing on the climate system, this would conform to 
traditional conceptions of science. However, when sulphate aerosols are presented for their 
capacity to counteract the climate forcing of growing CO2 emissions, this should be seen as a 
‘hallmark of technoscience’. 
Though Bunzl’s argument has the merit of drawing attention to often neglected 
epistemological, methodological and ontological dimensions of science and technology, it seems 
difficult to sustain the assumption that a solution can be found without considering the moral 
issues encompassed in the question ‘whether research should be done’.  
Indeed, the dualistic viewpoint from which the moral and methodological arguments were 
presented seems to neglect that the process of risk calculation is not objective, that ‘risk 
statements are neither purely factual claims nor exclusively values claims’, but something akin to 
a ‘mathematicised morality’ (Beck 2000, 215). Ultimately, the most intense and stormy 
controversies over science and technology are more to do with ‘moral uncertainties’ − the lack of 
commonly-shared normative yardsticks to underpin collective decision-making − than with the 
uncertainties about the impacts and risks those developments may raise (Hansen 2010).  
Moreover, if a good case could be made for the soundness of the methodological argument, 
it would imply, to some degree, consideration of the moral issues relegated to the first argument. 
In fact, and without questioning the truth of the first premise – i.e., that GEOENGINEERING 
proposals fall within a specific class of scientific endeavours where the object of interest is not 
modular and encapsulated – the soundness of the methodological argument is rather questionable 
in view of its second premise – i.e., that the full deployment of this kind of intervention relies on 
having a sound [scientific?] basis. Quite apart from the ambiguity that the term ‘sound basis’ 
encompasses, a brief look at the history of science and technology is enough to show that the 
acceptance of this premise is far from being consensual. One reason is because it disregards the 
profound reorientation of technoscientific practices in contemporary societies  –  in what has 
been seen as a major shift from the ‘laboratory ideal’ to the ‘field ideal’ of experimentation:  
The laboratory ideal involves designing manipulated, well-controlled, isolated 
experimental systems; the field ideal acknowledges their complexity, blurred 
boundaries, and unpredictable responses to interventions. Field experiments could 
hardly be called an alternative ideal if they had not undergone a reevaluation in the 
philosophy of science and a reassessment with regard to their social relevance. We 
suggest that both changes can be observed especially well in the 1980s in the domain of 
the environmental sciences. Even if field experiments were not entirely new at that time, 
environmental concerns in science and society gave them a new cognitive status, 
institutional backing, and a specific rhetorical image. Today we are seeing the spread of 
new styles of experimentation to many areas of society. Experiments performed in open 
spaces might be, say, a social reform or a medical treatment, an ecological remediation 
or a technological innovation. (Schwarz and Krohn 2011, 120) 
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Another reason is that it mirrors the fact-value dichotomy, thus neglecting relevant and 
meaningful perspectives on science and technology in the context of application (Jasanoff 2004; 
Nordmann, Radder, and Schiemann 2011; Carrier and Nordmann 2011; Irwin 2008; Collins and 
Evans 2002; Jones 2011; Balabanian 1994). To cite just one example: 
For understanding the new tasks and methods of science, we can fruitfully invert 
Latour’s metaphor, and think of Nature as reinvading the lab. We see this in many ways; 
for example, our science-based technology, which for a while appeared to be a new 
man-made Nature dominant over the old, is now appreciated as critically dependent on 
the larger ecosystem in which it is embedded; and that it risks destruction of itself if that 
matrix becomes seriously perturbed or degraded (…) To characterize an issue involving 
risk and environment, in what we call ‘post-normal science’, we can think of it as one 
where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent. In such a 
case, the term ‘problem’, with its connotations of an exercise where a defined 
methodology is likely to lead to a clear solution, is less appropriate. We would be 
misled if we retained the image of a process where true scientific facts simply determine 
the correct policy conclusions. (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, 742–744) 
Although rather fragmented, this rough sketch highlights the complex world of 
geoengineering. It is a complexity that cannot be reduced to the ambiguities of the term or to the 
range of methods that the term encompasses, but must be considered in the context of the 
profound transformations that science is currently undergoing – that of the ‘earth alienation’ 
underlying the whole development of science in the modern age, described with great lucidity by 
Hannah Arendt: 
At any event, while world alienation5 determined the course and the development of 
modern society, earth alienation became and has remained the hallmark of modern 
science. Under the sign of earth alienation, every science, not only physical and natural 
science, so radically changed its innermost content that one may doubt whether prior to 
the modern age anything like science existed at all. (Arendt 1958, 264, footnote added) 
Geoengineering within Epochal Breaks  – Two Broad Perspectives for 
Questioning the Geoengineering Scientific Worldview 
As explained in the previous section, different conceptions, understandings and value 
assumptions about science and technology tend to shape the geoengineering debate and inform 
the analytical framework within which the geoengineering domain has been problematised. This 
reinforces the need to unbind geoengineering discourses from the deeply embedded narratives of 
science, technology and society that put forward technoscientific innovation as the solution to 
our most critical problems and as a substitute for social change (Ulrike Felt et al. 2007). Looking 
at geoengineering from a more distant and detached point presupposes considering it from a 
broad, long-term perspective, both in terms of the human-environment relationship, and in terms 
of the relationships between science, technology and society. 
The following introduces and analyses two different conceptual frameworks from which the 
two fundamental questions under discussion may be addressed. The first represents the 
mainstream Earth System Science perspective, while the second corresponds to an alternative 
(though compatible) view from the field of social studies of science and technology. Central to 
5 i.e. ‘the distance which man puts between himself and the world’ (Arendt 1958, 252). 
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both is the concept of an ‘epochal break’: for the former in terms of the Human-Earth 
relationship, for the latter in terms of the relationship between science, technology and society. 
The Earth System Science Perspective – The Anthropocene: An Epochal Break in the 
Human-Earth Relationship 
Over the past 150 years, several efforts have been made to document and understand the 
interaction of human and environmental systems from a long-term, global perspective. 
George Perkins Marsh’s remarkable work ‘Man and Nature; or Physics Geography as 
Modified by Human Action’, first published in 1864, has been widely acknowledged by 
environmental scientists as the first comprehensive analysis of the detrimental effects of human 
modification on the natural environment (Krech, McNeill, and Merchant 2004). Marsh drew on 
examples from around the world to provide a comprehensive description of the major changes 
produced by human action on the earth’s surface – ‘the history of man’s industry as exerted upon 
Animal and Vegetable Life, upon the Woods, upon the Waters, and upon the Sands’ (Marsh 
1864, vi) – and to stress the need for caution in all human interventions which, on a large scale, 
interfere with the laws of nature. In the last chapter, he presents some of the major ‘geographical 
revolutions’ projected at that time (among them Epsy’s theory for artificial rainmaking), and 
concludes that ‘(…) every new fact, illustrative of the action and reaction between humanity and 
the material world around it, is another step toward the determination of the great question 
whether man is of nature or above her’ (Marsh 1864, 549). 
The second major effort to examine the geographically and historically cumulative effects of 
man on Earth was undertaken in an international symposium sponsored by the Wenner-Gren 
Foundation for Anthropological Research, held in Princeton in June 1955. The symposium was 
organised by the Foundation assistant’s director, William L. Thomas Jr., with the collaboration of 
Carl O. Sauer (chairman of the symposium), Marston Bates and Lewis Mumford. Under the 
broad themes of ‘retrospect’, ‘process’, and ‘prospect’, the symposium aimed to explore, in a 
holistic and integrative way, the question: ‘What has been, and is, happening to the earth’s 
surface as a result of man’s having been on it for a long time, increasing in numbers and skills 
unevenly, at different places and times?’ (Thomas Jr. 1956, viii). The symposium volume ‘Man’s 
Role in Changing the Face of the Earth’ was published in 1956 and includes the essays of 53 
contributors from a wide variety of disciplines, as well as the reports on the symposium 
discussions. Written more than half a century ago, this landmark work represents an early and 
valuable account of contemporary environmental concerns, which, along with ‘A Sandy County 
Almanac’ (Leopold 1949), seems to set the stage for the emergence of the ecological movement of 
the 1960s.  
Although favouring the quantitative aspects of human-induced environmental 
transformations, and paying less attention to its cultural and historical dimensions, during the 
next three decades the number of global environmental studies multiplied, contributing to an 
increased understanding of the magnitude of those transformations and the processes responsible 
for them (Kates, B. L. Turner II, and Clark 1990). The maturation of scientific knowledge about 
the Earth, advances in space-based Earth observation technologies and increasing awareness of 
how humans are modifying the environment have contributed to a new understanding of the 
Earth – as an integrated system, whose study must transcend disciplinary boundaries – leading to 
the development of NASA’s research approach to Earth System Science6, which has become the 
backbone of many global research initiatives around the world (ESSC 1988). 
6 This research approach consists of four steps: i) observation, ii) analysis and interpretation, iii) models, and iv) 
verification and prediction. 
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In 1990, with the publication of ‘The Earth as Transformed by Human Action’ (B. L. Turner 
II et al. 1990), a major scientific effort was made to provide new insights and a broad overview 
of the full array of human impacts on Earth. Drawing upon significant developments in science7, 
this work aimed not only to recover and tell ‘the general story of how humankind has remade the 
planet on which it lives’ (Meyer 1996), but also to address a deeper and more fundamental 
question: ‘What is and ought to be the relationship of humans to the earth?’ (Kates, B. L. Turner 
II, and Clark 1990, 2). 
Over the last two decades, research into the growing interference of human action with the 
Earth system has achieved considerable progress. There was a major boost to developing 
interdisciplinary global change research in 20018, with the establishment of the Earth System 
Science Partnership (ESSP), which has brought together the four international global change 
research programmes: DIVERSITAS; the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme 
(IGBP); the International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP); and the World Climate 
Research Programme (WCRP). 
In the course of these developments, a new concept – the Anthropocene – has emerged to 
capture the quantitative shift in the relationship between humans and the global environment, 
thus potentially marking the beginning of a new geological epoch (Steffen, Grinevald et al. 
2011). 
The term Anthropocene first appeared in print in 2000, in a newsletter of the IGBP (Crutzen 
and Stoermer 2000). Two years later, a related article from the Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen was 
published in the journal Nature, in which he notes that: 
Unless there is a global catastrophe  – a meteorite impact, a world war or a pandemic  –  
mankind will remain a major environmental force for many millennia. A daunting task 
lies ahead for scientists and engineers to guide society towards environmentally 
sustainable management during the era of the Anthropocene. This will require 
appropriate human behaviour at all scales, and may well involve internationally 
accepted, large-scale geo-engineering projects, for instance to ‘optimise’ climate. At 
this stage, however, we are still largely treading on terra incognita. (Crutzen 2002, 
emphasis added) 
The implications of recognising this newly-constructed concept go beyond the discussions 
around ‘golden spikes’ and stratigraphic criteria that aim to examine whether there is, in 
geological terms, a justification or need for the formal adoption of a new geological epoch 
(Zalasiewicz et al. 2008). As is clear from the above, the recognition of this epochal break seems 
to require much more: i) concerted efforts on part of scientists and engineers to achieve effective 
planetary stewardship; ii) substantial and effective behavioural change in the most advanced 
societies towards more sustainable lifestyles; iii) and the acceptance of large–scale 
geoengineering projects at the international level. The responses to these appeals have been swift 
and generous, reflecting the broad acceptance of the Anthropocene concept in the global change 
research community and the way it has been assumed as a central system of thought for Earth 
System Science – one that ‘works upon our identities and enables new ways of being in and 
acting upon nature and society’ (Lovbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009).  
7 ‘(1) new ways to conceptualize the unity of the biosphere, symbolized by the wide currency of the term itself; (2) new 
ways and collective efforts to acquire data and analyze their detail and complexity; and (3) reassessment of some of the 
avenues that link social behavior with environmental transformations’ (Kates, B. L. Turner II, and Clark 1990).  
8 The ESSP was launched in 2001 as a response to the Amsterdam Declaration on Global Change, which called for 
strengthening cooperation among the global environmental research programmes, for greater integration across 
disciplines, environment and development issues and the natural and social sciences. 
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Indeed, since the beginning of this century the Anthropocene has been widely discussed and 
has become an active area of research into global environmental change. New institutional 
frameworks for sustainable development and fundamental reforms of national and international 
institutions towards more effective planetary stewardship and earth system governance are being 
forged (Biermann, Abbott, Andresen, Bäckstrand, Bernstein, Betsill, Bulkeley, Cashore, Clapp, 
Folke, Gupta, Gupta, Haas, Jordan, Kanie, Kluvánková-Oravská et al. 2012; Biermann and 
Pattberg 2012; Biermann, Abbott, Andresen, Bäckstrand, Bernstein, Betsill, Bulkeley, Cashore, 
Clapp, Folke, Gupta, Gupta, Haas, Jordan, Kanie, Kluvánková-Oravská et al. 2012; Schellnhuber 
et al. 2004).  
Innovative approaches to identify ‘guardrails’ for responsible planetary management 
(Petschel-Held et al. 1999) and to quantify biophysical preconditions for human development in 
the Anthropocene have led to the definition of ‘planetary boundaries’, i.e. the ‘safe operation 
space for humanity’ with respect to the Earth system, within which humanity has the freedom to 
pursue long-term social and economic development, as long as thresholds are not crossed 
(Rockström et al. 2009a, 2009b). An increasing number of geoengineering research initiatives are 
opening up new approaches to tackling climate change and possible ways of overcoming those 
‘non-negotiable’ planetary boundaries. Lastly, several efforts have been made ‘to push 
geoengineering up the international agenda’ (UK House of Commons. Science and Technology 
Committee 2010; GAO 2011; Ginzky et al. 2011) and to consider policies and strategies for 
addressing geoengineering at national and international levels (Bracmort, Lattanzio, and Barbour 
2011). In this context, it seems that the fundamental frame9 to mobilise support for an alteration 
of social structures and agents’ social values, and to persuade wider society to adopt responsible 
behaviour on the basis of a proposed normative human response to climate change, is the only 
element that is still missing. A circumstance that shows which end of the spectrum of required 
transformational approaches posed by the Anthropocene10 has been favoured and how its 
imagery ‘both challenges and reproduces the Enlightenment promise of human self-realisation, 
autonomy and control’ (Lovbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009, 8).  
An STS Perspective – An Epochal Break in the Science-Technology-Society Relationship 
As previously discussed, the new integrative framework of Earth System Science to monitor 
human-induced transformations on the global environment, gain a better understanding of the 
direct and indirect processes underlying these transformations and develop the ability to estimate 
the past and future trajectories of those changes, has not only provided new perspectives on 
‘man’s role in changing the face of earth’, but has also brought to light the changed nature of 
human action – a condition that has long been recognised, even if its full implications are still 
difficult to grasp. 
(…) man now is evermore the maker of what he has made and the doer of what he can 
do, and most of all the preparer of what he will be able to do next. But who is “he”? Not 
you or I: it is the aggregate, not the individual doer or deed that matters here; and the 
indefinite future, rather than the contemporary context of the action, constitutes the 
relevant horizon of responsibility. This requires imperatives of a new sort. If the realm 
of making has invaded the space of essential action, then morality must invade the realm 
9 The term ‘frame’ is used here in the sense given by Mayer N. Zald, i.e. ‘specific metaphors, symbolic representations, 
and cognitive cues used to render or cast behaviour and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of 
action’ (Zald 1996, 262). 
10 In which ‘geoengineering and reducing human pressure on the Earth System at its source represent the end points of 
the spectrum in terms of philosophies, ethics and strategies’ (Steffen, Persson et al. 2011, 252). 
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of making, from which it has formerly stayed aloof, and must do so in the form of 
public policy. Public policy has never had to deal before with issues of such 
inclusiveness and such lengths of anticipation. In fact, the changed nature of human 
action changes the very nature of politics. (Jonas 1984, 9) 
In fact, in an almost paradoxical way, the concept of the Anthropocene, ‘which cuts through 
a mass of complexity and detail to place the evolution of the human enterprise in the context of a 
much longer Earth History’ (Steffen, Persson et al. 2011), seems to rest on previous efforts to 
understand the deeper meanings and implications of the trajectory of the human-environment 
relationship, to reproduce the very practices that gave rise to its high-order discontinuities, and 
which were precisely those that the term was sought to challenge in the first place (Lovbrand, 
Stripple, and Wiman 2009): 
The advent of the Anthropocene, the time interval in which human activities now rival 
global geophysical processes, suggests that we need to fundamentally alter our 
relationship with the planet we inhabit. Many approaches could be adopted, ranging 
from geoengineering solutions that purposefully manipulate parts of the Earth System to 
becoming active stewards of our own life support system. (Steffen, Persson et al. 2011, 
739) 
This situation draws attention to the need to look at this broad context of human-
environment relationship from a perspective that takes into account the discontinuities of both a 
social and a technoscientific nature that have shaped the interactions between socioeconomic, 
technological and environmental systems, and which, in our view, can only be perceived if we 
consider the profound transformations that have been taking place in the relationship between 
science, technology and society. 
If one wishes to draw a distinctive line between the modern age and the world we have 
come to live in, he may well find it in the difference between a science which looks 
upon nature from a universal standpoint and thus acquires complete mastery over her, 
on one hand, and a truly “universal” science, on the other, which imports cosmic 
processes into nature even at the obvious risk of destroying her and, with her, man’s 
mastership over her. (Arendt 1958, 268) 
And it is precisely therein that we understand the relevance (and the necessity) of 
considering our second ‘epochal break’, ‘the idea that there has been a transformation in the 
relation of science, technology, and society so profound that our received notions of ‘science’ 
have been superseded by something else (…) a shift from the scientific enterprise to the regime 
of technoscience’ (Nordmann, Radder, and Schiemann 2011). From this perspective, one way of 
looking at the geoengineering issue and the scalar dislocations that it introduces into modern 
systems of experience and understanding is to explore the differences and affinities which 
intentional climate change proposals have in relation to many other technologies that have 
emerged in the recent past. 
The concept of terraforming, which once made us dream about exploring and utilising other 
planets, seems to have been reinvented under the aegis of Earth System Science to re-centre on 
Earth itself the proposals for the wholesale rearrangement of a planet’s environment to support 
human life (Fogg 1995). Like the Space Exploration enterprises of the 1970s and 1980s, 
geoengineering proposals change the fundamental idea of limits that underpins the environmental 
movement, inspiring new possibilities for exalting and expanding our current lifestyles. These 
are just a few examples of alternative ways of interrogating geoengineering, which, in the context 
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of this epochal break, may ultimately be seen as an illustrative metaphor of the specific kinds of 
technoscientific promises and ‘technofix’ narratives emerging in our society. 
Final Remarks – Questioning Geoengineering: Nature Changed by Human 
Action or Changed Nature of Human Action? 
In conclusion, and to return to our two fundamental questions, we have drawn upon previous 
efforts to develop an integrated vision of human-environment interactions – the integration of 
human history with, and within, the history of the Earth on a global scale (Costanza et al. 2007, 
Cf. Figure 1, p. 524; Costanza, Graumlich, and Steffen 2007) – to suggest that these two epochal 
breaks (in terms of the Human-Earth relationship, and in terms of the relationship between 
science, technology and society) should constitute the fundamental axes from which a fully 
integrated history of geoengineering should be told and analysed. It is a history that not only 
places the evolution of this (and other) enterprise(s) in the context of a very long Earth history – 
nature changed by human action  – but critically reflects upon it, to understand and interpret 
fundamental transformations in the relationships between science and society, science and nature, 
and science and technology (Carrier and Nordmann 2011) – changed nature of human action. 
Indeed, the history we are talking about is not only the history of geoengineering, the 
Anthropocene or the major epochal-making realignment of science and technology in society; it 
is the history of human action, in which scientists have become passionate protagonists of their 
individual beliefs, enlarging ‘the realm of human affairs to the point of extinguishing the 
time-honoured protective dividing line between nature and the human world’ (Arendt 1958). But 
because this capacity for action has become ‘the exclusive prerogative of the scientists’ (idem), it 
lacks the revelatory capacity to illuminate the realm of human affairs in its specific phenomenal 
reality, and to endow this reality with meaning (Villa 1996): 
But the action of the scientists, since it acts into nature from the standpoint of the 
universe and not into the web of human relationships, lacks the revelatory character of 
action as well as the ability to produce stories and become historical, which together 
form the very source from which meaningfulness springs into and illuminates human 
existence. In this existentially most important aspect, action, too, has become an 
experience for the privileged few, and these few who still know what it means to act 
may well be even fewer than the artists, their experience even rarer than the genuine 
experience of and love for the world. (Arendt 1958, 324) 
In the context of these ‘policy vacuums’, characterised by ‘a growing sense of urgency 
coupled with a lack of knowledge of what to do and a lack of institutions where the issues could 
be addressed’ (Rommetveit, Funtowicz, and Strand 2010, 150), the recurrent claims that argue 
for a closer connection between science and society, with the purpose of exposing to public 
scrutiny the hidden assumptions, values and visions that are deeply embedded in science and 
technology, seem more than justified. 
For science and technology studies (STS) the far-reaching implications of those claims rely 
in a set of ‘boundary concepts’ (Irwin 2008), of which we highlight the concept of coproduction, 
that suggests that the ‘products of technoscience not only influence but also incorporate and 
reaffirm social values and institutional practices’ (Jasanoff 2011, 13), and which draws attention 
to ‘the often invisible role of knowledge, expertise, technical practices and material objects in 
shaping, sustaining, subverting or transforming relations of authority’ (Jasanoff 2004, 4).  
This explanatory power of thinking of natural and social orders as being produced together 
leads the participatory ideals of public engagement, with all the reservations pointed out by 
Wynne (2007), far beyond narrow perspectives of problematising the relationship between 
science and democracy. Indeed, a more sophisticated model of public engagement with science 
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(PES) and technology has been suggested for some time, one that acknowledges that ‘public 
engagement needs to move upstream’ to consider new ways of listening to and valuing more 
diverse forms of public knowledge and social intelligence (Wilsdon and Willis 2004; Felt and 
Fochler 2009). The basic assumption underlying the notion of ‘upstream public engagement’ 
relates with the necessity of replacing the one-way normative model of public ‘understanding’ of 
(or ‘deference’ to) science (Wynne 2007, 100) to a more substantive model of engagement, 
which aims at creating more socially-robust scientific and technological solutions by way of 
opening up questions, furthering debates, exposing differences and interrogating assumptions. 
The ultimate challenge is ‘to generate new approaches to the governance of science that can 
learn from past mistakes, cope more readily with social complexity, and harness the drivers of 
technological change for the common good’ (Wilsdon and Willis 2004, 24). What seems to be at 
stake is not only the need to clarify the assumptions and arguments that sustain the positions that 
tend to stick between hope and fear on science and technology – ‘For those promoting the 
technologies, such developments hold promises of a better world, for the sceptics they entail 
Faustian dangers and embody a lot of what is wrong with the modern world’ (Hansen 2010, 1) – 
but to go beyond these polarised positions to further explore the context of political uncertainty, 
public debate and societal decision-making in which science and technology have been operating 
(Irwin 2008).  
Against this background many authors have been arguing about the importance of 
considering public perceptions of geoengineering, thus helping to further unveil the perceived 
moral orders underlying these proposals (Bracmort, Lattanzio, and Barbour 2011; Miller 2010a, 
2010b; The Royal Society 2009; Cicerone 2006; Pidgeon et al. 2012; Corner, Pidgeon, and 
Parkhill 2012; Corner and Pidgeon 2010; Poumadere, Bertoldo, and Samadi 2011; Mercer, Keith, 
and Sharp 2011; Nerlich and Jaspal 2012). 
Therefore, in supporting the need to subject the scientific debate on geoengineering to  more 
open and critical reflection, we highlight the importance of rebuilding the ‘geoengineering 
scientific worldview’ on social processes of trust and credibility, in this way impelling climate 
change science to better reveal competing social interests, values and assumptions (Irwin and 
Wynne 1996). We also see this as an opportunity to promote critical thinking about social 
problems that tend to be ‘circumvented’ and reduced to technological fixes (Weinberg 1991), 
thus ‘alienating’ and ‘diverting’ our attention from an essential question, that of our place in 
nature. 
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Towards an Analytical Framework for Evaluating 
the Ethical Dimensions of Geoengineering 
Proposals 
 
Paula Curvelo, European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Italy 
 
Abstract: Over the last few years, geoengineering, or the ‘deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate system 
in order to moderate global warming’, has been attracting increasing attention within the portfolio of strategies to limit 
the impact and consequences of climate change. However, this ‘Plan B’ is inevitably conditioned by our limited 
understanding of the scientific basis of climate change and by major uncertainties as to the impact geoengineering might 
have on human and natural systems. Therefore, in spite of the controversy prevailing in the debates surrounding 
geoengineering technologies, there is widespread agreement on the need to consider the far-reaching ethical and social 
questions that proposals for intentional climate change entail. Although some attempts have been made to address this 
need (and to further ethical awareness in the scientific community), an ethical framework that could inform policy 
responses to geoengineering research, deployment and governance has yet to be developed. The overall objective of this 
paper, therefore, is to address the need to develop an analytical framework that can contribute to a better understanding 
of the ethical and social issues raised by geoengineering proposals and serve as a basis for further analysis, with a view to 
developing and implementing appropriate governance mechanisms to steer geoengineering research and deployment. 
Keywords: Geoengineering, Ethical Framework, Climate Change, Earth System Science, Epochal Break, Anthropocene 
What Makes Geoengineering an Ethical Issue? 
ver the past decade, geoengineering has been gaining momentum in the climate change 
community. This growing interest in ‘deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s 
climate system, in order to moderate global warming’ (Royal Society 2009) is closely 
linked to the ‘grossly unsuccessful’ efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Crutzen 2006) and 
the consequent urgent need to consider additional steps to address global climate change. 
However, the understanding of the physical science basis of geoengineering is still limited, 
and there are still major uncertainties concerning the impacts these technologies might have on 
human and natural systems. Therefore, in spite of the controversy prevailing in the debates 
surrounding geoengineering technologies, there is widespread agreement on the need to consider 
the far-reaching ethical and social questions that proposals for intentional climate change entail.  
Against this background, the development of new geoengineering research initiatives, the 
rapid expansion of the scientific literature in the field and the growing number of policy reports 
over the past few years not only reveal the ever more plausible role that solar radiation management 
(SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods are likely to play in the portfolio of solutions 
to address climate change, but also reflect the growing concerns about the ethical and social issues 
that we need to address when considering the use of these technologies to avert the climate crisis.   
At first glance, these two trends may suggest different forces pushing in opposite directions: 
on the one hand, the plausibility of geoengineering proposals, grounded in factual or empirical 
statements, seems to act as a catalyst for further research and deployment, while on the other hand 
normative concerns over unforeseen consequences, including controllability and reversibility – and 
other value judgments about the impacts on perceived naturalness and in terms of fairness and 
equity (Macnaghten and Chilvers 2012), seem to lie behind a reluctance to take these activities 
seriously. However, as we will try to show below, the reality is far more complex than this. 
In fact, as was made clear in the comprehensive study of climate engineering debates 
commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), the very 
different arguments that have been advanced for and against geoengineering, and the complex 
interplay between them at different levels of detail, reveal the rather complicated and entangled 
O 
 
The International Journal of  Climate Change: Impacts and Responses 
Volume 4, 2013, on-climate.com, ISSN 1835-7156 
© Common Ground, Paula Curvelo, All Rights Reserved 
Permissions: cg-support@commongroundpublishing.com 
189
relationships between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, facts and values, descriptive and normative, epistemic and 
material: 
‘On the one hand, the arguments make use of empirical assumptions which can be 
assessed scientifically. On the other hand, they always rely on more or less far-reaching 
normative premises, as well. Such normative assumptions may involve the weighting of 
side-effects or the moral assessment of inequalities; in any case, they evade an empirical, 
scientific evaluation’ (Rickels et al. 2011, 32). 
‘Within the CE [climate engineering] controversy, moral and extra-moral considerations 
seem to be deeply interwoven. This is mainly due to the fact that the moral arguments 
also make use of descriptive premisses such as forecasts of an action’s consequences’ 
(Betz and Cacean 2012, 66). 
It is precisely this characteristic of the controversial debate on climate engineering that 
provides the first part of the answer to our initial question: What makes geoengineering an ethical 
issue? A closer examination of the arguments that support the main theses and sub-theses of the 
geoengineering debate throws light on how issues tend to be discussed with reference to the ethical 
questions they pose – in terms of justice, intergenerational equity, responsibility, fairness and the 
like, thus conforming to a common-sense understanding of ‘what makes an issue an ethical issue’:   
‘… we can usefully distinguish between issues that are discussed and resolved with 
reference to the ethical questions they pose and issues debated on other grounds. The 
former are those discussed in terms of moral ideas, such as dignity, freedom, rights, 
fairness, respect, equality, solidarity, responsibility, justice, and integrity. Some of these 
are personal virtues, others are features of social life; some are powers, others ideals. 
What they have in common is that they are mentioned when one tries to speak of right 
and wrong, and that they are invoked in discussions that go beyond assertions about facts 
and descriptions of events to claims about why things ought to be done in certain ways or 
what ought to be done’ (Bulger, Bobby, and Fineberg 1995, 28). 
Although useful, this distinction does not allow us to draw any meaningful conclusion about 
the particular conceptualisations of geoengineering, research practices in this field, or the prospects 
of a ‘geoengineered world’ that invoke the set of ethical principles and moral values previously 
mentioned. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to lay the foundations for a comprehensive 
analytical framework within which the social and ethical issues raised by geoengineering proposals 
could be examined.  
Moreover, because no consensus has yet been reached as regards the development of an 
adequate theoretical framework to guide the resolution of ethical problems and moral dilemmas 
arising from geoengineering research and deployment, the design of this analytical framework 
should not only facilitate the examination of those problems, but also help to establish an integrated 
approach to promote discussion and provide general guidelines for ethically responsible decision-
making in the field of geoengineering.  
Indeed, since ‘all approaches to geoengineering express an implied ontology (an embedded 
theory of who we are, how we are situated in the realm of being) and a presumed ethics (an 
embedded theory of how we ought to behave)’ (Weiskel 2012), we suggest that only within the 
development of a systematic discourse involving ethics – as accompanying research 
(Begleitforschung) (Hronszky 2005) – can the following far-reaching preliminary questions be 
addressed: 
• How will geoengineering technologies improve the human condition now and in the long 
term?  
• What are the theoretical assumptions, motivations, and interests relating to the 
development of different geoengineering methods? 
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• What goals and visions tend to shape the methods and practices of science in the field of 
geoengineering? 
• What ‘imaginaries’, commitments and representations of nature and of the human being 
inform geoengineering debates? 
• What are the expectations, the embedded values and the ways of making sense of a 
geoengineered world? 
In order to address these issues, it will first be necessary to find an adequate vantage point 
from which the fundamental aspects underlying these questions might become visible. In the 
following section, we will therefore begin with an attempt to identify and summarise the key 
elements of the strategic framework for global environmental change research within which 
geoengineering is taking place. This approach will provide some fundamental background for the 
outline of our proposed framework, as presented in section 3 and further discussed in section 4 of 
this paper. 
Geoengineering at the Dawn of a New Era – The Anthropocene and a New 
System of Science  
In the mid-1980s, when the Earth System Sciences Committee of the NASA Advisory Council put 
forward a more complete and unified approach to Earth studies – Earth System Science – a new 
way of understanding and analysing the Earth system began to gain ground among scientific 
institutions around the world. Fundamental to this approach is a view of the Earth system as a 
related set of interacting processes operating on a wide range of spatial and temporal scales, rather 
than as a collection of individual components. Several factors have combined to stimulate this new 
approach to Earth studies and global change: the maturity of the traditional Earth science 
disciplines, developments in remote sensing systems and related earth observation activities, 
advances in conceptual and numerical models of Earth system processes, and the recognition of 
the growing role of human activity in global change (Earth System Sciences Committee 1988, 
1986). 
A few years after NASA acknowledged the need to strengthen international cooperation for a 
truly worldwide study of the Earth, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and 
Agenda 21 (a comprehensive plan of action to facilitate the transition towards the goal of truly 
sustainable development), unanimously adopted by 178 Governments at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), gave a major boost to the development 
of an integrated approach to sustainable development and for the interdisciplinary focus of Earth 
system science and global change (Johnson, Ruzek, and Kalb 1997).   
The next important step towards a holistic perception of the Earth system as a whole and, on 
this cognitive basis, developing concepts for global environmental management was taken in 2001 
with the establishment of the Earth System Science Partnership (ESSP), which brought together 
the four international global change research programmes: DIVERSITAS, the International 
Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP), the International Human Dimensions Programme 
(IHDP), and the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP)1.  
The orchestrated effort to integrate disciplinary knowledge, insights and understanding of 
parts of the Earth system within Earth system science gave rise to the idea of a ‘global system of 
global systems science’. Seen as a ‘substantive science of integration’, this new system of global 
environmental science is today presented as the key to implementing any approach towards global 
sustainability (Steffen et al. 2004). 
1 The ESSP was launched in 2001 as a response to the Amsterdam Declaration on Global Change, which called for closer 
cooperation between global environmental research programmes and for greater integration across disciplines, environment 
and development issues, and the natural and social sciences. 
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‘The challenge of understanding a changing Earth demands not only systems science but 
also a new system of science … 
Human-driven changes are pushing the Earth System beyond its natural operating domain 
into planetary terra incognita. Management strategies for global sustainability are 
urgently required. Earth System science is the key to implementing any approach 
towards good planetary management, as it can provide critical insights into the 
feasibility, risks, trade-offs and timeliness of any proposed strategy’ (Global 
Environmental Change Programmes 2011, 23-27, emphasis added). 
This new way of understanding and studying the Earth system, the recognition that humanity 
itself has become a global geophysical force, allied with new approaches and a growing 
commitment to achieving successful and effective planetary stewardship, are leading to a profound 
reorientation of the global environmental change research agenda, thereby opening up a wide range 
of new practices, techniques and mechanisms for global governance. 
‘The advent of the Anthropocene, the time interval in which human activities now rival 
global geophysical processes, suggests that we need to fundamentally alter our 
relationship with the planet we inhabit. Many approaches could be adopted, ranging from 
geoengineering solutions that purposefully manipulate parts of the Earth System to 
becoming active stewards of our own life support system’ (Steffen et al. 2011, 739). 
It is against this background that the idea of geoengineering, as a potential new tool for 
addressing climate change, is gaining ground. Hence, the first step towards establishing our 
analytical framework should consist in a critical examination of the salient narratives that capture 
the quantitative shift in the relationship between humans and the global environment, in order to 
suggest the beginning of a potential new geological epoch in which human beings appear to have 
become a driving force in the evolution of the planet and geoengineering starts to look acceptable, 
if not attractive.  
In fact, each new step in the direction of an integrated Earth system science seems to have 
reinforced the plausibility of geoengineering proposals within the wide range of options ‘towards 
good planetary management’ (Global Environmental Change Programmes 2011). This is made 
clear by considering the impetus for geoengineering that came from novel structural concepts of 
Earth system science. It is therefore worth examining the intrinsically prescriptive nature of 
concepts such as ‘climate stabilisation’ and ‘Anthropocene’ in some detail, as they seem to provide 
the ontological and epistemological underpinnings that brought geoengineering to the centre of the 
climate change debate.  
In 1974, William Kellogg and Stephen Schneider published an article in Science, entitled 
‘Climate Stabilization: For Better or for Worse?’, which presented the three options we would have 
if we could forecast climate changes:   i) to do nothing; ii) to alter our patterns of land and sea use 
in order to lessen the impact of climate change; or iii) to anticipate climate change and implement 
schemes to control it. In the context of this last option, the authors discuss the concept of climate 
stabilisation and the concomitant problems of predicting ‘what will happen if we try to influence 
part of the climate system’ and of defining ‘the “optimum climate” towards which we should aim 
our stabilization schemes’ (Kellogg and Schneider 1974). The early summary of various 
stabilisation schemes presented by the authors does not differ from many of the geoengineering 
methods that are being discussed today. Similarly, their insights about how developing skills to 
predict climate change might generate pressure to stabilise the climate could well describe some 
of the less widely discussed (but nevertheless far-reaching) implications of important advances in 
climate modelling and climate science in recent years towards the idea of greater planetary 
management and Earth-system control. Though emphasising the major uncertainties, contentions 
and political ramifications of the third option, Kellogg and Schneider drew attention to the 
possibility ‘that more schemes will be proposed for climate control than for control of the climate 
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controllers’ – thus anticipating and discussing a wide range of governance challenges associated 
with recent proposals to geoengineer the climate. 
Twenty-five years later, in a landmark paper for Earth system science published in the journal 
Nature, Hans J. Schellnhuber presented the five competing paradigms for sustainable development 
and Earth-system control: (1) Standardisation — prescribing a long-term co-evolution corridor; (2) 
Optimisation — maximising an aggregated anthroposphere-ecosphere welfare function; (3) 
Pessimisation — avoiding the worst under imperfect management; (4) Equitisation — preserving 
options for future generations; and (5) Stabilisation — landing and maintaining the Earth system 
in a desirable state (Schellnhuber 1999). Although involving very different ways of perceiving and 
evaluating man’s attempts to ‘act into nature’, these competing paradigms have been incorporated, 
to a certain extent, into Earth system thinking, creating tensions in the range of practices that have 
produced the ‘coupled human and ecological system’ as a ‘thinkable’ and governable domain 
(Lovbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009). 
These tensions can be captured by examining the formal elaboration of these paradigms and 
the attempts that have been made to put them into operation. For instance, the least speculative 
paradigm of pessimisation, the formal elaboration of which presupposes the compiling of a manual 
of minimum safety standards for operating the Earth system (the ‘guardrails’ for responsible 
planetary management), clearly contrasts with the paradigm of stabilisation2, where 
geoengineering tends to be seen as one of the least sophisticated options for landing and 
maintaining the Earth system in a desirable state:  
‘Why should Prometheus not hasten to Gaia’s assistance? Geoengineering proposals have 
become popular as a way of mitigating the anthropogenic aberrations of the ecosphere. 
One interesting idea features iron fertilization of certain ocean regions to stimulate the 
marine biological pump which draws down CO2. And Russian scientists are currently 
elaborating a repair scheme for the ozone layer using orbital lasers. But we can also think 
of proactive control of natural planetary variability: insights acquired during the present 
climate crisis may enable humanity to suppress future glaciation events by judicious 
injection of “designer greenhouse gases” into the atmosphere’ (Schellnhuber 1999, C23).  
The way these different strategies for sustainability have been embedded in Earth system 
thinking, leading to a definition of the ‘accessible universe’ and a heterogeneous set of practices 
that shape the political space for government intervention, can also be seen by examining how the 
‘Anthropocene’ imagery entails different ways of being and acting upon nature and society 
(Lovbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009). 
The term ‘Anthropocene’ first appeared in print in 2000, in a newsletter of the IGBP (Crutzen 
and Stoermer 2000). In 2002, Nature published a related article by Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen 
(who brought the discussion of geoengineering more squarely into public view four years later 
(Crutzen 2006; Pielke, Roger, Jr. 2010)), in which he noted that: 
‘Unless there is a global catastrophe — a meteorite impact, a world war or a pandemic — 
mankind will remain a major environmental force for many millennia. A daunting task 
lies ahead for scientists and engineers to guide society towards environmentally 
sustainable management during the era of the Anthropocene. This will require appropriate 
human behaviour at all scales, and may well involve internationally accepted, large-
scale geo-engineering projects, for instance to “optimize” climate. At this stage, 
however, we are still largely treading on terra incognita’ (Crutzen 2002, emphasis added). 
The implications of recognising the newly constructed concept go beyond the discussions 
around ‘golden spikes’ and stratigraphic criteria that aim to examine whether there is, in geological 
2 The title of one of the most-cited articles in the field of geoengineering, Engineering: Advanced technology paths to 
global climate stability: Energy for a greenhouse planet (Hoffert et al. 2002), suggests the relevance of this 
paradigm/concept to the subsequent developments in the field. 
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terms, a justification or need for the formal acknowledgement of a new geological epoch 
(Zalasiewicz et al. 2008).  As the above makes clear, the recognition of this epochal break seems 
to require much more: i) concerted efforts on the part of scientists and engineers to achieve 
effective planetary stewardship; ii) substantial and effective behavioural change in the most 
advanced societies towards more sustainable lifestyles; and iii) the acceptance of large-scale 
geoengineering projects at international level. The responses to these appeals have been swift and 
generous, reflecting the broad acceptance of the Anthropocene concept in the global change 
research community and the way it has been taken up as a central system of thought for Earth 
system science (Lovbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009; Dalby 2007, 2004).  
Indeed, since the beginning of this century, the Anthropocene has been widely discussed and 
has become an active area of global environmental change research. New institutional frameworks 
for sustainable development and fundamental reforms of national and international institutions 
towards more effective planetary stewardship and Earth system governance are being forged 
(Biermann, Abbott, Andresen, Bäckstrand, Bernstein, Betsill, Bulkeley, Cashore, Clapp, Folke, 
Gupta, Gupta, Haas, Jordan, Kanie, Kluvánková-Oravská et al. 2012). Innovative approaches to 
identify ‘guardrails’ for responsible planetary management (Petschel-Held et al. 1999) and to 
quantify biophysical preconditions for human development in the Anthropocene have led to the 
definition of ‘planetary boundaries’, i.e. the ‘safe operation space for humanity’ with respect to the 
Earth system, within which humanity has the freedom to pursue long-term social and economic 
development, as long as thresholds are not crossed (Rockström et al. 2009a, 2009b). An increased 
number of geoengineering research initiatives are opening up new approaches to tackling climate 
change and possible ways of overcoming these ‘non-negotiable’ planetary boundaries. Lastly, 
several efforts have been made to push geoengineering up the international agenda (UK House of 
Commons. Science and Technology Committee 2010; US Government Accountability Office 
2011) and to consider policies and strategies for addressing geoengineering at national and 
international levels (US House of Representatives 2010; Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013). In this 
context, it seems that the fundamental frame3 within which to mobilise support for an alteration of 
social structures and agents’ social values, and to persuade wider society to adopt responsible 
behaviour on the basis of a proposed normative human response to climate change, is the only 
element that is still missing. This shows which end-point of the spectrum of the required 
transformational approaches posed by the Anthropocene4 has been favoured. 
In fact, the concept of the Anthropocene, ‘which cuts through a mass of complexity and detail 
to place the evolution of the human enterprise in the context of a much longer Earth History’ 
(Steffen et al. 2011), seems to rest upon previous efforts to understand the deeper meanings and 
implications of the trajectory of the human-environment relationship (Marsh 1864; Thomas Jr. 
1956; B. L. Turner II et al. 1990), to open up a range of possible government programmes for 
sustainability that both challenge and reproduce the Enlightenment promise of human self-
realisation, autonomy and control. Accordingly, Lövbrand, Stripple and Wiman draw attention to 
how the Anthropocene imagery points to inconsistencies and ruptures within the emerging Earth 
system governmentality5: 
‘…we have identified ambiguities in the Anthropocene imagery in terms of (1) the 
persons over whom government is to be exercised (autonomous and rational individuals 
vs. ecologically embedded citizens); (2) the distribution of tasks and actions between 
authorities (expert-driven, central government vs. deliberative, popular control); and (3) 
contrasting ideals or principles for how government should be directed (control and 
3 We use the term ‘frame’ here in the sense given by Mayer N. Zald, i.e. ‘specific metaphors, symbolic representations, 
and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of 
action’ (Zald 1996, p. 262). 
4 In which ‘Geo-engineering and reducing the human pressure on the Earth System at its sources represent the end 
points of the spectrum in terms of philosophies, ethics and strategies’ (Steffen et al. 2011, p. 752). 
5 ‘As indicated by the semantic linking of the words governing and mentality, governmentality deals with how we think 
about governing’ (Lovbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009, p. 8). 
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management vs. humility and reflexiveness) (Lovbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009, p. 
12).  
The Ethical Matrix Revisited: Towards an Ethically Sound Framework for 
Geoengineering 
By stressing the relevance of considering the close links between thought and intervention, we 
draw upon the analytical concept of Earth system governmentality advanced by Lövbrand, Stripple 
and Wiman to suggest that the large continuum of possible government programmes for 
sustainability should constitute the backbone of the analytical framework outlined in this section. 
Moreover, as we will now see, it is also assumed that the analysis of geoengineering within this 
continuum might provide an adequate solution for addressing what have been tentatively agreed 
as the five main properties of ‘ethically sound frameworks’, namely:  
a. Inclusion of values at stake – making explicit the values at stake in any decision;  
b. Transparency – overcoming the ‘opaqueness’ of moral decision-making; 
c. Multiplicity of viewpoints – taking into account the multiplicity/plurality of 
known ethical viewpoints; 
d. Exposition of case-relevant ethically relevant aspects – taking into consideration 
all ethically relevant aspects of the issue, including the factual information that 
potentially contributes to strengthening or weakening a particular outcome or 
judgment; 
e. Inclusion of ethical arguments – understanding the arguments behind a particular 
decision, in order to enable rational critique and debate. 
At this point, it is worth mentioning the basic assumptions that underlie the design of our 
proposed framework: i) the need to be sufficiently comprehensive in order to capture the different 
perspectives on geoengineering and allow access to all relevant facts and normative considerations 
that lie behind a particular position; ii) the need to identify the salient ethical concerns according 
to which the social and ethical impacts of geoengineering can be assessed; iii) the possibility of 
subjecting the conflicting moral accounts to rigorous examination in the light of agreed ethical 
principles; and, last but not least, iv) the need to provide substance for ethical deliberation, so as 
to help decision-makers reach sound judgments and responsible decisions about the ethical 
acceptability of geoengineering research and deployment. 
Thus, building upon previous efforts to identify an appropriate tool for rational ethical 
analysis, we suggest considering (with the necessary adaptations) the approach developed by Prof. 
Ben Mepham and his colleagues at the University of Nottingham in the early 1990s for translating 
some of the criteria of ‘ethically sound frameworks’ into a procedural and substantive tool 6 –  the 
Ethical Matrix.  
The Ethical Matrix (EM) was initially designed to facilitate ethical deliberation by those with 
particular knowledge and/or interest in agri-food biotechnologies (Mepham 1996, 2000). Since 
then, the matrix has gained popularity and attracted considerable attention from specialists in 
different fields. In recent years, it has been developed further to facilitate ethical deliberation 
around the introduction of novel technologies into society and to help decision-makers arrive at 
sound judgments and defensible decisions about the ethical acceptability and/or optimal regulatory 
controls for existing or prospective technologies (Kaiser et al. 2007; Mepham 2010; Cotton 2009; 
Jensen et al. 2011; Forsberg 2007). 
As an ethical tool, the EM should not be confused with a particular ethical theory – which, 
ideally, ‘would distinguish all morally right from all morally wrong or morally neutral actions’ 
(Kaiser et al. 2007, 67).  As emphasised by Cotton, the EM ‘is intended as a tool for mapping out 
the issues underpinning a decision, rather than determining an ethical decision using some metric 
of evaluation’ (Cotton 2009, 160). The EM should be seen as a practical and pragmatic tool 
6 ‘By bringing ethical considerations to the fore, it acts as a substantive ethical tool; and by requiring policy-makers to 
articulate their assessments of impacts on each cell of the matrix, it acts as a procedural tool’ (Mepham 2010, p. 25). 
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designed to facilitate explicit ethical decision-making, without necessarily implying a unique 
normative answer to all issues (Kaiser et al. 2007). Accordingly, the ethical soundness of an EM 
relies on its capacity to take into account all information that is crucial to assess the multiplicity of 
normative viewpoints, ensuring that the ethical components of the approach are translated into 
terms which are meaningful to the different interest groups, and that their normative reasoning is 
transparent to all external reviewers and evaluators.  
The ethical matrix uses a ‘principled’ approach to ethics. In line with the approach developed 
by Beauchamp and Childress in the field of biomedical ethics, it appeals to a set of prima facie 
principles (i.e. rules of action that are ‘valid at first appearance’). Hence, the three basic principles 
employed in the EM were chosen to represent the major traditional ethical theories, namely: i) 
respect for wellbeing, representing the major utilitarian principle; ii) respect for autonomy, 
representing the major deontological principle; and iii) fairness, representing respect for justice 
(Rawls 1951, 1972), which is derived from both utilitarian and deontological theories (Mepham 
2005).  
It should be noted that, in the EMs that have been applied to assess the ethical impacts of 
biotechnologies in the fields of agriculture and food technology, ‘respect for wellbeing’ combines 
the principles of ‘beneficence’ and ‘non-maleficence’ (to which Beauchamp and Childress refer as 
separate ideas) – partly because it simplifies the framework, but also because in the context of agri-
food biotechnologies the two principles are inextricably linked (Mepham 1996, 2000). However, 
as Mepham also emphasises, in some circumstances (as we believe to be the case in 
geoengineering), it might be preferable to retain the original distinction between these two 
utilitarian principles (Mepham 2000). Indeed, as the controversy around the ‘lesser evil’ argument7 
suggests (Gardiner 2010; Rickels et al. 2011; Corner and Pidgeon 2010; Gardiner 2011; Hamilton 
2011), the difference between the principle of non-maleficence (a norm of avoiding the causation 
of harm) and the principle of beneficence (a group of norms for providing benefits and balancing 
benefits against risks and costs) seems to be fundamental to interpreting the various assumptions 
and normative claims in this area of debate. 
In any case, the three (or four) prima facie principles together represent what is referred to as 
‘common morality’, i.e. ‘moral norms that bind all persons in all places’ (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2001, 3), and their inclusion in the framework acknowledges the plurality of perspectives 
that might be brought to an ethical analysis (Mepham 2010). As we can see in Table 1, this ethical 
component of the method forms the columns of the EM.  
The second component of the method, listed in rows, consists of a set of selected interest 
groups or parties affected by the issue in question. These might include different groups of people, 
such as consumers and food producers, but also non-humans, such as farm animals or the 
environment (Food Ethical Council n.d.). The question of which interest groups are included in the 
EM depends heavily on the issue at hand.  
In the case of geoengineering, the list of potentially affected interest groups is broad (including 
most nations, subnational groups, nongovernmental organisations, corporations and civil 
societies). Thus, and because ‘the global impacts of geoengineering activities – both its benefits 
and risks – may be unevenly distributed across stakeholders’ (Bracmort and Lattanzio 2013, 21), 
we suggest that the best way to capture the explicit listing of stakeholders’ viewpoints is to consider 
the large spectrum of possible government programmes for sustainability that the concept of Earth 
system governmentality encompasses. Accordingly, the first and last rows of Table 1 depict the 
extremes of this continuum, i.e. the two types of government programme for sustainability 
(‘management first’ and ‘ethics first’) that occupy the end-points of the Anthropocene imagery 
(Lovbrand, Stripple, and Wiman 2009).  
The ‘management first’ approach ‘draws upon the optimistic view of human control and 
self-determination embedded in Earth System thinking and focuses on options and caveats for 
7 The core lesser-evil argument can be summarised as follows: ‘We could end up in a future situation (i.e., when climate 
sensitivity is very high or if our efforts to reduce emissions are insufficient) in which the (admittedly high risk) 
deployment of CE technology represents the lesser of two evils’ (Rickels et al. 2011, p. 27). 
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technological fixes and geoengineering’ (Idem). The first row of the EM (structured around 
established ethical theories) sets out the main arguments that have been advanced under this 
approach in the geoengineering debate, which, together, tend to sustain the idea that ‘we need to 
go further and faster in researching and deploying these technologies’.  
The counterpoint of this extreme interpretation of the Anthropocene is set out in the last row 
of the EM, which represents the ‘ethics first’ approach – ‘humbled by the scale, complexity and 
vulnerability of the Earth System, this political programme highlights the need for a new ethical 
framework for Earth stewardship’ (Idem). Accordingly, this lists the main arguments that have 
been advanced against geoengineering research and deployment - direct justification of a research 
ban and an international moratorium on deployment (Rickels et al. 2011). 
The outline of this framework underlines the importance of facilitating deliberative 
assessments in order to map the plurality of perspectives and explore qualitative aspects of 
uncertainty in and around geoengineering. Thus, the empty spaces between these two extreme end-
points of the Anthropocene imagery reflect the scope for democratic decision-making and public 
engagement in the field of geoengineering. In fact, in the context of current ‘policy vacuums’, 
characterised by ‘a growing sense of urgency coupled with a lack of knowledge of what to do and 
a lack of institutions where the issues could be addressed’ (Rommetveit, Funtowicz, and Strand 
2010), the recurrent claims that argue for a closer connection between science and society, with 
the purpose of exposing to public scrutiny the hidden assumptions, values and visions that are 
deeply embedded in science and technology, seem more than justified. Moreover, as pointed out 
by Bucchi and Neresini, ‘public participation warrants attention not only because it may be a 
solution to a decisional impasse on technoscience issues or to a crisis of representativeness, but 
also because it exposes the inevitably political nature of current dilemmas’ (Bucchi and Neresini 
2008, 466). Indeed, it is here, in the realm of the controversies over science and technology, that 
new assemblages are being created and new alliances for democratic regeneration and revival are 
being forged (Irwin and Michael 2003).   
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‘Management 
first 
approach’ 
Innovation 
argument:  
R&D in 
geoengineering 
triggers spin-offs and 
creates jobs. 
Side-effects of 
R&D are 
negligible: 
The side-effects of 
geoengineering 
research should be 
negligible. 
R&D first 
argument: 
R&D should not be 
constrained; once 
technologies have 
been developed, a 
decision can be 
taken as to their 
implementation. 
Argument from 
survival: 
Without technical 
counterbalances, 
climate change 
might endanger the 
survival of the entire 
human species.  
 (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) 
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‘Ethics first 
approach’ 
Hubris argument: 
Geoengineering 
belongs to a tradition 
of large-scale 
interventions which 
have ignored the 
boundaries of 
technical 
manipulation. It 
testifies to arrogance 
and a form of self-
deceit that will 
heavily backfire. 
Moral hazard 
argument:  
Even mere research 
into geoengineering 
and the vague 
prospect of a 
technical solution to 
the climate problem 
could deter 
governments and 
private stakeholders 
from carrying out 
mitigation measures. 
No informed 
consent: 
Geoengineering 
should be 
researched and 
carried out only 
with the broad and 
well-informed 
consent of everyone 
involved. 
Risk transfer 
argument: 
By carrying out 
research into and 
planning for 
geoengineering, one 
passes on risks to 
future generations. 
   GEOENGINEERING DEPLOYMENT 
   Beneficence Non-maleficence Autonomy Fairness/Justice 
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‘Management 
first 
approach’ 
Lesser-evil 
argument:  
At some future point 
in time, the 
deployment of 
geoengineering 
methods could be the 
lesser of two evils, 
and we should 
prepare for that 
situation. 
Easiness argument: 
Geoengineering 
allows dangerous 
climate change to be 
bypassed without 
altering lifestyles, 
habits and the basic 
structure of our 
economy. 
Do-it-alone 
argument:  
Geoengineering can 
be carried out by a 
small group of 
countries — without 
the long-term 
cooperation of all 
nations — for the 
good of all 
humanity.  
Compensation: 
For the purposes of 
compensation, 
intentional 
intervention is 
required.  
 (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) 
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‘Ethics first 
approach’ 
Catastrophic 
side-effects:  
The catastrophic 
side-effects of 
geoengineering are 
not the lesser evil. 
Intentional harm: 
Deploying 
geoengineering 
involves harming 
some people (rather 
than others); this 
reduces the ethical 
value of our lives. 
Human rights:  
Geoengineering 
deployment alters 
the global 
institutional and 
economic 
conditions so that 
human rights will 
be ensured to a 
lesser degree. 
Distributional 
effects:  
The uneven 
distribution of 
climate impact 
offsets (benefits), 
costs and harmful 
side-effects 
associated with 
geoengineering 
deployment is 
unjust. 
Table 1 - The ethical matrix revisited: towards an analytical framework for evaluating the ethical 
dimensions of geoengineering research and deployment.   
Sources used to assemble these arguments: (Rickels et al. 2011; Betz and Cacean 2012, 2011). 
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Geoengineering at the Centre of an Epochal Break in Scientific History 
In the previous section, we proposed an adaptation of the ethical matrix devised by Mepham 
(Mepham 2000, 2004; Mepham et al. 2006) in order to: i) identify and map the plurality of 
perspectives on geoengineering across the wide spectrum of possible government programmes for 
sustainability; ii) structure the conflicting moral accounts and crucial ethical concerns over 
geoengineering around the major traditional ethical theories; iii) make explicit the value judgments 
about the attempts to ‘act into nature’ that are embedded in geoengineering proposals; and lastly 
iv) facilitate ethical deliberation and assist ethical decision-making in this field. 
As the outline of our framework suggests, there is indeed a need for public engagement and 
democratic decision-making in the area of geoengineering. Although this idea is not new (Jamieson 
1996), only recently have the practical implications and challenges of such demands begun to be 
properly considered. In this context, many authors have been arguing about the importance of 
considering public perceptions of geoengineering (Boyd 2008; Bracmort, and Lattanzio 2013; 
Cicerone 2006; Miller 2010a;  Miller 2010b; Morton 2007; Powell et al. 2010; Royal Society 2009; 
Rayner et al. 2013). What seems to be at stake is not only the need to identify the ethical issues 
embodied in citizens’ concerns, but also to shed more light on the wider social values, interests 
and imaginations around science and technology.  
As we have argued elsewhere (Curvelo and Pereira, forthcoming), the full meaning of 
geoengineering proposals can only be grasped in the context of the wider ‘imaginaries’ of science 
and technology in which geoengineering narratives are rooted. Hence, it is suggested that those 
imaginaries, and the master-narratives that sustain them, should be examined further, particularly 
by considering alternative ethical paradigms, such as discursive or deliberative ethics (Habermas 
1992, 1993).  
Therefore, in supporting the need to subject the scientific debate on geoengineering to more 
open and critical reflection, we highlight the importance of rebuilding the ‘geoengineering 
scientific worldview’ on social processes of trust and credibility (Irwin and Wynne 1996), in this 
way impelling climate change science to reveal more clearly the competing interests, values and 
assumptions underlying geoengineering proposals. We also see this as an opportunity to promote 
critical thinking about social problems that tend to be ‘circumvented’ and reduced to technological 
fixes, thus ‘alienating’ and ‘diverting’ our attention from an essential question, that of our place in 
nature.  
Because the new system of global environmental science seems to imply a profound 
reorientation of the scientific enterprise, we also suggest that key research questions concerning 
the ontological, epistemological and normative dimensions of geoengineering can be better 
addressed from a perspective that takes into account the social and technoscientific discontinuities 
which have shaped the interactions between socioeconomic, technological and environmental 
systems.  Indeed, it is only in the light of a perceived major shift in the representational practices 
of science that the very nature of geoengineering can come into question. 
‘If one wishes to draw a distinctive line between the modern age and the world we have 
come to live in, he may well find it in the difference between a science which looks upon 
nature from a universal standpoint and thus acquires complete mastery over her, on one 
hand, and a truly "universal" science, on the other, which imports cosmic processes into 
nature even at the obvious risk of destroying her and, with her, man’s mastership over 
her’ (Arendt 1958, 268). 
It is precisely here that we understand the relevance (and the necessity) of considering our 
second ‘epochal break’, ‘the idea that there has been a transformation in the relation of science, 
technology, and society so profound that our received notions of "science" have been superseded 
by something else … the epochal shift from the scientific enterprise to the regime of technoscience’ 
(Nordmann, Radder, and Schiemann 2011).  
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From this perspective, one possible way of looking at the geoengineering issue and the ‘scalar 
dislocations’ that it introduces into modern systems of experience and understanding is to explore 
the differences and affinities between intentional climate change proposals and many other 
technologies that have emerged in the recent past. The idea of terraforming, which once informed 
dreams about exploring and exploiting other planets (Fogg 1995), seems to have been reinvented 
under the aegis of Earth system science to re-centre on Earth itself the proposals for the wholesale 
rearrangement of a planet’s environment to support human life. Like space exploration in the 1970s 
and 1980s, geoengineering proposals challenge the basic concept of limits that underpins the 
environmental movement and hold out new prospects for enhancing and expanding our current 
lifestyles.  
By drawing attention to recent efforts to identify the right vantage point from which to address 
the epoch-making transition from the scientific enterprise to the regime of technoscience, we also 
highlight the relevance of exploring the technoscientific objects of geoengineering in order to 
scrutinise the ‘experimental’ and ‘upstream’ nature of geoengineering proposals. Indeed, the 
‘pressure of practice’ under which science operates today (Carrier 2011) is giving rise to the 
emergence of new objects of research – ambivalent beings, hybrid products and theoretically 
constructed objects through which we gain a new understanding and control of nature – that call 
for a more careful consideration of the complex narratives and practices of science and technology 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, 1994b, 1994a; Latour 1987; Haraway 1997; Law 2002; Michael 
2006). Consequently, some authors have suggested that it is precisely at the level of these objects 
of research that we can find the meaningful distinction between science and technoscience, an 
ontological difference that ‘becomes more explicit when research results are presented in 
particular settings and when the objects of research are exhibited for the specific interest they 
hold’ (Bensaude-Vincent et al. 2011, 365). Accordingly, and by way of illustration, one could say 
that when the result of a global climate model experiment is presented as scientific evidence for 
understanding the importance of aerosols forcing on the climate system, this would agree with 
traditional conceptions of science. However, when sulphate aerosols are presented for their 
capacity to counteract the climate forcing of growing CO2 emissions, this should be seen as a 
‘hallmark of technoscience’.  
On the other hand, and because geoengineering proposals fall into a specific class of scientific 
endeavour, in which the object of interest is not modular and encapsulated (Bunzl 2009), its 
underlying concept of experimentation points to a profound reorientation of technoscientific 
practices in contemporary societies, in what has been seen as a major shift from the ‘laboratory 
ideal’ to the ‘field ideal of experimentation’:   
‘The laboratory ideal involves designing manipulated, well-controlled, isolated 
experimental systems; the field ideal acknowledges their complexity, blurred boundaries, 
and unpredictable response to interventions. Field experiments could hardly be called an 
alternative ideal if they had not undergone a reevaluation in the philosophy of science and 
a reassessment with regard to their social relevance. We suggest that both changes can be 
observed especially well in the 1980s in the domain of the environmental sciences. Even 
if field experiments were not entirely new at that time, environmental concerns in science 
and society gave them a new cognitive status, institutional backing, and a specific 
rhetorical image. Today we are seeing the spread of new styles of experimentation to 
many areas of society. Experiments performed in open spaces might be, say, a social 
reform or a medical treatment, an ecological remediation or a technological innovation’ 
(Schwarz and Krohn 2011, p.120). 
These are but a few examples of alternative ways of interrogating geoengineering, which, in 
the context of this epochal break, may ultimately be seen as an illustrative metaphor of particular 
technoscientific promises and ‘technofix’ narratives that are emerging in our society. 
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Final Remarks 
Different conceptions, understandings and value assumptions concerning the changing 
relationships between science and society, science and technology, and science and nature tend to 
shape the geoengineering debate and inform the analytical framework within which the 
geoengineering domain has been problematised. This reinforces the need to unbind geoengineering 
discourses from the deeply embedded narratives of science, technology and society that present 
technoscientific innovation as the solution to our most critical problems and as a substitute for 
social change (Felt et al. 2007). Similarly, the construction of narratives that give meaning to 
human action within nature, and provide guidance for humans’ domination of nature, deserves a 
more critical and open reflection than has been the case to date. Looking at geoengineering with 
more distance and detachment presupposes taking a broad, long-term perspective, in terms both of 
the human-environment relationship and the relationships between science, technology and 
society. 
In this paper, we have presented and analysed two different frameworks within which to 
address the ethical issues in geoengineering. The first represents the mainstream Earth system 
science perspective, while the second corresponds to an alternative view from the field of social 
studies of science and technology. Central to both is the concept of an ‘epochal break’, in the 
former in terms of the human-earth relationship, in the latter in terms of the relationship between 
science, technology and society. 
As we have suggested, these two epochal breaks reinforce the substantive and procedural roles 
of the proposed adapted version of the ethical matrix. By considering the concept of ‘Earth system 
governmentality’, and the range of practices that have produced the ‘coupled human and ecological 
system’ as a thinkable and governable domain, we argue that the continuum of possible 
government programmes for sustainability that the Anthropocene imagery entails might bring the 
crucial ethical considerations in and around geoengineering to the fore. This is expected to lead to 
a more conscious and explicit articulation of the interplay between factual judgements and value 
judgements, thus helping decision-makers reach sound decisions about the ethical acceptability of 
geoengineering proposals. 
On the other hand, the positioning of geoengineering within the second epochal break is 
considered critical to open up the debate and encourage further reflection on the very nature of 
geoengineering and its framing assumptions. Ultimately, it is hoped that this perspective will 
stimulate the ability of decision-makers to reason critically about alternative courses of action, and 
might inspire a vision of human enlightenment that goes far beyond the idea of mastery and control 
over nature to incorporate a proper balance of epistemic humility and epistemic hope, thus 
providing a cautious approach to action. 
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Abstract: The universe of geoengineering is filled with all sorts of imageries. 
They are all part of the geoengineering story, revealing facts, knowledge, 
values, fears, desires, promises, anxieties, incredulity, about not only the idea 
of deliberately manipulating Earth’s climate to offset anthropogenic climate 
change, but also, and above all, what we know about the world and how we 
make sense of our place in it. In this context, where geoengineering can be seen 
as an illustrative metaphor of particular technological promises and ‘upstream 
solutions’ of modern technoscientific societies, we stress the relevance of 
considering the continuum between imaging and imagining (imag[in]ing) in 
order to examine the plausibility of current geoengineering proposals. By 
suggesting that the visual representations of geoengineering should be seen as 
pictorial narratives, we draw on Walter Fisher’s homo narrans metaphor. Thus, 
adopting the concept of ‘narrative rationality’, we propose to analyse the  
sense-making structures of a set of selected visual narratives of geoengineering 
and test them against the principles of narrative probability and narrative 
fidelity. 
Keywords: geoengineering; climate engineering; plausibility; plausible 
reasoning; narrative rationality; imag[in]ing. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), responses to address climate change have until recently fallen essentially 
within two major groups of strategies, namely: 
1 mitigation measures, which comprise all human interventions to reduce the 
anthropogenic forcing of the climate system, such as reducing greenhouse gas 
sources and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks 
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2 adaptation measures, which include any adjustments made to natural or human 
systems in response to actual or expected impacts of climate change, with the aim of 
moderating harm or exploiting beneficial opportunities. 
However, another strategy to limit the impacts and consequences of climate change has 
been gaining ground over the past decade: the idea of geoengineering, commonly defined 
as the “deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract 
anthropogenic climate change” (Royal Society of London, 2009). 
Hitherto, the scientific community has regarded geoengineering proposals with 
scepticism, if not outright disbelief (Cicerone, 2006; Fleming, 2010; Wolpert, 2008). 
Indeed, in 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) still 
considered that “geo-engineering options, such as ocean fertilisation to remove CO2 
directly from the atmosphere, or blocking sunlight by bringing material into the upper 
atmosphere, remain largely speculative and unproven, and with the risk of unknown  
side-effects”. Nonetheless, during the last few years something appears to have changed, 
for the IPCC (2012) is now considering “the role of geoengineering within the portfolio 
of response options to anthropogenic climate change”. 
This recent ‘political-epistemic’1 movement towards a more plausible geoengineered 
world is illustrated by the way the scientific and policy communities are beginning to 
seriously consider geoengineering as a potential strategy for addressing climate change 
and by the general perception that this topic will remain on the climate change agenda for 
years to come. Some significant events contributed to this: the publication in 2003 of two 
high profile reports by the US National Research Council (2003) and the US Pentagon 
(Schwartz and Randall, 2003) recommending further research into geoengineering, and, 
perhaps most significantly, the 2006 editorial essay of the journal Climatic Change, in 
which Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen called for active scientific research into 
geoengineering schemes that aim to enhance the Earth’s albedo by releasing sulphate 
aerosols into the stratosphere (Crutzen, 2006). But to better understand why 
“geoengineering has been transformed from a topic discussed largely in science fiction 
and esoteric scientific papers into mainstream scientific and policy debate” (Macnaghten 
and Szerszynski, 2013) it is important to place these events in the context of increasing 
doubt and disbelief regarding the commitment of the international community to 
adequately respond to the problem of global warming. 
In fact, throughout the 21st century, the geoengineering debate has been closely 
coupled with the climate change agenda, being affected by its major convulsions in the 
scientific and political arenas. The grossly unsuccessful efforts to lower carbon dioxide 
emissions (Crutzen, 2006) – a symptom of what has been described as a “problem of 
political inertia” (Gardiner, 2010) – the resonant call for greater planetary management 
and Earth system control (Steffen and Tyson, 2001), and the tendency to favour 
transformational rather than incremental responses to climate change (New et al., 2010) 
are all factors that may help explain why the scepticism and suspicion with which 
geoengineering was greeted is now giving way to a more pragmatic and serious 
consideration of its latest scientific and technological breakthroughs and the challenges 
ahead. 
But how plausible are current geoengineering proposals? Is the plausibility of 
geoengineering due to the recent developments in the field, or is the broader context 
within which those developments are taking place the key element in understanding this 
shift? What are the determinants of geoengineering plausibility? 
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In order to address these questions, we will focus our analysis in this paper on the 
visual representations of geoengineering. The rationale behind this approach is twofold. 
First, by acknowledging that the visual modes of representation (that are integral to many 
kinds of thinking) function as a powerful method of meaning making, and that pictorial 
expressions are not qualitatively different from verbal expressions (Barbatsis, 2005), it 
seems opportune to draw attention to the concept of ‘narrative rationality’ (Fisher, 1987, 
1985) and to the continuum between imaging and imagining (‘imag[in]ing’) 
(Ruivenkamp and Rip, 2011) in order to explore the way geoengineering images convey 
plausible, or implausible, arguments about current proposals to intentionally modify the 
global climate and how a geoengineered world could be. The second assumption 
underlying this approach is that the pictorial representations of geoengineering can also 
provide valuable insights into its objects of research, an issue that has not received a great 
deal of attention but seems particularly relevant when considering the plausibility of 
geoengineering proposals. 
2 Questioning the plausibility of geoengineering 
Why question the plausibility of geoengineering? Given the current state of affairs,  
in which geoengineering is receiving increasing consideration from academics and  
policy analysts as a possible means by which to offset human-induced climate change, 
this might seem a rather elementary or needless question. Yet, given the conflicting 
arguments and the variety of theses that inform the current debates on geoengineering,  
we are compelled to acknowledge that not only the need to address this question  
should be taken more seriously, but also that answering it is inevitably far from 
straightforward. 
“The current debate on climate engineering is far more complex and 
multilayered than a purely scientific-economic analysis would indicate. To 
understand the complexity of the debate, it is necessary to collect, structure, 
and interrelate the wide range of arguments advanced in favor of or against 
climate engineering. (…) As the analysis reveals, individual arguments can 
frequently only be assessed for validity and plausibility when different 
disciplines are taken into account.” [Rickels et al., (2011), p.14] 
Indeed, although plausible reasoning seems to play an important role in the ongoing 
debates on geoengineering, there is still a lack of understanding of how this “practical 
epistemic device” (Rescher, 2009) is being used within the context of the disputed 
arguments and controversial theses on the pros and cons of geoengineering research and 
deployment. 
While some authors emphasise the plausible assumptions supporting the need for 
further and more in depth research into the field of geoengineering – be it to increase our 
ability to access this topic, or ultimately, to deploy (in case of a climate emergency) the 
associated technologies (Royal Society of London, 2009; Hemming and Hagler, 2011; 
Morris, 2008; Wold et al., 2009) – others draw attention to the highly inconsistent and 
implausible features that dominate the geoengineering debate (Macnaghten and 
Szerszynski, 2013; Thernstrom, 2010; Curry, 2011). Moreover, even a cursory glance at 
the literature on the subject reveals the diversity of contexts in which the concept of 
plausibility has been invoked, such as those related with: 
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1 the description, or formulation, of the conditions that justify acknowledging the 
arguments in favour of research into and possible deployment of geoengineering 
(Keith, 2010) 
2 the attempts to bring into prominence the epistemic and non-epistemic values 
attached to geoengineering proposals (Gardiner, 2011a) 
3 the disentanglement of the kinds of world that geoengineering might bring into being 
(Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013) 
4 the critical exploration of the assumptions that underpin governance debates around 
these technologies (Keith et al., 2010b; Bodansky, 2012) 
5 the discussion about the underlying assumptions of technical and economical 
assessments conducted in this field (Bellamy et al., 2012). 
Against this background, the development of new research initiatives on geoengineering, 
the exponential increase of media and scientific publications devoted to the topic, and the 
growing number of policy reports released over the past few years not only point to the 
ever more plausible role that solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon  
dioxide removal (CDR) methods are likely to play in the portfolio of solutions to address 
climate change, but also bring to light threatening situations of cognitive dissonance 
and/or inconsistencies connected with the complex arguments that characterise the 
geoengineering debate (Rickels et al., 2011). In fact, because “all approaches to 
geoengineering express an implied ontology (an embedded theory of who we are, how we 
are situated in the realm of being) and a presumed ethics (an embedded theory of how we 
ought to behave)” (Weiskel, 2012), the very different arguments that have been advanced 
for and against geoengineering reveal the rather complicated and entangled relationships 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, facts and values, descriptive and normative, epistemic and 
material. 
“On the one hand, the arguments make use of empirical assumptions which can 
be assessed scientifically. On the other hand, they always rely on more or less 
far-reaching normative premises, as well. Such normative assumptions may 
involve the weighting of side-effects or the moral assessment of inequalities; in 
any case, they evade an empirical, scientific evaluation.” [Rickels et al., (2011), 
p.32] 
As the comprehensive study commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research refers, the arguments that have been advanced in the current debate on 
geoengineering confront us with qualitatively different sets of assumptions. Because 
these assumptions are associated with distinctly different kinds of reasoning, a closer 
examination of the geoengineering debate should begin by trying to understand how 
empirical and normative assumptions are supported by the reasons offered to back them 
up. 
In the field of geoengineering, where knowledge is incomplete, uncertain, and 
inconsistent, the inductive and deductive arguments that one would expect to encounter 
in the scientific model of justification – the positivistic model of scientific verification of 
empirical and analytic propositions – seem to intermingle with a third class of arguments, 
the so-called abductive, presumptive, or plausibilistic forms of argumentation. This class 
of arguments is based on a kind of plausible reasoning that combines normative or value 
stating premises (premises stating general rules) with premises drawn from the presumed 
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facts of a case (Walton, 2003) – be it a simulation model that seeks to address the 
climatic consequences of geoengineering proposals (Matthews and Caldeira, 2007; 
Lenton and Vaughan, 2009), a limited and controlled real world geoengineering 
experiment (Pidgeon et al., 2013), or an assessment of different geoengineering 
techniques in terms of efficiency, affordability, safety, controllability, timeliness, or 
reversibility (Royal Society of London, 2009; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011; Boyd, 2008). 
Indeed, the contexts in which the concept of plausibility has been used and the set of 
things it refers to not only reveal “a very large class of plausibility reckonings deeply 
embedded in actual cognitive practice” (Gabbay and Woods, 2005a), but also expose the 
dual nature of plausibility in hypothetical reasoning: 
“Plausibility trisects reasoning in characteristic ways. We can conceive of the 
plausible as that which is reasoned from and as that which is reasoned to. We 
can also see it as characterizing the inference link between what is reasoned 
from and what is reasoned to. Seen this way, a piece of reasoning may have 
premisses that are plausible; it may have a plausible proposition as its 
conclusion; and its conclusion may be plausibly inferred from its premisses. It 
is also notable that plausibility is ambiguous as between propositions and what 
we might call the “engagement of propositions”. The two are logically 
independent. Planck famously thought that his quantum hypothesis was 
radically implausible, but he conjectured it all the same, illustrating that it can 
sometimes be reasonable to accept (if only tentatively) the unreasonable. Given 
the linguistic tie between the reasonable and the plausible, a like concurrence 
affects the plausible. Accordingly we shall distinguish propositional plausibility 
from strategic plausibility.” [Gabbay and Woods, (2005b), p.68; emphasis 
added] 
This distinction points to the ambiguous cognitive and epistemic status of plausibility and 
highlights the importance of considering both the explanatory and instrumental aspects of 
abductive reasoning (Magnani, 2009) in the context of the geoengineering debate, where 
the two different kinds of plausible contentions (propositional and strategic plausibility) 
are being brought into play to answer two very different kinds of questions: what is it 
reasonable to believe? and what is it reasonable to do? 
According to Hodgson, these two questions involve the type of decisions that “cannot 
be made by overt calculation or computation or any other way involving the overt 
mechanical application of conclusive rules” (Hodgson, 2012). As he argues, these are 
rather the typical questions that can only be answered by the exercise of reasonable 
(albeit fallible) judgment. In fact, the need to engage in this kind of (inconclusive) 
plausible reasoning cannot be eliminated by the ability to use the logical structure of 
scientific knowledge – or what Fisher (1987) refers to as the logic of reasons associated 
with the rational world paradigm. As suggested in the following section, in this sort of 
situation – when we are confronted with these kinds of questions, when we need to make 
judgments on the basis of inconclusive reasons, and when we need to transform the logic 
of reasons into a logic of good reasons – the narrative paradigm offers a means of 
transcending the “uncompromising and irreducible oppositions presented by all kinds of 
absolutisms: dualisms of reason and imagination, of knowledge and opinion, of 
irrefutable self-evidence and deceptive will, of a universally accepted objectivity and an 
uncommunicable subjectivity, of a reality binding on everybody and values that are 
purely individual” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). 
This goes some way towards recapturing the Aristotelian question of balancing 
instrumental rationality with value-rationality (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2004). Accordingly, 
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when analysing the various qualities of plausible claims deemed important in the field of 
geoengineering, we stress the relevance of considering the neo-Aristotelian accounts of 
practical reasoning that, rooted in a critique of modern instrumental technical rationality, 
seek to redress the imbalance between the intellectual virtues of episteme, techne and 
phronesis (Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
With this background in mind, we argue that the considerations of reasonability and 
plausibility that lie at the heart of the geoengineering debate should be understood as 
manifestations of a reasoning process in between two theoretical traditions, namely: 
1 the instrumental technical rationality of modern conceptions of scientific reasoning 
(the epistemological stance engendered by enlightenment rationalism and logical 
positivism) 
2 the tradition of practical reasoning that draws on practical value rationality to 
challenge the logical empiricism, its ontological privileging of scientific knowledge, 
and the adequacy of instrumental rationality alone. 
As we will see in the following sections, these kinds of considerations are also embedded 
in the pictorial narratives of geoengineering, with their implied reasoning corresponding 
in many ways to a form of narrative rationality pertaining to rhetorical action. 
3 Exploring geoengineering plausibility through expanded notions of 
narrative 
Different conceptions, understandings, and value assumptions concerning the changing 
relationships between science and society, science and technology, and science and 
nature tend to inform the geoengineering debate and sustain a variety of discursive 
frames that shape the way geoengineering has been problematised (Scholte et al., 2013; 
Sikka, 2012; Huttunen and Hildén, 2013; Luokkanen et al., 2013; Nerlich and Jaspal, 
2012). This reinforces the need to unbind geoengineering discourses from the deeply 
embedded narratives of science, technology, and society that present technoscientific 
innovation as the solution to our most critical problems and as a substitute for social 
change. Similarly, the construction of narratives that give meaning to human action 
within nature, and provide guidance for humans’ domination of nature, deserves a more 
critical and open reflection than has been the case to date. 
Accordingly, one possible way of looking at the geoengineering issue and the scalar 
dislocations that it introduces into modern systems of experience and understanding is to 
explore the plausibility of geoengineering by adopting expanded notions of narrative that 
account for its particular ways of rendering the world in both visual and verbal forms. 
Thus, by assuming that pictorial expressions are not qualitatively different from verbal 
expressions (Barbatsis, 2005), we propose to analyse some visual representations of 
geoengineering in order to understand how they use a narrative way of structuring 
thought to make sense of a geoengineerd world. In doing so, we draw on Fisher’s homo 
narrans metaphor, suggesting that both the descriptive and explanatory elements of the 
visual narratives of geoengineering need to be examined to understand the role specific 
plausibility structures play in satisfying the demands of probability and fidelity of those 
narratives. 
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The descriptive and explanatory elements of a narrative point towards the two 
different kinds of narrative research described by Polkinghorne: the descriptive narrative 
research aims “to render the narrative accounts already in place which are used by 
individuals or groups as their means for ordering and making temporal events 
meaningful”; the explanatory narrative research seeks “to construct a narrative account 
explaining ‘why’ a situation or event involving human actions has happened” 
[Polkinghorne, (1988), p.161]. We expect that the first kind of narrative research may 
help us to articulate the various (conflicting?) narrative schemes that lie underneath the 
visual representations of geoengineering – narrative schemes that operate not only in the 
realm of rationality, knowledge, and facts, but also in the realm of subjectivity, values, 
imagination, and fiction. However, it is only within an explanatory narrative approach 
that we will be able to address the fundamental question of why geoengineering is 
gaining more serious consideration and becoming an increasingly plausible solution to 
climate change. Because explanatory narrative research is retrospective and retrodictive2, 
adopting this kind of approach does not seem an easy task when considering the ongoing 
debates on geoengineering. Nonetheless, because an analogy can be made with prior, 
already-told stories – of which “the pathological history of weather and climate 
modification” is just one example (Fleming, 2010) –, we believe this task is not only 
possible, but also an imperative: 
“I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior 
question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human 
society, that is, with one or more imputed characters – roles into which we have 
been drafted – and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to 
understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to 
be construed.” [MacIntyre, (1984), p.216] 
In addition, we must confront the resistance put up by science to this kind of 
investigation. In fact, explanatory narrative research is not typically used in the sciences, 
partly because “narrative truth is distinguished from other kinds of formal science truths 
by its emphasis on the life-like, intelligible and plausible story. Stories typically reflect a 
coherence (as opposed to correspondence) theory of truth in that the narrator strives for 
narrative probability – a story that makes sense; narrative fidelity – a story consistent 
with past experiences or other stories; and aesthetic finality – a story with satisfactory 
closure and representational appeal” [Sandelowski, (1991), pp.164–165]. 
In the context of this discussion, which points to some of the presuppositions that 
underpin Fisher’s narrative paradigm, it is important to emphasise the difference between 
the elements of narrative theory, a theoretical distinction stressed by structuralists who 
considered that each narrative has two parts: a story (what is depicted in a narrative) and 
the discourse (how it is depicted). According to Chatman (1978, pp.19–22), the story 
consists of the content or chain of events and the existents (characters and items of 
setting), while the discourse refers to the means by which the content is communicated, 
thus comprising two subcomponents: the narrative form itself (the structure of narrative 
transmission) and its manifestation (its appearance in a specific materialising medium). In 
order to capture all elements of the communicative situation, Chatman reminds us that 
narrative is a semiotic structure, which presupposes that it should include a form and a 
substance of expression and a form and a substance of content. 
Moreover, the broad amplitude of intended or unintended choices that may influence 
visual representation is a fundamental aspect to which a visual analyst should be alert. 
This broad amplitude of the representational space – in what Pauwels (2006) refers to as 
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the visual representational latitude – is determined by the nature of the problem being 
depicted (type of referent), by the intentional and unintentional choices of the author (the 
context of production), and also by the characteristics of the audience in relation to a 
particular visual representation (the context of use) – Figure 1. 
Figure 1 A conceptual framework for analysing and producing visual representations in science 
(see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Adapted from Pauwels (2006, p.23) 
4 From geoengineering imag[in]ing to geoengineering plausibility 
Focusing on nanotechnology representations, Ruivenkamp and Rip (2011, p.185) 
mention that it is “the entanglement between imaging and imagining which is the key to 
understanding what images do”. While imaging refers to the creation of images based on 
data, aiming for resemblance and offering ‘a view on what is out there’, imagining refers 
to the creation of impressions, offering visions of worlds that might be realised. Thereby, 
the word ‘imag(in)ing’ aims at capturing the continuum between imaging and imagining, 
referring to something that has not only to do with the way an image may bear some 
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resemblance to that which it represents, but also with the way it might ‘stands for’ and is 
able to ‘act for’. It thus refers to the realm of symbolic action, in the sense that these 
visual representations have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, or interpret 
them, and might provide a meaning and a rationale for decision and action (Fisher, 1987, 
1985). 
As in nanotechnology, the images that populate the world of geoengineering tend to 
balance the past, present, and future in order to communicate the results of recent 
experiments, as well as to present the potentialities, drawbacks, and risks associated with 
its associated technologies. Not surprisingly (given what is happening in the field of 
nanotechnology), the visual representation of geoengineering also involves entangling its 
present achievements and future visions of what it may become, drawing attention to the 
anachronism that tends to be associated with innovation processes in the context of 
knowledge production. 
In line with this notion of ‘imag(in)ing’, we will focus our attention in the following 
section on the continuum between geoengineering imaging and imagining with a view to 
exploring the potential of a visual narrative approach for better understanding the 
plausible and implausible aspects of geoengineering proposals. Thus, also adopting the 
concept of narrative rationality, we propose to assess the ‘narrative fidelity’ and the 
‘narrative probability’ of three pictorial narratives of geoengineering. 
4.1 How plausible are the objects of geoengineering research? 
It seems most reasonable to question the plausibility of geoengineering research in light 
of its object of interest. Indeed, the pressure of practice under which science operates 
today (Carrier, 2011) is giving rise to the emergence of new objects of research – 
ambivalent beings, hybrid products and theoretically constructed objects through which 
we gain a new understanding and control of nature – that call for a more careful 
consideration of the complex narratives and practices of science and technology. 
Following this appeal, some authors have suggested that it is precisely at the level of 
these objects of research that we can find a meaningful distinction between science and 
technoscience, an ontological difference that “becomes more explicit when research 
results are presented in particular settings and when the objects of research are exhibited 
for the specific interest they hold” (Bensaude-Vincent et al., 2011). Accordingly, and by 
way of illustration, it could be said that when the result of a global climate model 
experiment is presented as scientific evidence for understanding the aerosol climate 
forcing, this would tally with traditional conceptions of science. However, when sulphate 
aerosols are presented for their capacity to counteract the climate forcing of growing CO2 
emissions, this should be seen as a ‘hallmark of technoscience’. 
Thereby, a closer examination of the attempts that have been made to visually 
represent the objects of geoengineering research may shed some light towards often 
neglected differences between science and technoscience: 
1 in terms of their epistemic ideals and how the corresponding perspectives imply 
different understandings of the interplay between representing and intervening 
2 in terms of their objects of interest and how they hold different functional properties 
3 in terms of the guiding ideals or research orientations that tend to shape the practices 
of science and technoscience in very different ways [Idem]. 
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In what follows, we will explore the potential of a visual narrative approach to 
understanding the role of plausibility in imag(in)ing the objects of interest of 
geoengineering. We will focus our attention on an image that appeared in an online 
article entitled ‘Engineering a cooler Earth’ (Engelhaupt, 2010). In this article Erika 
Engelhaupt refers to the Asilomar Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies, 
held in March 2010 in Pacific Grove, California, to describe some of the geoengineering 
strategies that have been discussed by the scientific community. One of these  
strategies, which has become known as ‘air capture’ consists in an industrial process that 
captures CO2 from ambient air, producing a pure CO2 stream for use or disposal (Royal 
Society of London, 2009). Although not yet tested on a large-scale, several conceptual 
designs of such air capture units have already been proposed and demonstrated at 
laboratory scale3. 
The most well-known air capture technology involves the so called ‘artificial trees’ or 
‘synthetic trees’. Two terms that suggest the similarity between the engineered air capture 
process and the way (natural) trees remove CO2 from the air – because after all, as one of 
the leading proponents of this technology says: “Every tree demonstrates that capture of 
carbon dioxide from the air is physically feasible. In addition, technologies that are more 
effective than trees at scrubbing carbon dioxide out of the air have been developed more 
than half a century ago” (Lackner, 2008). Furthermore, “filtering machines – think of 
them as synthetic trees – can capture far more CO2 than natural trees of a similar size” 
(Lackner, 2010). 
And it is precisely an illustration of an artificial tree, published in the  
above-mentioned article, which called our attention to the relevance of questioning the 
plausibility of the technoscientific objects of geoengineering – Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Giant air-capture machines, such as artificial trees, could cleanse the atmosphere of 
excess carbon dioxide (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Engelhaupt (2010); illustration by Michael Morgenstern (reproduced 
by kind permission of the author) 
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Indeed, this image seems to incorporate several elements conveying a sense of 
plausibility. It gives the idea that the illustrator took into consideration the narrative 
standards of truth in order to ensure that the story portrayed in this illustration  
would make sense, would be consistent with past experiences and would provide a 
satisfactory closure and representational appeal. Everything seems to cohere and hang 
together: the devices that resemble natural trees and that combine ecological and 
aesthetical functions; the girl skipping on a rope, suggesting that the environment in 
which she is playing is safe and healthy and calling attention to the non-disruptive nature 
of this technology; and lastly, an exuberant sun that seems to have been placed there to 
remind us that there is nothing to fear about it. Apparently, this picture depicts a story 
free of contradictions, one that can lay the ground for a more serious consideration of the 
arguments in favour of research into and possible deployment of this technology. But 
how plausible is this image? Is it reasonable to believe what it says? Is it reasonable to 
do what it suggests? 
Although there seems to be “no doubt that air capture technologies could be 
developed” (Royal Society of London, 2009) and that “it is technically possible to 
capture CO2 from air at industrial scale” (Keith et al., 2010a) the plausibility of this 
image is still questionable. In fact, if we take into consideration the diverse descriptions 
(Lackner, 2010) and illustrations4 of artificial tree prototypes we have to recognise that 
they are far from resembling natural trees: 
“His prototype looks like a big furnace filter, with layers of ruffled leaves of 
permeable material coated with sodium carbonate. As the air wafts through the 
filter, the sodium carbonate will combine with the carbon dioxide to become 
sodium bicarbonate; periodically, a liquid will flush the leaves, washing the 
bicarbonate into solution. That solution will go to a separator, where 
electrodialysis will turn it back into carbon dioxide (for sequestration) and 
sodium carbonate (for reuse in the filter). A unit the size of a forty-foot 
shipping container standing on the end, says Lackner, would remove a ton of 
carbon dioxide a day.” [Horn and Krupp, (2008), p.241] 
This description, although apparently consistent, depicts an unresembling object – 
something which does not correspond to the devices represented in Figure 2. In this 
context, one must not forget that “a discourse can be perfectly coherent although it 
describes a bizarre sequence of events; thus coherence must be evaluated independently 
of plausibility. Coherence is essentially dependent upon coreference. Plausibility is 
dependent upon the interpretation the subject is able to assign to a discourse in an 
appropriate temporal, spatial, causal and intentional framework” [Ehrlich and Charolles, 
1991), p.276]. 
Therefore, a set of questions emerge at this point: if “they don’t exist yet, and when 
they do, they probably won’t look like real trees” (Kunzig, 2010), why are these objects 
portrayed to resemble real trees? Is it to provide an element that could ring true with our 
experiences, views, and beliefs (narrative fidelity and aesthetic functionality)? Is it to 
provide a satisfactory answer to some of the questions and concerns raised by the public 
about these technologies? (Table 1). 
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Table 1 Some concerns and questions about air-capture technologies that emerged in a public 
dialogue on geoengineering conducted by the UK Natural Environment Research 
Council 
Air capture 
Disadvantages and concerns: 
• The capture devices may be an eyesore and could take up land space 
• Visual appearance and potential noise 
• There are not many places to store CO2 underground 
Participant’s questions to scientists: 
• What is the process by which CO2 is captured? 
• How big would they be? 
• What would they be made out of? 
• Would there be health benefits for those living near them? 
Source: Natural Environment Research Council (2010) 
As this illustration suggests, the entanglement of imaging and imagining of 
geoengineering brings to light the technoscientific ideal that orients research towards the 
acquisition of a demonstrable capability of control. Although transgressing the categories 
of the natural and the artificial – by shaping and reshaping the features of the world 
according to visions of how it could be – the familiar and mundane representation of this 
object of geoengineering research, as well as its implicit ‘anticipatory performativity’, 
confers a sense of plausibility that contrasts with the incomplete, uncertain, and 
inconsistent knowledge that a ‘technoscience-in-the-making’ can provide. 
4.2 How plausible are geoengineering facts? 
The second image that drew our attention, and pointed to other possible directions for 
analysing the plausibility of pictorial narratives of geoengineering, was included in the 
report issued in September 2009 by the UK Royal Society (Royal Society of London, 
2009) – Figure 3. 
The [con]text where this figure appeared is very explicit about its purpose and the 
uncertainties that surround different geoengineering methods: this figure was meant to 
provide a provisional overall evaluation based on different methods discussed in the 
Royal Society’s report, which “should be treated as no more than a preliminary and 
somewhat illustrative attempt at visualising the results of the sort of multi-criterion 
evaluation that is needed” [Royal Society of London, (2009), p.49], and “may serve as a 
prototype for future analyses when more and better information becomes available”. As 
explained in the text “indicative error bars have been added to avoid any suggestion that 
the size of the symbols reflects their precision – but note that the error bars are not really 
as large as they should be, just to avoid confusing the diagram” [idem ibidem]. 
From the perspective of reception theory, this textual explanation not only provides 
the elements necessary to clarify the point of view of the author-imager, thereby guiding 
the reader viewer in the process of meaning making, but also reveals the author/imager’s 
concerns in terms of narrative probability (coherence) and narrative fidelity (truthfulness 
and reliability). 
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Figure 3 A preliminary overall evaluation of the geoengineering techniques considered in 
Chapters 2 and 3 of the Royal Society’s report (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Royal Society of London (2009, p.49) (reproduced by kind 
permission of the Royal Society of London) 
Despite the efforts to clarify its ‘functional adequacy’ that is, the limits of its potential 
uses in acts of communication and “the correct type of intentional relationship to its 
subject matter” [Mitchell, (1992), p.220], the narrative structure of this image and the 
contexts in which it has been reproduced and analysed tend to underestimate the 
uncertainty that surrounded its production and the caveats regarding its uses, thereby 
stretching its original purpose and meaning and leading to a range of different 
considerations as to the most promising geoengineering schemes and the resulting rank of 
preferred geoengineering actions (Table 2). 
Table 2 Some quotations retrieved from the internet, with implicit or explicit reference to 
Figure 3 
“(...) But the study does break new ground in attempting to rank the different contending 
technologies according to how effective they’re likely to be, how much they’re likely to cost, 
how safe they appear, and how quickly they could be deployed. So the most cost-effective, 
overall, is probably pumping dust into the upper atmosphere, mimicking the impact of volcanic 
eruptions that are known to produce a net cooling by reflecting sunlight back into space.” 
Source: Black, R. (2009) Plan B for Planet Earth [online] 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/richardblack/2009/09/plan_b_for_planet_earth.html 
(accessed 10 June 2013). 
“This diagram provides a solid overview of the schemes the authors examined and their overall 
assessment of their effectiveness, timeliness, affordability and degree of risk.” 
Source: Jacquot, J. (2009) Focus on Climate Mitigation; Give Geoengineering a Chance 
[online] http://arstechnica.com/science/2009/09/focus-on-climate-mitigation-give-
geoengineering-a-chance/ (accessed 10 June 2013). 
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Table 2 Some quotations retrieved from the internet, with implicit or explicit reference to 
Figure 3 (continued) 
“While the numbers assigned to effectiveness, affordability, safety and timeliness are somewhat 
qualitative (hence the error bars – which merely denote large uncertainties), this representation 
gives a sense of which geoengineering approaches might be the more promising ones. In crude 
terms, the ideal method would be represented by a large green circle to the upper right of the 
chart. Under these criteria, using stratospheric aerosols to scatter sunlight away from the earth 
comes closest to the ideal.” 
Source: Maynard, A. (2009) Geoengineering the Climate: A Clear Perspective from The Royal 
Society [online] http://2020science.org/2009/09/01/geoengineering-the-climate-a-clear-
perspective-from-the-royal-society/ (accessed 11 June 2013). 
“Reflective technologies could cool the planet within a year, and according to the Royal 
Society’s findings the most promising method in terms of cost and effectiveness would be to 
pump sulphate particles into the stratosphere.” 
Source: Brahic, C. (2009) Top Science Body Calls for Geoengineering ‘Plan B’, New Scientist, 
1 September 2009 [online] http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17716-top-science-body-
calls-for-geoengineering-plan-b.html (accessed 11 June 2013). 
“The authors rated various schemes on the basis of effectiveness, affordability, safety and 
timeliness, with estimates of uncertainty for the first two parameters. There were no clear 
winners: options that scored highly on effectiveness scored low on safety or cost, whereas those 
that were affordable and safe were less effective.” 
Source: Williamson, P. (2011) ‘Climate geoengineering. Could we? Should we?’, IGBP’s 
Global Change, January, Vol. 76, pp.18–21 [online] http://www.igbp.net/ (accessed 11 March 
2013). 
As we can see through these quotations, a figure that was conceived as a starting point for 
future research runs the risk of being seen as the culminating point of research already 
done. In fact, this image does not conform to the traditional sketches that one would 
expect to find at the start of an investigation (Gooding, 2004). It points to the complex 
issues of visualisation and visual communication in science and the interdependencies 
that exist among the elements and arguments represented in Pauwel’s framework  
(Figure 1). 
As the following list may suggest, this single figure and the discourses that surround 
it seem to offer a wealth of opportunities for reflection about important features of 
plausible judgement under conditions of severe uncertainty – that is, when probabilities 
are non-measurable or unknown, and when the space of possible events is only partially 
identified (Brandolini and Scazzieri, 2011): 
• the idea of ‘epistemically authoritative sources’ as a substantive basis of plausibility 
(Gabbay and Woods, 2005b; Rescher, 2006) 
• the dissemination of knowledge, and the communication of science among 
professionals and to the public 
• the intertextuality associated with this type of representation 
• the roles that these kinds of images play in the process of knowledge production 
• the paradoxes related to the visual representation of uncertainty 
• the quantitative imperative5 versus the imperative of presuppositions (Niaz, 2009) 
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• the need to tackle the dilemmas of the science-policy interface, i.e., the difficulty of 
accommodating the “growing expectations for science”, which has to simultaneously 
address issues of policy relevance, scientific quality, and legitimacy in a context 
where “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). 
In fact, the types of use and claims attached to Figure 3 not only point to the difference 
between the meaning making role of an image’s pictorial content and its pictorial form or 
syntax (Barbatsis, 2005), but also bring to the discussion of geoengineering plausibility 
the concept of ‘reliability’ – thus, recalling Rescher’s idea of epistemically authoritative 
sources (Rescher, 2006), according to which “a thesis is more or less plausible depending 
on the reliability of the sources that vouch for it” (Rescher, 2003). 
The contexts of use of this figure also turn our attention to the ever-growing 
circulation of information worldwide (mainly on the internet) and how easy it is to 
distribute, copy, transform, and recombine images, thus facilitating rapid appropriation 
(or misappropriation), sometimes for uses that were not originally intended. This 
situation not only undermines the established rules of graphic communication, but also 
disrupts the familiar practices of image production and exchange (Mitchell, 1992). 
The attempt to represent and visualise system uncertainties with the traditional 
language of science seems to run into a profound paradox: how can we address what is 
not fully known in a scientific problem with the same (and expected?) quantitative 
scientific tools and concepts that are used to communicate what is known? Science is by 
definition related to knowledge and what can be logically and rationally explained. In this 
attempt to understand system uncertainties, to explain the inexactness of scientific 
knowledge, and to communicate the limits of what can be known, science has primarily 
been using numerical language, the language of objectivity, namely what we have been 
educated to think of as the language of precision: 
“A political demand for scientific consensus and unambiguous quantitative 
information in the assessment process would be likely to grow as science 
moves nearer to the context of policy making and the political process 
surrounding the climate negotiations.” [van der Sluijs et al., (1998), p.59] 
The risk is clear: we may have been led to overestimate what we know about uncertainty 
and to underestimate the inexactness, unreliability, and – most of all – ignorance of it. 
This paradox, linked with the imperative for precision in the field of scientific 
communication about ‘system uncertainties’, is clearly seen in an article published in 
Science about the challenges of visualisation and communication of uncertainties 
resulting both from incomplete or disputed knowledge and from indeterminacy of the 
future (Spiegelhalter et al., 2011). Although drawing attention to the emphasis that has 
been given to probability and risk assessment approaches, the authors question not only 
the uncertainties of those approaches – “What if we’re uncertain about probabilities?” – 
but also the inadequacy of adopting such approaches in a context of “post normal 
science” (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). 
4.3 How plausible is the idea of a robust governance structure for 
geoengineering? 
Many of the questions that have been raised about the plausibility of geoengineering 
concern the various governance challenges that these proposals encompass (Gardiner, 
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2011a; Keith et al., 2010b; Bodansky, 2012; Bodle, 2013). In fact, the most intense and 
stormy controversies in geoengineering are more about the question of political control 
over the development and deployment of its associated technologies, as well as about 
underlying moral uncertainties – “a lack of commonly shared normative yardsticks to 
underpin collective decision-making” (Hansen, 2010) – than about scientific and 
technical issues. 
Although no clear dividing line can be drawn between research and deployment6  
(Bodle, 2013; Parson Edward and Ernst Lia, 2013), legal experts in this field generally 
agree that governance for geoengineering research should be addressed separately from 
governance for deployment of geoengineering activities (GAO, 2009). 
Discussions about governance mechanisms and basic principles to guide 
geoengineering research tend to highlight the profound reorientation of technoscientific 
practices in contemporary societies – in what has been seen as a major shift from the 
laboratory ideal to the field ideal of experimentation (Schwarz and Krohn, 2011). 
“But what if the object of your interest is not modular or encapsulated? What 
do you do then? For that, after all, is the feature that big ‘G’ geoengineering 
proposals have in common. They call for interventions on systems that lack just 
this characteristic. You cannot encapsulate part of the atmosphere and it is too 
complex to be able to build a realistic non-virtual model at scale. As such, it is 
reasonable to ask whether we could ever have a sound basis for moving to full 
deployment of any such proposed intervention. And if not, then why bother to 
even research such proposals in the first place?” (Bunzl, 2009) 
However, the question of “whether a technology program is modular and contained or 
whether it involves the release of material into the wider environment”, as well as many 
others concerning ‘risk factors’ which have taken priority in the contemporary debate on 
geoengineering (Bracmort et al., 2011), are far from exhausting the challenges that the 
governance of research and experimentation encompass. 
As Clive Hamilton reminds us, before we embrace the idea that “we should at least do 
the research”, we must address some pressing questions in need of answers: Who is this 
‘we’? Who should pay for the research? Who should oversee and regulate the research? 
Who should impose ethical standards? Should the research be transparent, or should it be 
secret? Who should own the results of the research?... (Hamilton, 2013). Only after we 
have been given satisfactory answers to these ‘hard question’ can we start developing the 
means to engineer the climate. 
Moreover, by acknowledging that the scientific enterprise cannot be excused from 
moral considerations, nor thought of as something entirely outside the realm of action 
(Strand, 2002), we not only draw attention to the absence of any sharp boundary between 
facts and values, but also emphasise the close relationship between knowledge and 
action, thereby suggesting the importance of considering the connection between 
theoretical and practical discourse in the field of geoengineering. Accordingly, though it 
seems reasonable to assume that the regulatory needs of geoengineering research are 
different from those of full-scale deployment, when we consider both the methodological 
and moral issues that these activities entail we come to recognise that this boundary is 
permeable and often indistinct. 
We thus suggest that before considering the question of whether it is reasonable to 
believe that a set of principles7 (Rayner et al., 2013) and governance mechanisms 
(SRMGI, 2013) could in fact ensure that “where research does proceed, it is safe, ethical, 
and subject to appropriate public oversight and independent evaluation” (Hanafi and 
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Hamburg, 2013), we should start by addressing the question of if it is reasonable to do 
so. 
The image that we selected to illustrate some of the implausible ideas underpinning 
the idea of a robust governance structure for geoengineering was published in the Society 
Matters blog of the Open University (Corry, 2012) – Figure 4. It recalls a question 
already asked by Robock (2011): “Whose hand is on the thermostat?”. 
This image has the power of reminding us that recent proposals to geoengineer the 
climate are just one contemporary manifestation of man’s long-standing desire to control 
nature – an early-21st-century embodiment of the Baconian project of human mastery 
over nature. 
Figure 4 Whose hand is on the thermostat? (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Corry (2012); cartoon by Catherine Pain (reproduced by kind 
permission of the Open University) 
The perfect control that the human hand exerts over the thermostat seems intended to 
extinguish the sense of trepidation that arises from the transformative capacity of modern 
technologies, from their stated aspiration to manipulate the natural world, and from their 
power to perform and to surprise us (Bensaude-Vincent et al., 2011; Lee, 2012). 
However, on trying to address Robock’s question that this image evokes, two possible 
and opposed interpretations come to mind: 
• First, that this hand is a legitimate hand; a hand that represents our capacity to 
overcome the current political inertia on climate change – the weak political 
leadership, the power of the fossil fuel lobby, the pervasive wishful thinking and the 
culture of denial that have undermined plan A (Hamilton, 2013) – and that after an 
obstinate resistance, we were able to establish legitimate geoengineering institutions 
that invoke the appropriate norms of justice and community (Gardiner, 2010; 
Gardiner, 2011b). 
• Second, that this hand is an illegitimate hand; a hand that not only failed to address 
the problem of political inertia, but by trying to operate with its constrains, was able 
to license illegitimate geoengineering activities, violating the kinds of norms of 
global justice and community that dealing with the problem of climate change might 
suggest (Idem). 
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The inconsistencies and implausibility of the first interpretation seem clear: 
“The ‘we should at least do the research’ lobby assumes that, if geoengineering 
research succeeds and the situation calls for deployment, it will be done in a 
way that respects the scientific evidence and protects the interests of the poor 
and vulnerable. Do we really believe that? The irony is that if we did believe in 
such a world, there would be no need for research into geoengineering.” 
(Hamilton, 2013) 
But how (im)plausible is the second interpretation? In fact, if we look at the past, if we 
agree that technical artefacts have political qualities, that is, that they can embody 
specific forms of power and authority and “that the adoption of a given technical system 
actually requires the creation and maintenance of a particular set of social conditions as 
the operating environment of that system” (Winner, 1980), we would have to 
acknowledge that there is a clear risk that the second interpretation of this image is far 
more plausible than a first glance could suggest. 
5 Final remarks 
Since the mid-1980s, when the Earth System Sciences Committee of the NASA Advisory 
Council put forward a more complete and unified approach to Earth studies a new way of 
understanding and studying the Earth system began to gain ground among scientific 
institutions around the world – Earth System Science (Earth System Sciences Committee, 
1988, 1986). This new approach to Earth studies and global change, the recognition that 
humanity itself has become a global geophysical force, allied with new approaches and a 
growing commitment to achieving successful and effective planetary stewardship, are 
leading to a profound reorientation of the global environmental change research agenda, 
thereby opening up a wide range of new practices, techniques and mechanisms for global 
governance. 
“The advent of the Anthropocene, the time interval in which human activities 
now rival global geophysical processes, suggests that we need to fundamentally 
alter our relationship with the planet we inhabit. Many approaches could be 
adopted, ranging from geoengineering solutions that purposefully manipulate 
parts of the Earth System to becoming active stewards of our own life support 
system.” (Steffen et al., 2011) 
It is against this background that the idea of geoengineering, as a potential new tool for 
addressing climate change, is gaining ground. In fact, each new step in the direction  
of an integrated Earth System Science seems to have reinforced the plausibility of 
geoengineering proposals within the wide range of options “towards good planetary 
management” (Steffen and Tyson, 2001). Accordingly, the first step towards 
understanding why geoengineering “migrated from marginal to mainstream science and 
policy making” (Scott, 2012) should consist of a critical examination of the salient 
narratives that captured the shift in the relationship between humans and the global 
environment, in order to suggest the beginning of a potentially new geological epoch in 
which human beings appear to have become a driving force in the evolution of the planet 
and geoengineering starts to look acceptable in preventing the worst effects of climate 
change. 
As Roland Barthes noted “there are countless forms of narrative in the world (...), 
each of which branches out into a variety of media, as if all substances could be relied 
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upon to accommodate man’s stories” (Barthes, 1975). By contending that reasoning can 
be discovered in all sorts of symbolic actions (non-discursive as well as discursive), 
Fisher (1987, 1985) introduced the concept of narrative rationality, suggesting that its 
application to specific stories8 may further clarify its nature and value. It was in line with 
these ideas that we proposed to examine the pictorial narratives of geoengineering. By 
drawing on Fisher’s narrative paradigm – with its associated concept of narrative 
rationality – we highlighted the importance of looking at the narrative fidelity and 
narrative probability of the visual representations of geoengineering in order to examine 
the plausible and implausible aspects of geoengineering stories. Hence, by focusing our 
attention on the concept of plausibility, we adopted a visual narrative approach to 
interpret and assess the sense making structures of a set of pictorial narratives of 
geoengineering and to identify the particular instances of these narratives that provide  
(or not) a reliable, trustworthy, and desirable guide to thought and action. 
As we have shown in the previous sections, the pictorial narratives of geoengineering 
illustrate the ambiguous epistemic status of plausible reasoning. Indeed, the 
considerations of reasonability and plausibility that lie at the heart of the geoengineering 
narratives should be understood as manifestations of a reasoning process in between two 
theoretical traditions: 
1 the instrumental technical rationality of modern conceptions of scientific reasoning 
2 the tradition of practical reasoning that draws on practical value rationality to 
challenge the logical empiricism, its ontological privileging of scientific knowledge, 
and the adequacy of ‘instrumental rationality alone’. 
Plausible reasoning tends to be defeasible and inconclusive, “meaning that even when it 
is in favor of the truth of a proposition, it leaves open the possibility that further evidence 
could come in that would be in favor of the falsity of that proposition” [Walton, (2003), 
p.172]. This kind of reasoning is typically used in persuasion dialogue and is highly 
characteristic of ethical justification argumentation. However, it is also used in scientific 
argumentation, particularly at “the so-called discovery stage, where a hypothesis is being 
constructed, even though no (or few) experimental results are in yet” (Idem, p.214) – 
which is precisely the stage at which geoengineering finds itself. As we hope to have 
illustrated, although plausible reasoning is required for many matters that science cannot 
address, there are at least three different areas where the scientific method itself depends 
heavily on plausible reasoning: “(1) the formulation of hypothesis to be tested, (2) the 
devising of experiments to test them, and (3) the selection of which unrefuted hypothesis 
should be provisionally accepted (because although experiments can refute general 
assertions about the world, they cannot give them positive support without the aid of 
plausible reasoning)” [Hodgson, (2012), pp.39–40]. 
In the field of geoengineering, where the promises of scientific and technological 
developments seem to give place to more and more uncertainty and the feeling that our 
ignorance is more important than what we know, we highlighted the important role that 
plausible reasoning play in addressing our two initial questions: what is it reasonable to 
believe? and what is it reasonable to do? 
As the three images included in this paper suggest, plausibility tends to play a 
prominent role in the entanglements of imaging and imagining of geoengineering. As we 
hope to have been able to demonstrate, these are entanglements of the present and the 
future, of the world in which we live and of worlds that might be realised; of a science 
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that has to deal with our incomplete, inconsistent, and uncertain knowledge and a science 
that aspires to precision and exactitude; of a humanity constrained by its very nature and 
a humanity that aspires to transcend its own nature. In fact, plausible reasoning not only 
plays a central role in the discovery, pursuit, and justification of geoengineering 
hypotheses, but also constitutes the fundamental practical epistemic device through 
which we make sense of geoengineering narratives, articulate the entanglements of 
imag(in)ing geoengineering, and seek the answers to our fundamental questions. 
Although highlighting the key role of plausible reasoning in the field of 
geoengineering, it is important not to forget that prudence is essential in its application. 
Thus, by drawing on Rescher’s Fundamental Rule of Presumption9, we stress the 
importance of considering plausibility as the fundamental instrument of epistemic 
prudence, closely analogous to the prudential principle of action. 
Lastly, we would like to emphasise that the narrative paradigm not only predicates 
that all human discourse (including scientific ones) is meaningful and is subject to the 
tests of narrative rationality, but also lays the ground for a more sophisticated model of 
public engagement with science. Thus, in line with Fisher’s (1987, 1985) perspective on 
the role of the public in assessing public moral arguments, we support the need to subject 
the scientific debate on geoengineering to more open and critical reflection. Ultimately, it 
is hoped that this perspective will stimulate the ability of decision-makers to reason 
critically about alternative courses of action, and might inspire a vision of human 
enlightenment that goes far beyond the idea of mastery and control over nature to 
incorporate a proper balance of epistemic humility and epistemic hope, thus providing a 
cautious approach to action. 
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Notes 
1 Here we refer to Latour’s (2008) concept of ‘political epistemology’, the idea “that the key to 
the understanding of politics lies in conceptions of science and, more generally, of knowledge 
acquisition”. 
2 “(…) in that: a) certain events in the past are interpreted as hanging together by being narrated 
into a story with a beginning, middle, and end; and b) a story must be ended before it can be 
explained” (Sandelowski, 1991). 
3 The commercial systems that remove CO2 from air for use in subsequent industrial processes 
(Royal Society of London, 2009) and the technologies used to maintain safe levels of CO2 in 
submarines and spaceships (Keith et al., 2010a) are the most cited examples aimed at 
demonstrating the technical feasibility of air capture technologies to counteract climate 
change. 
4 Some examples can be seen at the following links (accessed 10 June 2013): 
 http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/big-idea/13/carbon-capture-pg2 
 http://www.earth.columbia.edu/news/2007/story04-24-07.php 
 http://carboncapture.us/docs/scrubbing_air_graph_080508.jpg. 
5 As stated by Michell (2003), “the quantitative imperative is the view that studying something 
scientifically means measuring it’”. 
6 This is mainly because there is a widespread perception that to obtain reliable information 
about the feasibility and risks of a particular geoengineering technique, at a certain stage of the 
research programme it would require “real-world field experiments that would have to be 
gradually scaled up” (Bodle, 2013). 
7 Drafted by a UK-based team of scholars, the Oxford principles comprise the following five 
high-level principles for geoengineering governance: 
a geoengineering to be regulated as a public good 
b public participation in geoengineering decision-making 
c disclosure of geoengineering research and open publication of results 
d independent assessment of impacts 
e governance before deployment. 
For a detailed analysis, see Rayner et al. (2013). 
8 Although recognising that technical communities have their own conceptions and criteria for 
judging the rationality of communication, Fisher considered that “the work even of scientists 
is inspired by stories, hence their discourse can be interpreted usefully from the narrative 
perspective” (Fisher, 1984). 
9 “Presumption favours the most plausible of rival alternatives – when indeed there is one. This 
alternative will always stand until set aside (by the entry of another, yet more plausible 
presumption)” (Rescher, 2006). 
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Abstract  
Geoengineering is a term that refers to a broad set of methods and technologies that aim to 
deliberately alter the climate system in order to alleviate the impacts of climate change - a term 
that seems to translate into reality the Cartesian dream of a practical  philosophy by means of 
which we could "render ourselves as masters and possessors of nature". In this chapter we 
propose to question the "end of the Cartesian Dream" by taking into account the imaginaries of 
science and technology underlying geoengineering proposals. The main focus of our analysis is 
the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), which includes, for the first time in this report series, an assessment of 
geoengineering solutions. As the results of our analysis suggest, the Cartesian mechanistic 
worldview, with its emphasis on the instrumental mastery of nature, is deeply embedded in the 
dominant techno-scientific framing of climate change and in the range of practices that have 
produced the ‘coupled human and ecological system’ as a ‘thinkable’ and governable domain. 
1. Introduction 
More than half a century ago, in his book Landmarks of Tomorrow, Peter Drucker described his 
"tangible present     a period of fundamental shift in worldview    as an age of transition and 
overlap (Drucker 1957). According to Drucker, this was an age where the Cartesian worldview 
of the past three hundred years was still providing the means of expression, standards of 
expectations and tools of ordering, but was no longer acting effectively, and where "the new 
post-Cartesian, post-modern world", though controlling human action and its impact on the 
world, was still lacking definition, vocabulary, methods and tools.  
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While discussing the philosophical shift from the Cartesian universe of mechanical cause to the 
new universe of pattern, purpose and processes, Drucker identifies the twofold contribution of 
Descartes to the modern world:   
 first, its basic axiom about the nature of the universe and its order  a lawlike, 
mathematically determinate universe whose intelligibility became clearly expressed in 
the classic definition of science proposed by the Académie Française
i
: "the certain and 
evident knowledge of things by their causes";  
 second, inspired by the "long chains of utterly simple and easy reasonings that 
geometers commonly use to arrive at their most difficult demonstrations" Descartes 
provided the method to make his axiom effective, that is: a "method that contains 
everything that gives certainty to the rules of arithmetic and that teaches one to follow 
the true order and to enumerate exactly all the circumstances of what one is seeking" 
(Descartes 1988, 11-12). 
Although recognising that few philosophers since Descartes have accepted his substantive 
claims or have followed him in his answers to the major problems of systematic philosophy, 
Drucker still considered that the dominant worldview of the modern West was the Cartesian 
worldview: "More than Galileo or Calvin, Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau, far more even than 
Newton, he determined, for three hundred years, what problems would appear important or even 
relevant, the scope of modern man's vision, his basic assumptions about himself and his 
universe, and above all, his concept of what is rational and plausible" (Drucker 1957, 2).  
But if this is so, it is because Descartes' legacy to the modern world cannot be reduced to its 
basic axiom about the nature of the universe and its intelligibility, neither to the method upon 
which one would be able "to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences". In fact, the  
epistemological ideals of clarity, detachment and objectivity that Descartes bequeathed to 
modern science can only be understood if we consider the underlying "Cartesian anxiety" that 
hovers in the background, and which has spread to all areas of human inquiry and activity 
(Bernstein 1983). As Hannah Arendt reminds                                             
                                                                          , and that man may be 
nothing                                             -                                       
nightmares of the whole modern age (Arendt 1958, 277, 279). The dark side of the Cartesian 
dream thus forces us to look at Descartes' legacy from a perspective that tends to expose the 
obsessive concern with the loss of certainty that became decisive for the whole development of 
modern thought, and which is inseparable from the all-pervasive radical doubt that form the 
crux of Descartes' method. 
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Descartes' doubt concerning the reality of everything (de omnibus dubitandum est),         
                                                                                             
                                                                                            
our modern worldview, transforming the way we think about the universe, ourselves, nature, 
God and knowledge, and determined the problems, metaphors and questions that have since 
then been at the centre of philosophy (Bernstein 1983, Tlumak 2007, Capra 1983). As Hannah 
Arendt has pointed out, modern philosophy and thought began with the rise of the Cartesian 
doubt. In its radical and universal significance, the Cartesian doubt became the invisible axis 
around which all thinking has been centred, occupying much the same vital position as that 
occupied by the ancient Greek thaumazein (Arendt 1958)    the attitude of wondering that 
inaugurated the ascending development of philosophy, and which, according to Brentano, made 
it vigorous (Mezei and Smith 1998)
ii
. 
From this perspective, to question the end of the Cartesian dream is not only an attempt to 
articulate the reconstruction of an alternative understanding of scientific knowledge without the 
foundational metaphor that lies at the very basis of Cartesian philosophy, but it is also an 
attempt to understand how far we have come from the worldview that derived from it and from 
the problems, metaphors and questions that Descartes bequeathed to the modern age. 
It is against this background that we propose to look at current proposals for the deliberate 
manipulation of the Earth's climate in order to alleviate the impacts of climate change. The 
assumption that geoengineering proposals can provide a privileged perspective from which to 
address the aforementioned questions follows from three lines of reasoning:  
 First, because geoengineering seems to translate into reality the Cartesian dream of a 
practical  philosophy by means of which we could "render ourselves as masters and 
possessors of nature", it can help us gain insight into current narratives of science and 
technology that purport scientific and technological innovation as the solution to our 
current environmental problems, and give meaning to human action within nature.  
 Second, inasmuch as climate engineering can arguably be considered as a typical 
scientific field that "not only generates knowledge but also increases ignorance 
concerning the possible side effects of scientific innovation and their technological 
application" (Böschen et al. 2006, 294)
iii
, it constitutes a pertinent locus from which to 
investigate the far-reaching epistemic consequences of moving from the Holocene to 
the Anthropocene
iv
, i.e. to a "new geologic epoch" where the epistemic ideal of 
the certainty                                                                            
                               "science-based ignorance"v (Ravetz 1990) that not only 
threatens our faith in sciences, but also threatens our new man-made world. 
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 Lastly, the efforts that have been made to address the array of ethical concerns 
associated with geoengineering (and which are far from being restricted to its 
unintended side effects
vi
) offer some useful insights into the attempts that have been 
made to overcome the illusory dichotomies between mind and matter, facts and values, 
and subject and object, which lay at the very heart of Cartesian philosophy and of the 
worldview derived from it. 
The main focus of our analysis is the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
vii
, which includes, for the first time in this 
report series, an assessment of geoengineering technologies. After a brief description of how 
geoengineering technologies are assessed in the three Working Group (WG) contributions to the 
AR5, we will critically examine the scientific and technical ideas underlying geoengineering 
proposals in order to address the three main questions of this chapter, which are: 
 To what extent have we moved away from the Cartesian belief in scientific truth and 
from the worldview derived from it? 
 How have we reconstructed an alternative understanding of scientific knowledge 
without the foundational metaphor that lies at the very basis of Cartesian philosophy? 
 Is geoengineering bringing into reality the Cartesian dream of rendering man the master 
and possessor of nature?  
2. The Science of Geoengineering: Geoengineering in the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
In its Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), released in 2007, the IPCC stated that 
“Geo-engineering options, such as ocean fertilization to remove CO2  directly from the 
atmosphere, or blocking sunlight by bringing material into the upper atmosphere, remain largely 
speculative and unproven, and with the risk of unknown side-effects” (IPCC 2007, 15). 
However, since the publication of the AR4,  geoengineering has attracted increasing attention as 
a means to address climate change, having been "transformed from a topic discussed largely in 
science fiction and esoteric scientific papers into mainstream scientific and policy debate" 
(Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013, 465). T   “                    ”                         
dioxide emissions (Crutzen 2006) — a symptom of what has been described as   “           
                 ” (Gardiner 2010, 286-287) — the resonant call for greater planetary 
management and Earth-system control (Global Environmental Change Programmes 2001), and 
the tendency to favour transformational rather than incremental responses to climate change 
(New et al. 2010) are all factors that may help explain why the scepticism and suspicion with 
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which geoengineering was greeted is now giving way to a more pragmatic and serious 
consideration of its latest scientific and technological breakthroughs and the challenges ahead. 
2.1 - The IPCC Expert Meeting on Geoengineering: The definitional issues 
Against this background, in June 2011 the IPCC convened a joint Expert Meeting of WGI, 
WGII, and WGIII to discuss the latest scientific basis of geoengineering, its impacts and 
response options, and to identify key knowledge gaps for consideration by the author teams of 
    IP  ’  F                R      (IPCC 2010, 2012).  
The expert meeting proposed the use of a coherent framework for assessing geoengineering 
technologies across the three IPCC AR5 Working Groups, having identified the following 
preliminary set of criteria: effectiveness, feasibility, scalability, sustainability, environmental 
risks, cost and affordability, detection and attribution, governance challenges, ethical issues, 
social acceptability, and uncertainty related to all these criteria. It was then expected that the 
consistent treatment of geoengineering options across the three contributions to the Fifth 
Assessment Report would add to a better understanding of: (i) the physical science basis of 
geoengineering (WGI), ii) the impacts of  geoengineering proposals on human and natural 
systems (WGII), and iii)  the role of geoengineering within the portfolio of response options to 
anthropogenic climate change (WGIII). 
As stated in the meeting report, a substantial amount of time was spent discussing terminology 
in and around geoengineering (Boucher, Gruber, and Blackstock 2011). Accordingly, the 
summary of the synthesis session not only provided the set of common definitions for the terms 
"Geoengineering" (Box 1), "Solar Radiation Management" (SRM) and "Carbon Dioxide 
Removal" (CDR) to be used in the Fifth Assessment Report, but also presented an illustration of 
the conceptual relationship between these terms and those of mitigation and adaptation
viii
, as 
used by the IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report (Figure 1).  
Box 1 - Definition of "Geoengineering" as proposed in the IPCC Expert Meeting on Geoengineering and 
used in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report. 
"Geoengineering refers to a broad set of methods and technologies that aim to deliberately alter the climate 
system in order to alleviate the impacts of climate change. Most, but not all, methods seek to either (1) 
reduce the amount of absorbed solar energy in the climate system (Solar Radiation Management) or (2) 
increase net carbon sinks from the atmosphere at a scale sufficiently large to alter climate (Carbon Dioxide 
Removal). Scale and intent are of central importance. Two key characteristics of geoengineering methods 
of particular concern are that they use or affect the climate system (e.g., atmosphere, land or ocean) 
globally or regionally and/or could have substantive unintended effects that cross national boundaries. 
Geoengineering is different from weather modification and ecological engineering, but the boundary can 
be fuzzy" (Boucher, Gruber, and Blackstock 2011). 
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Figure 1: Illustration of mitigation, adaptation, Solar Radiation Management (SRM) and Carbon Dioxide 
Removal (CDR)  methods in relation to the interconnected human, socio-economic and climatic systems 
and with respect to mitigation and  adaptation. The top part of the figure represents the Kaya identity. 
REDD stands for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation  and forest Degradation. (Source: Boucher, 
Gruber, and Blackstock 2011). 
The definition of geoengineering proposed by the Expert Meeting participants seems to take 
into account previous attempts to identify the key "markers of geoengineering", which are:  i) 
the scale (global or continental); ii) the intent  (the deliberate nature of the action rather than a 
side effect of it) (Schelling 1996), and iii) the degree to which the action is a countervailing 
measure (Keith 2000)                                                                               
                                                            , that they "could have substantive 
unintended effects that cross national boundaries".  
In fact, as we will see next, the attempt to untangle the ambiguities associated with the term 
through the identification of this key characteristic of geoengineering actions generates even 
more obscurity in an already clouded field. This becomes particularly evident when we take into 
account how uncertainty surrounding geoengineering is addressed across the IPCC AR5 and 
how the confidence scale
ix
 is used to synthesise author team's judgements about the validity of 
findings in the field. In fact, on the rare occasions where a high or very high level of confidence 
is assigned to a finding concerning geoengineering, either it refers to the uncertainties about the 
potential of these technologies to counteract climate change or it refers to the their almost 
certain side effects that are "difficult if not impossible to forecast" (IPCC 2014c). The following 
five quotations are illustrative of this (Box 2):  
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"There is robust agreement among models and high confidence that the compensation between GHG 
warming and SRM cooling is imprecise" (IPCC 2013b, 635). 
"There is only limited evidence on the potential of geoengineering by CDR or solar radiation 
management (SRM) to counteract climate change, and all techniques carry risks and uncertainties (high 
confidence)" (IPCC 2014d, 7). 
"The level of confidence on the effects of both CDR and SRM methods on carbon and other 
biogeochemical cycles is very low" (IPCC 2013b, 552). 
"The knowledge base on the implementation of SRM and CDR techniques and associated risks is 
presently insufficient. Comparative assessments suggest that the main ocean-related geoengineering 
approaches are very costly and have large environmental footprints (high confidence, Boyd, 2008; 
Vaughan and Lenton, 2011; Russell et al., 2012)" (Pörtner et al. 2014, 43). 
"Depending on the level of the overshoot, overshoot scenarios typically rely on the availability and 
widespread deployment of BECCS and afforestation in the second half of the century. The availability 
and scale of these and other Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies and methods are uncertain 
and CDR technologies and methods are, to varying degrees, associated with challenges and risks  (high 
confidence)" (IPCC 2014e, 13). 
Box 2: What is known and unknown about the potential of geoengineering technologies to counteract 
climate change and about their unintended side effects.  
 
Thus, there seems to be a clear inconsistency between the definition of geoengineering 
presented in the IPCC AR5 and the main findings presented by the three WG. Would it make 
sense to review the definition of geoengineering accordingly? What level of scientific credibility 
could be attached to geoengineering were it to be defined as a set o technologies and methods 
that intent to manipulate the climate system to counteract climate change, but whose potential 
to achieve this goal is still imprecise and whose unintended side effects of large-scale are 
difficult if not impossible to forecast?   
Moreover, the option to use in this same definition two words with the very opposite meaning 
("deliberately" and "unintended") translates much of what has been said about the ignorance 
generated by science and reflects the growing awareness of the new unresolved problems that 
arise in the context of scientific and technological applications. But bringing these issues into 
the very definition of geoengineering is nevertheless surprising, particularly if we consider the 
scale to which those intended and unintended effects refer to. What account of science and 
technology can be grasped from a field that defines itself as the intentional intervention in the 
global climate system to counteract the unintended effects of greenhouse emissions, and which 
may carry unintended (and unknown) large-scale side effects? And given this definition, what 
can be said about the research objects of geoengineering? As M. Carrier and A. Nordmann have 
pointed out "on the technoscientific account, it is no longer possible even to construe objects 
like the hole in the ozone-layer or the cancer-mouse as natural. They have been created by 
humans but they constitute objects of scientific research all the same" (Carrier and Nordmann 
2011, 4). 
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2.2 Geoengineering across the three Working Groups contributions to the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report  
As suggested by the participants of the IPCC Expert Meeting on Geoengineering, the 
assessment of geoengineering technologies across the three WG contributions to the IPCC AR5 
is presented "within the context of the risks and impacts of climate change and other responses 
to climate change, rather than in isolation" (IPCC 2012, 4). Accordingly, the physical science 
basis of CDR and SRM is assessed in Chapters 6 (Carbon and other Biogeochemical cycles)  
and 7 (Clouds and Aerosols) of AR5 WGI report, while additional impacts of  geoengineering 
proposals on human and natural systems are assessed in Chapters 6 (Ocean Systems) and  19 
(Emergent risks and key vulnerabilities) of WGII contribution to AR5. The social, economic 
and ethical implications of geoengineering are assessed in section 3.7.7 of AR5 WGIII report. 
Further, section 6.9 of AR5 WGIII report discusses how the use of geoengineering methods can 
change the relationships between GHG emissions and radiative forcing and their potential role 
in the context of transformation pathways. Lastly, Chapter 13 (International Cooperation: 
Agreements and Instruments) assesses the special case of geoengineering governance. 
One of the aspects that drew special attention to the WGI contribution to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC was the inclusion of the topic of geoengineering in the final paragraph of the 
"Summary for Policymakers" (SPM) — perhaps one of the most-read sections of this report 
series (Box 3). 
"Methods that aim to deliberately alter the climate system to counter climate change, termed 
geoengineering, have been proposed. Limited evidence precludes a comprehensive quantitative 
assessment of both Solar Radiation Management (SRM) and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and 
their impact on the climate system. CDR methods have biogeochemical and technological limitations 
to their potential on a global scale. There is insufficient knowledge to quantify how much CO2 
emissions could be partially offset by CDR on a century timescale. Modelling indicates that SRM 
methods, if realizable, have the potential to substantially offset a global temperature rise, but they 
would also modify the global water cycle, and would not reduce ocean acidification. If SRM were 
terminated for any reason, there is high confidence that global surface temperatures would rise very 
rapidly to values consistent with the greenhouse gas forcing. CDR and SRM methods carry side 
effects and long-term consequences on a global scale" (IPCC 2013c, 29). 
 Box 3- Reference to geoengineering in the last paragraph of the Summary for Policymakers (SPM) of the 
Working Group I contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (WGI AR5). 
Although this paragraph seems intended to convey the alleged policy neutrality
x
 of the IPCC, its 
very presence at the end of the Summary for Policymakers raised several concerns as to the new 
scientific status that geoengineering appears to have acquired, the way it was prematurely 
placed on the climate change agenda as a legitimate topic of debate and, thereby, the political 
leverage that can be exercised over geoengineering research and deployment (ETC Group 2014, 
Stilgoe 2014) - Box 4.  
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"In the scientific world, a final paragraph is often the place to put caveats and suggestions for further 
research. In the political world, a final paragraph is a coda, a big finish, the place for a triumphant, 
standing-ovation-inducing summary. The IPCC tries to straddle both worlds. The addition of the 
word "geoengineering" to the most important report on climate change for six years counts as a big 
surprise (...) There is an argument that the taboo has already been broken and that, like sex education, 
it therefore has to be discussed. Those of us interested in geoengineering were expecting it to appear 
in one or two of the main reports when they are published in the coming months. To bring it up front 
is to give it premature legitimacy"(Stilgoe 2014). 
Box 4 - Excerpt of the post "Why has geoengineering been legitimised by the IPCC?" published on the 
Political Science blog hosted by The Guardian. 
But the most interesting aspect of this paragraph is that it reflects much of the approach 
followed by the AR5 author teams to present the key findings of the assessment of 
geoengineering  techniques and their judgments about the validity of those findings.  In  fact, 
the almost absence of quantified measures of uncertainty to communicate the degree of certainty 
in the assessment of CDR and SRM methods, and the option to assign a confidence level to 
speculative conditional sentences are two aspects of the geoengineering assessment in the AR5 
that deserve closer attention. The emphasis on the side effects of CDR and SRM methods is also 
a key feature of all three WG contributions to the IPCC AR5 that deserves equal consideration. 
In the remaining part of this section we will focus our attention on these three aspects in order to 
address the key questions presented in the beginning of this chapter.  
When assessing geoengineering technologies, the option to use the quantitative likelihood  scale 
to describe a probabilistic estimate of the occurrence of a specific outcome is confined to CDR 
methods, particularly when referring to their side effects on carbon and other biogeochemical 
cycles, or to biogeochemical and technological limitations to their potential. An example of this 
can be seen in Chapter 6 of AR5 WGI report - Box 5.  
 T   ‘              ’                             is likely to diminish the effectiveness of all the CDR 
methods". 
"Uncertainties make it difficult to quantify how much CO2 emissions could be offset by CDR on a 
human time scale, although it is likely that CDR would have to be deployed at large-scale for at least 
one century to be able to significantly reduce atmospheric CO2. In addition, it is virtually certain that 
the removal of CO2 by CDR will be partially offset by outgassing of CO2 from the ocean and land 
ecosystems". 
Box 5- The likelihood of specific outcomes associated with CDR methods.
xi
 
 
Despite the i) low level of confidence on the effectiveness of these methods, ii) the limited 
evidence on the potential for large-scale deployment of these technologies and iii) their 
unpredictable (but almost certain) side effects and long-term consequences on a global scale the 
Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios
xii
, used as a basis for future projections 
in the AR5, already include some CDR methods. In fact, long-term mitigation scenarios 
typically rely on the availability and widespread use of bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS) and large-scale afforestation in the second half of the century. The political 
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implications of this are clear, as recognised by IPCC WGII: "the increasing dependence of 
pathways on CDR options reduces the ability of policymakers to hedge risks freely across the 
mitigation technology portfolio".  But what does this tell us about the assumptions underlying 
RCPs with lower radiative forcing levels? What imaginaries of science and technology inform 
these RCPs? What visions of nature are embedded in these scenarios? What images of the 
relationship between man and nature are portrayed in the overshoot scenarios?  
But perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects of the assessment of geoengineering conducted 
by WGI refers to the level of confidence assigned to conditional sentences in order to 
communicate the degree of certainty in key findings (Box 6).  
"Theory, model studies and observations suggest that some Solar Radiation Management (SRM) 
methods, if practicable, could substantially offset a global temperature rise and partially offset some 
other impacts of global warming, but the compensation for the climate change caused by GHGs would 
be imprecise (high confidence)" (IPCC 2013b, 574). 
"If SRM were terminated for any reason, a rapid increase in surface temperatures (within a decade or 
two) to values consistent with the high GHG forcing would result (high confidence)" (IPCC 2013b, 
635). 
Box 6 - Statements of WGI to the AR5.  
What can we infer from these statements?  Can they be considered policy-relevant? If so, what 
scientific basis do they provide for policymakers?  
If we now return to our initial questions we have to conclude that, although we have long since 
recognised the severe limitations of the mechanistic paradigm informed by the Cartesian belief 
in scientific truth, our worldview in still entrenched in it. And this is so because the "alternative" 
understanding of scientific knowledge    the systemic paradigm  that recognises that all 
scientific concepts and theories are limited and approximate, that science can never provide any 
complete and definitive understanding and that we always deal with limited and approximate 
knowledge  (Capra and Luisi 2014)    has yet to recognise that there is no point in post-normal 
science problems in trying to emulate the mechanistic and reductionist views of classical 
physics in its control of uncertainty (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990).  This is one of the paradoxes 
of our time. Indeed, the attempt to communicate uncertainties with the traditional language of 
science seems to run into a profound contradiction: how can we address what is not fully known 
in a scientific problem with the same (and expected?) quantitative scientific tools and concepts 
that are used to communicate what is known? Science is by definition related to knowledge and 
what can be logically and rationally explained. In this attempt to understand system 
uncertainties, to explain the inexactness of scientific knowledge and to communicate the limits 
of what can be known science has primarily been using numerical language, the language of 
objectivity, namely what we have been educated to think of as the language of precision. The 
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risk is clear: we may have been led to overestimate what we know about uncertainty and to 
underestimate the inexactness, unreliability and – most of all – our ignorance of it.  
Moreover, the pressure of practice under which science operates today is giving rise to the 
emergence of new objects of research through which we gain a new understanding and control 
of nature (Carrier and Nordmann 2011, Carrier 2011). As the assessment of geoengineering 
technologies in the IPCC AR5 demonstrates, the techno-scientific framing of climate change, 
although involving different ways of perceiving ma ’              ‘               ’  is giving 
                                                                          ’               
nature. 
3. The Geoengineering worldview: halfway between the Cartesian dream and the 
Cartesian nightmare? 
In the mid-1980s, when the Earth System Sciences Committee of the NASA Advisory Council 
put forward a more complete and unified approach to Earth studies – Earth System Science – a 
new way of understanding and analysing the Earth system began to gain ground among 
scientific institutions around the world. Fundamental to this approach is a view of the Earth 
system as a related set of interacting processes operating on a wide range of spatial and temporal 
scales, rather than as a collection of individual components. Several factors have combined to 
stimulate this new approach to Earth studies and global change: the maturity of the traditional 
Earth science disciplines, developments in remote sensing systems and related earth observation 
activities, advances in conceptual and numerical models of Earth system processes, and the 
recognition of the growing role of human activity in global change (ESSC 1988, 1986). 
A few years after NASA acknowledged the need to strengthen international cooperation for a 
truly worldwide study of the Earth, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and 
Agenda 21 (a comprehensive plan of action to facilitate the transition towards the goal of truly 
sustainable development), unanimously adopted by 178 Governments at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), gave a major boost to the 
development of an integrated approach to sustainable development and for the interdisciplinary 
focus of Earth system science and global change (Johnson, Ruzek, and Kalb 1997).   
The next important step towards a holistic perception of the Earth system as a whole was taken 
in 2001 with the establishment of the Earth System Science Partnership (ESSP), which has 
brought together the four international global change research programmes: DIVERSITAS, the 
International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP), the International Human Dimensions 
Programme (IHDP), and the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP)xiii.  
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The orchestrated effort to integrate disciplinary knowledge, insights and understanding of parts 
       E                   E                                               ‘                
                      ’  S         ‘                                  ’    is new system of 
global environmental science is today presented as the key to implementing any approach 
towards global sustainability (Steffen et al. 2004). 
‘T                                         E                                      
but also a new system of science … 
Human-driven changes are pushing the Earth System beyond its natural operating 
domain into planetary terra incognita. Management strategies for global sustainability 
are urgently required. Earth System science is the key to implementing any 
approach towards good planetary management, as it can provide critical insights 
into the feasibility, risks, trade-                                            ’ (The 
Global Environmental Change Programmes 2011, 23-27, emphasis added). 
This new way of understanding and studying the Earth system, the recognition that humanity 
itself has become a global geophysical force, allied with new approaches and a growing 
commitment to achieving successful and effective planetary stewardship, are leading to a 
profound reorientation of the global environmental change research agenda, thereby opening up 
a wide range of new practices, techniques and mechanisms for global governance (Lövbrand, 
Stripple, and Wiman 2009). 
‘T                                 e time interval in which human activities now rival 
global geophysical processes, suggests that we need to fundamentally alter our 
relationship with the planet we inhabit. Many approaches could be adopted, ranging 
from geoengineering solutions that purposefully manipulate parts of the Earth System to 
                                                       ’ (Steffen et al. 2011, 739). 
It is against this background that the idea of geoengineering, as a potential new tool for 
addressing climate change, is gaining ground. In fact, each new step in the direction of an 
integrated Earth System Science seems to have reinforced the plausibility of geoengineering 
                                           “                                 ” (Steffen and 
Tyson 2001)                                                                      “         
                                                     ” (Scott 2012) should consist of a 
critical examination of the salient narratives that captured the shift in the relationship between 
humans and the global environment, in order to suggest the beginning of a potentially new 
geological epoch in which human beings appear to have become a driving force in the evolution 
of the planet and geoengineering starts to look acceptable in preventing the worst effects of 
climate change.  
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